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Introduction and Overview 
 
Poverty and unemployment are two of the greatest issues facing developing nations 
today. This dissertation contains four essays addressing these topics on various levels 
as they relate to Indonesia and the developing world.  The first two essays analyse the 
regional and individual persistence of unemployment while the third essay explores 
the appropriate design and scale of the cash transfer program; the final essay presents 
an alternative to the international poverty line and compares it to the official “dollar a 
day revisited” at 1.25 dollars per day that is used by the World Bank. The first three 
papers focus on the Indonesian case while the last one relates to developing countries. 
Essay 1 entitled “The Hysteresis versus Persistence Hypotheses on Regional 
Unemployment Rates in Indonesia, 1990-2012”. It applies time-series and panel unit 
root frameworks during the period of 1990–2012 to prove the hysteresis or 
persistence hypothesis of the provincial unemployment rates in Indonesia. The 
analyses also consist of the provincial unemployment rates by total and categorised 
subgroups: gender, age, education, location in urban or rural areas, and their gaps. The 
results show that the changed definition of unemployment in 2001 by the Indonesian 
Central Body of Statistics (CBS) and the choice of using linear or quadratic trends play a 
significant role in the empirical results. On the one side, most of the individual 
provincial tests using linear trends and the CBS definition cannot reject the hysteresis 
hypothesis. Oppositely, there are increasing rejections of the hysteresis if the tests use 
quadratic trends and the old definition (U1). The main results from the tests by 
categorical gaps suggest rejecting the hysteresis hypothesis as well. When examining 
the results using panel data, the majority of the tests reject the hysteresis both using 
linear and quadratic trends.  
This essay contributes to the empirical studies of the persistence of regional 
unemployment, especially in Indonesia. As a comprehensive empirical study, it 
analyses not only the provincial unemployment rate in total but also the 
unemployment rate by categories and their categorical gaps. It also includes the 
effects of the changed definition of unemployment. Methodologically, it compares the 
test choices between linear and quadratic trends on the several different methods 
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such as: Dickey-Fuller (1979), Elliot, et. al. (1996), Ayat and Burridge (2000) and Zivot 
and Andrews (1992) for provincial data and Im, et. al. (2003), Pesaran (2007) and Levin 
et. al. (2002) for panel data analysis. 
Essay 2 entitled “Persistence of Individual Unemployment in Indonesia: 
Dynamic Probit Analysis from Panel Susenas 2008-2010”. It compares a variety of 
dynamic random effects estimators, especially from the Heckman (1981) and 
Wooldridge (2005) approaches. This essay proves that there is strong evidence of the 
implications of an individual’s previous unemployment experience for his/her future 
labour market experience which is consistent with the state dependence in 
unemployment or the theory of scar unemployment. In addition, the consequences of 
including control variables or observable heterogeneity, unobservable heterogeneity, 
and initial conditions in the models, the effects of the variables in the household 
formation and the external support become weaker or insignificant. Meanwhile the 
variables regarding the family support play a significant role in the current 
unemployment status. The probability of being unemployed increases if the individuals 
are males and live in urban areas and it decreases if they are married. However, the 
level of education is insignificant to the probability of being unemployed due to the 
low level of education attainment which is on average of 8 years of schooling.  
This essay contributes to the empirical literature by analysing the first empirical 
evidence of individual persistent unemployment for the case of Indonesia through 
employing the first and latest round of the consistent panel data from the Susenas 
surveys. Even though the estimation methods are similar to those previous empirical 
studies in the developed countries (such as the USA, UK, and Germany), the empirical 
models here introduce some new variables such as: family support, household 
formation, and external (government or non government) support in addition to of 
individual’s education, gender, age and marital status.      
Essay 3 entitled “Issues on Targeting and Designing the Amount of Grant for 
the Cash Transfer Programs in Indonesia”. This essay aims to investigate who gets the 
cash transfer programs in Indonesia and to provide better options for the amount of 
grant compared to the fixed universal grant applied by Indonesian government 
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recently. Despite a significant number of mis-targeting in the BLT and PKH programs, 
the probit estimates of these programs’ recipients show that the poor households, the 
household characteristics relating to the poor conditions, and receiving the other 
social benefits, have significant effects to the probability of receiving the programs. 
Furthermore, this essay examines two alternative options that should be used as 
guidelines by decision-makers for the amount of grant compared to the government’s 
fixed universal grant. The first is making the amount equal to the value of the poor 
family’s income deficit plus the expected inflation. The second is making the value of 
the cash transfer amount equal to a province’s representative value (75th percentile) of 
the income deficit plus its expected inflation. These two options decrease the poverty 
rates significantly. Therefore, this essay contributes to the alternative designs for the 
amount of grant on the cash transfer programs in Indonesia as well as other 
developing countries.      
The final essay or Essay 4 entitled “Dollar a day Re-revisited”. It revisits the 
derivation of the new international poverty line proposed by Ravallion, Chen, and 
Sangraula (2009). First, we emphasize that it is critical to estimate the relationship with 
respect to the log of per capita consumption as only that relationship actually shows a 
structural break which is at the heart of the issue of an absolute international poverty 
line. When doing so, all our estimates generate a significantly larger reference group 
for the estimation of the international poverty line. Our best estimate for the 
threshold model stands at $1.45 per day. Of course, this would lead to a higher global 
poverty count than that of the new $1.25 poverty line. In fact, in 2005, we would now 
be looking at 1.74 billion absolutely poor in the world if we adopted that procedure for 
finding the new international poverty line. This essay contributes to the debate on the 




The findings of all essays in this dissertation may have some policy implications for the 
local and central governments’ economic policies in Indonesia. The findings in Essay I 
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suggest to promote the investment policies and managing the growth of real regional 
minimum wages to reduce the persistence of unemployment rates in the local labour 
markets rather than increase the local government expenditures or rely on the local 
economic growths.  
Moreover, most of Indonesian labour force has low education or about 8 years 
in average of schooling and they graduated from primary and secondary general 
education. This makes education variable insignificantly influence the probability of 
being unemployed which has mentioned in the results of Essay 2. However, promoting 
and creating more medium and high vocational schools would be a good policy since 
the labour forces graduated from this kind of education have lower unemployment 
rates compared to general education which has mentioned in the results of Essay 1. 
This policy will increase the skills of the labour forces and hopefully will decrease their 
probability of being unemployed in the future. 
 The results in essay 3 support the Indonesian government to revise the 
database for the social protection programs in 2008, called PPLS 2008. This is the main 
database for the cash transfer programs in Indonesia during 2008-2010. The support 
for a revision is based on the facts that there is a significant number of the cash 
transfer recipients come from the non-poor or non-intended households. The 
government eventually has created the newest database for the social protection 
programs, called PPLS 2011. Furthermore, the results in Essay 3 also suggest the 
government to make a new design of the cash transfer amounts which the social-
economic conditions, living costs, and locations of the targeted households are taken 
into account. 
 The last policy implication comes from Essay 4 which suggests for revising the 
absolute international poverty line from $1.25 to $1.45 a day. This new international 
poverty line would have consequences for the progress on the Millennium 
Development Goals (MGDs), especially the first goal, Eradicate Extreme Poverty and 
Hunger. It also has consequences for creating the new sustainable development goals 
post-2015 in which some of the goals may be related to global poverty calculation.       
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Essay 1: The Hysteresis versus Persistence Hypotheses on Regional 





This paper presents the tests of hysteresis versus persistence hypotheses of provincial 
unemployment rates in Indonesia by applying time-series and panel unit root analyses 
during the past 23-year period from 1990 to 2012. The tests consist of the 
unemployment rates analysed in subgroups: gender, age, education, location in urban 
or rural areas, and their gaps. The results show that the changed definition of 
unemployment in 2001 by the Indonesian Central Body of Statistics (CBS) and the 
testing choices between linear and quadratic trends play a significant role on the 
empirical results. On the one side, most of the individual provincial tests using linear 
trends and CBS definition cannot reject the hysteresis hypothesis. On the other side, 
there are increasing rejections of the hysteresis if the tests use quadratic trends and 
the old definition (U1). The main results from the tests by categorical gaps suggest 
rejecting the hysteresis hypothesis as well. When examining the results using panel 
data, the majority of the tests reject the hysteresis both using linear and quadratic 
trends. Lastly, the local economic policies that can be used to promote investment and 
managing the growth of real regional minimum wages are more favourable than 
increasing local government expenditure in order reduce the unemployment rates and 
the adjustments to their normal levels in local labour markets.                
  
Keywords: hysteresis, persistent unemployment, sakernas, unit root test, panel unit 
root test. 
 





Local economies in Indonesia have been extensively developed since the reform era. 
Larger regional autonomy in economic development policies and fiscal decentralisation 
has been implemented since the economic crisis of the late 1990s. However, the 
economic heterogeneity of these local economies seems to be a natural consequence 
of the geographical factor of an archipelago country and their initial development. 
Therefore, so-called “national economic performances” might not reflect their regional 
economic performances, including unemployment rates. Thus, the “national 
unemployment rates” may not reveal the full situation in provinces’ unemployment 
rates. We therefore need a comprehensive study for unemployment and its 
persistence not only at the national level but also at the regional level.  
Unemployment persistence has been a concern for many economists since the 
high unemployment rates in European countries in 1980s and 1990s. In aggregate 
unemployment, Blanchard and Summers (1986) explored the idea of the 
unemployment hysteresis and persistence. Barro (1988) assessed the extent of 
unemployment persistence using a time-series approach. Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) 
provided a theoretical model explaining the persistence of regional unemployment.  
There are many studies about persistence of unemployment around developed 
countries but only few for the cases in developing countries, especially Indonesia. The 
persistence of unemployment in Indonesia was recently studied by Soekarni, et. al. 
(2009). The study used national and regional data. However, regional data only 
consisted of west and east Indonesia instead of all provinces. They concluded that 
there was disequilibrium persistent unemployment without self-correcting 
mechanisms in Indonesia from 1994 to 2006. Moreover, the west region was more 
persistent than the east region. 
It is necessary to expand the study not only for comprehensive aggregate 
evidences in gender, age group, level of education, and rural urban but also for their 
gaps. Therefore, this shall be carried out to test the hysteresis or persistence 
hypotheses of regional unemployment rates in Indonesia by all divisions of 
unemployment rates and their gaps as mentioned previously.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
In general, there are two definitions of unemployment persistence in macroeconomics. 
First, the unemployment persistence can be understood as an unemployment level 
that reaches higher and higher and then eventually levels off (Elmeskov, 1993). Second, 
it can also be said to be the slow adjustment to its equilibrium level of unemployment 
under the influence of its previous path of unemployment or time-dependence 
(Lindbeck, 1993, Panigo, et. al., 2004).  
The last interpretation comes from the econometric literature originally used 
by Blanchard and Summers (1986) which is based on a unit root test analysis of time-
series variables of unemployment rate. This interpretation could be modelled as 
following equation: 
(1.1)  𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝜌𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡    
where 𝑢𝑛𝑡 is the current unemployment rate, 𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 is the first lagged unemployment 
rate and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term. The coefficient ρ ≥ 0 would be defined as the persistence 
effect. Based on the hysteresis hypothesis, the coefficient ρ would be equal to one or 
called as a unit-root in a time-series analysis. It means that the future behaviour of the 
unemployment would be equal to the previous value plus/minus a random variation. 
This would imply that the unemployment rate is also a random walk or a non 
stationary process (Dickey and Fuller, 1976, Panigo, et. al., 2004). 
The hysteresis should not be confused with persistence. Persistence implies 
that, even though the adjustment towards the equilibrium level is slow, 
unemployment still shows mean reversion then ρ should lay between zero and one. 
Thus, persistence might be known as a special case of the natural rate hypothesis in 
which unemployment is a stationary process. Therefore, macroeconomic policy would 
have long lasting but not permanent effects under persistence but it would have 
permanent effects in hysteresis (Leon-Ladesma, 2002). 
The empirical studies in the 1980s found that the wage determination 
behaviour of insiders as a possible reason for hysteresis in European and US economies 
(Blanchard and Summers, 1986); unionization and the size of government had positive 
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effects on persistence among the economies that lacked a centralized structure of 
labour bargaining (Barro, 1988). From the 1990s until recently, most empirical studies 
stated that wage rigidities, structural shocks and institutions were usually the better 
explanations for the persistence in European unemployment (Elmeskov, 1993; 
Blanchard and Jimeno, 1995; Bianchi and Zoega, 1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, 
Blanchard, 2006). Long periods of unemployment would reduce an individual’s 
employability due to the loss of  human capital and productivity deterioration, then 
causing them to become permanently unemployed (Pissarides, 1992).     
Moving to the research findings on regional unemployment persistence, Jimeno 
and Bentolila (1998) provided a theoretical model and empirical evidence to explain 
regional unemployment persistence in Spain (see also Murillo, et al., 2005). They 
explained that a demand shock in the labour market was the main cause of the 
persistence of regional unemployment in the country. Other research findings were 
provided by Song and Wu (1997) and Leon-Ladesma (2002) for the case of US states, 
Leon-Ladesma and Mc Adam (2004) for the cases in European transition countries, 
Panigo, et. al. (2004) for Argentina, Bornhorst and Commander (2006) for six transition 
countries in Europe, Wu (2003) for China, and Soekarni, et. al. (2009) for Indonesia. In 
the two latest works, they also presented the determining factors of the persistence in 
regional unemployment. According to Wu (2003), the higher the share of industry 
output by state sector, the higher the regional unemployment persistence. The private 
sector was the main employment destination for the jobless and had acted to reduce 
unemployment persistence. On the other side, Soekarni, et. al. (2009) stated that the 
shares of manufacturing and service sectors on regional outputs were the causes of 
regional unemployment persistence.  
Investigating the specific characteristic of unemployment, Azmat, et al. (2006) 
and Queneau and Sen (2007, 2009) explored the persistence of gender gaps in 
unemployment rates in OECD countries. Queneau and Sen (2009) measured the 
gender unemployment gap as the difference between the female and male 
unemployment rates. Their empirical evidence implied that any shock to the gender 
unemployment gaps were relatively persistent in most countries except Finland and 
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Italy. However, in another paper, Queneau and Sen (2007) introduced the ratio of the 
female to male unemployment rates as the gender gaps measurement. Their empirical 
evidence showed that the gender unemployment gaps were not persistent for all 
countries in their sample except for Australia.  
Wu (2003) also proved that youth unemployment was less persistent than total 
unemployment in China. However, this is not quite comparable because youth 
unemployment is already included in total unemployment. Youth unemployment 
should be compared to older people’s unemployment. This paper compares the 
comprehensive results of national and regional unemployment rates in Indonesia 
based on: gender, age groups, level of education, and urban or rural location. 
 
1.3 Labour Situation in Indonesia 
1.3.1 Change in Definition and Its Consequence 
The labour market situation in developing countries, especially in Indonesia, is quite 
different from the labour market in developed countries. Let us begin with the 
definition of unemployment and how it has changed in Indonesia during the period of 
1990-2012. Table 1.1 presents the major change of the CBS definition of 
unemployment prior and since 2001. Prior to 2001, unemployment was defined as not 
working and actively looking for a job in the previous week (U1) which is relatively 
similar to the standard International Labour Organization’s (ILO) definition that is 
followed by most of developed countries. But since 2001 three additional groups have 
been included in the unemployment definition, namely: a person establishing a new 
business (U2), discouraged (U3), and those who have a job but have not yet started 
(U4).  
Some claimed that CBS has changed the definition of unemployment from a 
well-defined period as “not working and looking for a job during the previous week” to 
“not working and looking for a job” since Sakernas 1994 (see for example: Manning 
and Junankar, 1998, Dhanani, 2004, and Suryadarma, et. al., 2007). This is not entirely 
true due to the following reasons. First, the question on “have you been looking for a 
job” on the questionnaire of Indonesian National Labour Force Survey (Sakernas) is not 
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explicitly followed by the phrase “during the previous week” because there is a 
heading statement with capital letters "the activities during the previous week" as the 
title of Part IV section B. This has been especially noted since Sakernas 2001. Second, 
the question on "activities during the previous week" is explicitly and consistently 
asked for “working”. Because unemployment is a sub-division from working, the exact 
definition of unemployment by CBS would be “not working --in the previous week-- 
and actively looking for a job --either in the previous week or longer--. Thus, this 
implicit meaning of “during the previous week” should be included in the question of 
“have you been looking for a job”. However, such claims by Manning and Junankar 
(1998) and others could be true if the surveyors in the field do not inform this to the 
respondents so that the interpretation of the question "have you been looking for a 
job" is no longer in the context of "during the previous week" meanwhile the implicit 
answer for “not working” is always in the context of “during the previous week”1
 
. 
Table 1.1 Changes on Unemployment Definition by Indonesia’s CBS 
Prior to 2001  Since 2001 
U1= Not working and actively looking for a  
job 
 U1  =  Not working and actively looking for a job 
U2 = Not working and not looking for a job but 
establish a new business 
U3 = Not working and not looking for a job, and not 
establish a new business but reason for not 
looking for job is “discouraged” 
U4 = Not working and not looking for a job and not 
establish a new business but reason for not 
looking for job is have a job but have not 
started yet 
Note: Reasons for not looking for job: the actual answer for discouraged is “feel that it is impossible to get a job”. The same 
answer could be traced back to Sakernas 1999-2000. The similar answer could be also noticed on Sakernas 1995-1998 as 
“hopeless”. Since 2007: CBS explicitly wrote a footnote what is the explanation for the answer in the questionnaire as “a reason 
for looking job many times but do not get a job. Or for those who feel impossible to get a suitable job due to the 
situation/condition/climate/seasonal”. 
 
Prior to 1994 and using the old definition, national unemployment rates were 
relatively stable at 2-3 percent. In 1994, unemployment rates increased quite 
significantly from 2.79 percent to 4.36 percent. In 1995, CBS used the Inter-Censal 
Population Survey (SUPAS) instead of Sakernas data since it had more than twice as 
                                                          
1 There are two questions about looking for a job in Sakernas 2007. One is an alternative answer for the 
question “what did you do during the previous week” besides working, schooling, housekeeping, and 
other activities. The other is an independent question for “have you been looking for job” which is the 
based question for calculating unemployment by CBS.      
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many observations and resulted in the unemployment rate jumping to 7.02 percent. 
After 1995, CBS used Sakernas data again and unemployment rates remained stable at 
4-6 percent until 2000. In 2001 with the new definition, the unemployment rate 
increased by more than 2 percent to 8.10 percent. This would correspond to 5.54 
percent using the old definition. However, only the definition of discouraged labour 
forces (U3) could be traced back until 1995. Using the combination of the old definition 
(U1) plus U3, the unemployment rate in 2001 was 7.58 percent, lower than the highest 
at 13.90 percent in 2000. So, the new CBS definition is dominated by U1 and U3 while 
U2 and U4 could be accounted as the differences between CBS and (U1+U3) on the 
Figure 1.1.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 National Unemployment Rates, 1990-2012 
 
1.3.2 Unemployment in the Period of Economic Crisis 
A question might also be emerged, especially during the economic crisis period 
particularly in year 1998, when the economic growth sunk to -13.1 percent but why 
was unemployment rate relatively low at 5.46 percent by CBS definition or 6.18 
percent by U1 plus U3 definition? The answers for this could be explained in Table 1.2. 
The table shows the changes in the working population from 1997 to 2000. Compared 
to 1997, the total working population in 1998 increased by 3.46 million with 










1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
CBS U1 U1 plus U3
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closer look showed that all employment sectors decreased except for the agriculture, 
transportation and communication sectors. In total, about 2.39 million were displaced 
because of the crisis in which the manufacturing sector suffered most at 1.07 million 
unemployed. On the other hand, there were about 4.6 million additional absorptions 
in agricultural, livestock, forestry, and fishing sectors. It could be concluded that the 
economic crisis did not greatly affect unemployment rates because of the increase of 
employment absorption in the agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing sectors. 
However the displaced workers might also have gone to school to pursue higher skills 
or simply became discouraged labour force.  
 
Table 1.2 Changes in Working Population during the Period of Economic Crisis  
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
CBS Alternative CBS Alternative CBS Alternative CBS Alternative 













































































 Unemployed: 4,183,971 4,842,759 5,045,260 5,751,888 6,030,319 8,606,247 5,813,231 14,560,159










Schooling 10,775,591 10,675,574 11,240,506 11,199,841 10,934,731 10,910,452 10,763,473 10,143,115 
House Keeping 25,804,437 25,477,734 25,173,849 24,998,444 25,857,621 24,753,385 25,275,187 19,699,558 
Others 8,737,435 8,505,367 9,251,557 8,760,999 9,456,887 8,009,474 9,481,184 6,930,243 
Note: One province (Maluku) in Sakernas 2000 was not surveyed. Sector 1-9: (1) agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing; (2) 
mining and quarrying; (3) manufacture; (4) electricity, gas, and water; (5) construction, (6) trade, hotel, and restaurant; (7) 
transportation and communication; (8) financial, real estate and business services; (9) services.  
Sources: Sakernas, 1997-2000 (author’s calculation). 
 
In 1999 when the effects of crisis had been tackled, the manufacturing sector 
had recovered and absorbed an additional 1.6 million workers. This was more than half 
a million higher than its displaced number in 1998 while the agriculture sector 
absorption was reduced by about 0.77 million. It seemed that the workers who were 
displaced in 1998 had come back to manufacturing sector in 1999. However, the 
number of discouraged labour force increased to 1.87 million. This reached the highest 
peak at 8.75 million in 2000. As it is noticed in Figure 2.1, the unemployment rates by 
U1 plus U3 definition in 2000 would be the highest unemployment rate in history at 
13.90 percent. The highest U3 in 2000 was also temporary if we compare it to the 
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following’s year data in 2001 at 2.12 million. Around 6.63 million of discouraged 
unemployed went back to be employed or became actively looking for a job. Basically, 
the U3 calculation came from schooling, women who were housekeepers and other 
activities (such as: retirees and handicapped persons). In 2000, if we included U3 as the 
labour force then 8.7 million of U3 came from schooling (0.6 million), housekeeping 
(5.6 million), and others (2.5 million). 
 
1.3.3 Characteristics of Labour Force in Indonesia 
Table 1.3 presents the characteristics of the labour force in Indonesia during the period 
1990-2012. The composition of the employment rate based on gender was not very 
different from the male employment share at 59.70 percent of the total labour force in 
1990 and became 58.51 percent in 2012. The female employment share however, 
reduced from 37.75 percent to 35.36 percent in the same period. Employment rates by 
age were also relatively stable during the same period. In 1990, the youth employment 
share was at 21.20 percent and with a decreasing trend became 14.13 percent in 2012 
while adult employment share ranged between 76.25 – 79.73 percent. 
 A very different trend was found for the employment rate based on education. 
For more than 20 years of the surveys, the employment rate for low education 
decreased from 75.72 percent in 1990 to only 45.64 percent in 2012 while the 
employment rate for medium education increased from 19.90 percent to 39.80 
percent in the same period. The employment rate of high education also increased 
from 1.82 percent in 1990 to 8.43 percent in 2012. It was noticed in 2012 that workers 
with medium and high education have dominated the employment market. Even 
though this is a quite good achievement, there is still the great challenge of increasing 
the number of educated and skilled workers in the near future. 
 It was also found that there was significant mobility in the labour force, 
especially for workers moving from rural to urban areas. In 1990, there were 73.33 
percent of workers living in rural areas but only 49.27 percent in 2012. This would be 
consistent with the employment rate by sector in which sector 1 (agriculture, livestock, 
forestry, and fishing) dominated the labour market in 1990 at 53.70 percent but 
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became less dominant at 32.94 percent in 2012. Meanwhile the employment rate for 
manufacturing, trade, and service sectors (sector 3, 6, and 9) increased by about 11 
percent during the period of 1990-2012. 
 
Table 1.3 Characteristics of Labour Force in Indonesia 
Labour Force 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2008 2012 
Employment Rate 97.45 95.64 94.54 91.90 88.76 91.61 93.86 
by gender: 
       Male 59.70 58.72 58.12 57.82 58.04 57.08 58.51 
Female 37.75 36.91 36.42 34.08 30.72 34.53 35.36 
by age 
       Youth, 15-24 21.20 19.83 17.62 15.63 14.03 14.79 14.13 
Adult, 25+ 76.25 75.80 76.91 76.27 74.73 76.82 79.73 
by education: 
       Less and Primary School 75.72 68.87 61.90 56.23 49.18 49.43 45.64 
Junior/Senior High School - Vocational 6.20 7.20 7.54 7.57 6.92 6.91 8.85 
Junior/Senior High School - General 13.70 16.92 21.34 23.67 27.75 29.00 30.95 
Diploma 0.75 1.18 1.98 2.41 2.84 3.71 5.91 
University 1.07 1.47 1.79 2.01 2.07 2.57 2.52 
by location: 
       Urban 24.12 28.82 32.79 36.53 35.41 37.74 44.59 
Rural 73.33 66.81 61.75 55.37 53.35 53.87 49.27 
by status A): 
       Informal 69.72 63.54 63.41 65.00 64.17 66.43 59.73 
Formal 27.73 32.09 31.13 26.90 24.59 25.18 34.13 
by sector B): 
       Sector 1 53.70 43.49 42.39 40.22 39.02 36.92 32.94 
Sector 2 0.68 0.87 0.73 0.96 0.85 0.96 1.36 
Sector 3 9.94 12.69 10.74 12.23 11.29 11.21 13.02 
Sector 4 0.18 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.21 
Sector 5 2.72 4.24 3.81 3.88 4.31 4.86 5.75 
Sector 6 14.43 16.45 18.18 17.68 16.92 18.96 19.61 
Sector 7 3.07 4.02 4.49 4.50 5.34 5.52 4.23 
Sector 8 0.64 0.75 0.67 1.14 1.08 1.30 2.26 
Sector 9 12.08 12.90 13.36 11.14 9.76 11.70 14.49 
Unemployment Rate 2.55 4.36 5.46 8.10 11.24 8.39 6.14 
by definition: 
       U1 2.55 4.36 5.46 5.39 7.14 6.22 3.93 
U2 
   
0.16 0.06 0.15 0.11 
U3 
   
2.15 3.58 1.78 1.91 
U4 
   
0.40 0.45 0.25 0.19 
by gender: 
       Male 1.51 2.37 3.09 4.08 5.94 4.69 3.57 
Female 1.04 2.00 2.38 4.02 5.30 3.71 2.57 
by age 
       Youth, 15-24 1.84 3.13 3.65 4.95 7.05 4.49 3.44 
Adult, 25+ 0.71 1.24 1.82 3.14 4.19 3.90 2.70 
by education: 
       Less and Primary School 0.66 1.08 1.26 2.78 3.46 2.36 1.72 
Junior/Senior High School - Vocational 0.51 0.81 1.05 1.24 1.55 1.32 0.93 
Junior/Senior High School - General 1.22 2.10 2.69 3.54 5.56 3.85 2.95 
Diploma 0.08 0.21 0.27 0.29 0.37 0.53 0.37 
University 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.17 
by location: 
       Urban 1.54 2.57 3.35 4.51 5.87 4.63 3.70 
Rural 1.01 1.79 2.11 3.59 5.37 3.76 2.44 
Notes: all values as a percentage of total labour forces at respective year.  
A) Informal: (1) own account workers, employer assisted by temporary, unpaid and permanent workers; (2) unpaid workers; (3) 
casual employee in agriculture; (4) casual employee in non-agriculture. 
 B) Sector 1-9: (1) agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing; (2) mining and quarrying; (3) manufacture; (4) electricity, gas, and 
water; (5) construction, (6) trade, hotel, and restaurant; (7) transportation and communication; (8) financial, real estate and 
business services; (9) services. 
Sources: Sakernas, 1990-2012 (author’s calculation).           
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 Moreover, flexibility and mobility of workers were not only noticed from 
location but also from worker’s employment status. Informal workers have continued 
to dominate the labour market since 1990. In 1990, 69.72 percent of employees 
worked in the informal sector and continued to dominate until 2012 at 59.73 percent. 
The flexibility of workers’ movement was also found in time of economic crisis as 
mentioned previously, especially from the manufacturing to agricultural sectors, from 
formal paid to informal jobs, and from urban to rural areas.                      
Table 1.3 also shows unemployment rate by definition, gender, age, education 
and location. The new definition begun in 2001 in which U1 and U3 dominated the 
unemployment rate at 5.39 percent and 2.15 percent respectively. The unemployment 
rate reached its peak at 11.24 in 2005 in which U1 at 7.14 percent an U3 at 3.58 
percent. In 2012, the unemployment rate decreased as well as U1 at 3.93 percent and 
U3 at 1.91 percent of total labour force. As a summary, in 2012 the unemployment 
rate was dominated by males, youth, those with a middle education especially for 
general education, and urban areas.         
As a developing country, there is no unemployment benefit scheme in Indonesia 
even though after the Social Safety Net Law in 2004 (Law No. 40/2004) and the law for 
Social Safety Net Agencies in 2011 (Law No. 24/2011) in which a social safety net 
agency for labour force was introduced. The social safety net agency for labour force 
insures employees against accident, death, and retirement but not against being 
unemployed. In the post economic crisis, the central government mandated the 
regional government to regulate regional minimum wages. This development in the 
labour market coincided with the passing of others labour laws such as the Trade 
Union Law (No. 21/2000) for basic labour rights and freedom to create and become a 
member of a trade union. The Manpower Law (No. 13/2003) was passed for governing 
severance pay, minimum wage and contract work. The Industrial Disputed Resolution 
Law (No. 2/2004) was created to manage industrial disputation. The Law of Migrant 
Workers Overseas (No. 39/2004) was created to protect Indonesian workers overseas. 
In 2012, Indonesia passed the Law No. 6/2012 to ratify the international convention on 





The data used in this study consist of unemployment rates based on gender, age group, 
level of education, location (urban or rural) and their gaps. The gaps are calculated as 
the ratios not as the differences. The unemployment data will also be divided into 
national and provincial data which contain 26 or 33 provinces. The main source of data 
is the National Labour Force Survey (Sakernas) from the Central Body of Statistics-
Indonesia (CBS) except for in 1995 in which we use the Inter-Censal Population Survey 
(SUPAS). There are changes of the definition for unemployment rates by CBS, 
especially in 2001. Thus for the empirical analysis, the data consider both the old and 
the new definition. The time periods are 1990-2012 for 26 provinces and 2001-2012 
for 33 provinces. 
 
1.4.2 Method 
1.4.2.1 Time-Series –Unit Root Test 
At an aggregate macroeconomic level, the concept of persistent unemployment is 
known, with the idea that if an unexpected shock would increase or reduce the 
unemployment rate above or below its natural or normal level, the variable may stay 
above or below this level for an indeterminate period of time even when the causes of 
the change in the current level of unemployment have disappeared (Panigo, et al., 
2004).  
Testing for unemployment persistence is originally based on the idea of 
Blanchard and Summers (1986) as mentioned in equation (1.1). It uses an first-order 
autoregressive process or AR(1) to carry out the level of persistence. The coefficient of 
the AR(1) process will assume to be below one (persistence) or one (hysteresis). This 
method is exactly the same as the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test from Dickey-Fuller (1979). 
Dickey and Fuller formulated their test for the unit root by subtracting the left and 
right side in equation (1.1) by the lag of its dependent variable, or: 
(1.2) 𝑢𝑛𝑡 − 𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 = 𝛼+ 𝜌𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡      
(1.3) ∆𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡        
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where, 𝑢𝑛𝑡 is the variable of interest or unemployment rates at time-period t, ∆ is the 
first-difference operator, β = ρ-1 and ε is white noise disturbances. Then, we perform 
the DF test using t-statistics (called tau-statistics) to test if H0:β=0 which is equal to 
test ρ=1 (hysteresis) and H1: 𝛽<0 which is equally a test for ρ<1 (persistence). The 
model could also include a linear trend to DF test in equation (1.3). However, if we 
look back to Figure 1.1 and the other figures (see Appendix 1.1) which depict 
unemployment rates across provinces, then we see that most of the graphs do not 
follow linear but rather quadratic trends. Therefore, the unit root tests would follow 
these models: 
(1.4) ∆𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑+ 𝜀𝑡      
(1.5) ∆𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑+ 𝛾2𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑
2 + 𝜀𝑡     
(1.6) ∆𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑+ 𝛾2𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑
2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑝∆𝑢𝑛𝑡−𝑝
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑡. 
The included lags of the dependent variable on the right hand side of the model 
are to avoid serial correlation. It may appear that the test can be implemented by 
performing a t-statistics on the estimated coefficient of 𝑢𝑛𝑡−1 or 𝛽. However, the t-
statistics under the null hypothesis of a unit root does not have the conventional t-
distribution as showed by Dickey and Fuller (1979). They also simulated the critical 
values for selected sample sizes and tabulated, so called Dickey-Fuller t-statistics. 
MacKinnon (1991), however, implemented a larger set of simulations than those by 
Dickey and Fuller and approximated the response surface function using the simulation 
results. His tabulation allowed the calculation of Dickey-Fuller critical values for any 
sample size and for any number of right-hand variables.  
Nevertheless, Dickey-Fuller and MacKinnon distributions apply only for 
equation (1.3) and (1.4). Therefore, we have to make another Monte Carlo simulation 
by following a t-distribution for equation (1.5). We apply the tests by calling t-statistics 
as DF-c, DF-t, and DF-q from equation (1.3), (1.4), and (1.5) respectively. 
 
1.4.2.2 Panel Unit Root Test 
This paper also applies the panel unit root test that is proposed by Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (2003) to test for unemployment persistence because of regional 
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unemployment rates in Indonesia as mentioned before are various. The IPS method is 
basically based on the Dickey-Fuller test. Let  𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡 be the unemployment rate by 
province i = 1, 2, 3, ….., N at time t = 1, 2, ..., T . Then the dynamics of unemployment 
can be tested with the following Dickey-Fuller regression without a trend in term of 
panel data as: 
(1.7) 𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        
Again, if 𝜌𝑖 = 1 then we call it hysteresis for each i. On the other hand, if 𝜌𝑖 < 1 then it 
will be called persistence. To be clear, if ρ almost reaches 1, for example 0.9, then the 
unemployment rate is persistent. The dynamic process in equation (1.7) could also be 
rewritten by including lags of dependent variable and all deterministic parts: constant, 
linear trend and quadratic trend, called Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) as: 
(1.8) ∆𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑝∆𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝛽𝑖 = (𝜌 − 1)𝑖. The IPS panel tests the null hypothesis of unit root or H0: 𝛽𝑖 = 0 
for each i, while the alternative hypothesis is H1: 𝛽𝑖 < 0 also for each i. Testing 
(𝜌− 1)𝑖 in equation (1.8) is equivalent to the test of  𝜌𝑖 = 1 in equation (1.7) for each 
province with additional linear and quadratic trends. Note that the IPS test does not 
assume that all cross-sectional units converge towards the equilibrium value at the 
same speed, i.e. 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 𝜌3 = ⋯ = 𝜌𝑖 < 0. On the other hand, Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002) test for the common coefficient, 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌. To avoid cross-sectional correlation 
(CIPS) and unobserved heterogeneity, Pesaran (2007) and Pesaran, et. al. (2013) 
proposed the model with additional variables: averages of current lag and its lagged 
difference. The final test then with additional quadratic trend could be modelled as 
follows: 
(1.9) ∆𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖
2 + 𝛾3𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑡−1��������  + 𝛾4𝑖∆𝑢𝑛𝑡−1����������+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑢𝑛𝑡−1�������� and ∆𝑢𝑛𝑡−1���������� are averages of current lag of unemployment rate and its 
lagged difference.   
The research continues to find out the determining factors that affect the 
persistence via the models of Wu (2003) and Soekarni, et. al. (2009). However, the 
final model will be adjusted to the Indonesian economic situation and the feasibility of 
data. The Wu’s model can be written as follows: 
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(1.10) ∆𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑖𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where Xit is the share of industry output by the state sector and Yit is the share of 
industry output by the collective (semi-private) sector. They expect that Xit and Yit have 
significant effects on regional unemployment persistence. However, in Soekarni, et. al. 
(2009), Xit and Yit are referred to the share of industry output by the manufacture 
sector and service sector. In this, research Xit will be defined as the policy variables: the 
share of government in local economies and real minimum wages, Yit will be other 
variables which are suspected to have a significant effect to unemployment 
persistency and Growit represents provincial economic growth. If we assume common 
estimated coefficients for all provinces in equation (1.10) then we may apply a pooled 
estimation or the Arellano and Bond (1991). However, if we assume that the estimated 
coefficients vary across provinces, then it applies Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
(SUR) estimation by Zellner (1962) or random coefficient estimation by Swamy (1970).    
 
1.5 Empirical Evidence 
1.5.1 National Data 
Table 1.4 shows national unemployment persistent tests based on the Dickey-Fuller 
approach. The data are divided by period 1990-2012 and 2001-2012, then by CBS 
version and old version (U1) and also by gender, age, education, location, and their 
gaps. We apply a DF test with constant and trend (DF-t) and constant, trend, and 
quadratic trend (DF-q) for national unemployment and their categories and constant 
only (DF-c) for the gaps.  
The majority of the tests can not reject the null hypothesis of hysteresis for 
total unemployment rates, by CBS or U1 in all periods or 2001-2012. This is a different 
result compared to the finding of Soekarni, et. al. (2009) in which the persistence 
hypothesis is accepted for the period of 1991-2006 using the CBS definition. The 
hysteresis hypotheses are not rejected for the gender and location categories. In the 
age category, except for adults on the CBS version and the period 2001-2012, by using 
the DF with quadratic trend all tests can not reject the hysteresis. The DF-q statistics = -
6.566 is significant at the 1% critical value (DF-q, p-value=0.01 = 3.978 for N=12). We also 
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find another significant value for the education category with quadratic trend. The 
hysteresis hypothesis is rejected at the 10% and 5% level respectively for low-medium 
and high educated unemployed in the period 1990-2012 according to the U1 definition. 
A similar result is also found in the period 2001-2012 for high education which rejects 
the hypothesis at a 10% critical value. 
         
Table 1.4 DF-Unit Root Test for National Unemployment Rates  
  1990 – 2012   2001 – 2012 




DF-t DF-q DF-t DF-q 
 
DF-t DF-q DF-t DF-q 
Unemployment Rate -0.557 -2.166 -1.356 -3.329  -2.098 -1.123 -1.267 -3.005 By Gender:          Female -0.813 -2.217 -1.764 -3.497  -2.000 -1.312 -1.435 -3.755 Male -0.506 -2.257 -1.095 -3.136  -2.017 -1.747 -1.313 -2.125 By Age:          Youth, 15-24 -0.807 -2.361 -1.350 -3.345  -2.230 -0.961 -1.880 -1.187 Adult, 25+ -0.623 -1.880 -1.944 -3.132  -1.138 -6.566*** -1.267 -3.425 By Education:          Low and Medium -0.563 -2.101 -1.658 -3.949*  -2.311 -0.823 -1.523 -2.624 High -1.583 -1.636 -3.158 -4.434**  -0.762 -1.292 -2.756 -4.582* By Location:          Urban -0.649 -2.760 -1.071 -3.555  -2.039 -2.140 -1.403 -3.266 Rural -0.630 -1.880 -1.831 -3.223  -2.102 -0.901 -1.228 -2.826 
          By Gaps: DF-c DF-c 
 
DF-c DF-c 
Gender gap  -2.916*  -2.764*  -1.515 -2.506 Age gap -1.132 -1.695  -1.236 -1.435 Education gap -1.754     -3.603**  -0.941 -1.968 Urban-rural gap -2.083     -3.168**  -0.788 -2.365 Notes: ***, **, * significant at level 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Simulation with Monte Carlo replications at 
50,000 produce the Dickey-Fuller critical value for 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 at: N=12: -4.289, -3.200, and -2.738 (DF-
c: constant only), -5.169, -3.942, and -3.417 (DF-t: constant and trend), -6.027, -4.597, and -3.978 (DF-q: 
constant, trend and quadratic trend). N=23: -3.736, -3.000, and -2.636 (DF-c: constant only), -4.408, -3.607, 
and -3.245 (DF-t: constant and trend), -4.966, -4.110, and -3.721 (DF-q: constant, trend and quadratic trend).  
 
The gaps are calculated by ratios: female/male, youth/adult, low and 
medium/high, and urban/rural. By using these ratios in the DF test, linear trend and/or 
quadratic trend should disappear. The appropriate method for this would be without 
linear and quadratic trends (DF-c). The results show that we cannot reject the 
hysteresis hypothesis for age gap neither by CBS or U1 definition in all sample periods. 
However, we can reject the hypothesis for gender gap at least 10% of critical value and 
at 5% of critical value for education and location gaps by using the U1 definition.  
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1.5.2 Provincial Data 
Table 1.5 shows the tests for persistent unemployment by individual province. There is 
a quite significant difference between the DF-test using the CBS and U1 definitions. All 
DF tests with a linear trend for all provinces are not significant when using the CBS 
definition in the period 1990-2012. Only three provinces are significant: DKI Jakarta, 
Central Kalimantan and East Kalimantan (column 3) when using quadratic trend. 
Therefore, almost all provinces cannot reject the hysteresis hypothesis.  
 
Table 1.5 DF-Unit Root Test for Individual Provincial Unemployment  
  1990 – 2012   2001 – 2012 




DF-t DF-q DF-t DF-q 
 
DF-t DF-q DF-t DF-q 
Aceh Darussalam -2.358 -3.267 -2.838 -3.262  -2.560 -2.510 -2.488 -3.224 North Sumatera   0.110 -2.131 -1.155 -4.371**  -2.712 -0.208 -2.084 -3.401 West Sumatera -1.111 -1.973 -2.280 -3.056  -1.913 -0.732 -1.590 -2.236 Riau -0.995 -2.164 -2.011 -3.390  -2.444 -2.365 -2.146 -5.053** Jambi -2.189 -3.077 -2.872 -3.456  -2.440 -3.529 -2.106 -4.115* South Sumatera -1.581 -2.421 -2.452 -3.408  -2.430 -3.617 -1.459 -3.149 Bengkulu -1.764 -2.616 -3.103 -3.886*  -3.138 -3.350 -2.563 -3.615 Lampung -0.758 -2.424 -1.557 -3.202  -3.159 -2.903 -1.746 -2.084 DKI Jakarta -1.457 -5.297*** -1.279 -4.743**  -4.191** -4.325* -2.865 -5.871** West Java -0.769 -2.355 -1.491 -3.413  -1.667 -1.598 -1.278 -2.495 Central Java -1.007 -2.440 -1.137 -3.254  -1.562 -2.604 -1.216 -4.816** DI Yogyakarta -1.275 -2.309 -1.924 -2.537  -1.475 -3.058 -1.464 -3.095 East Java -0.743 -2.164 -1.028 -2.622  -2.014 -1.553 -1.425 -1.237 Bali -1.737 -2.783 -2.727 -3.528  -2.899 -2.001 -1.847 -2.724 West Nusa Tenggara -2.284 -2.968 -3.792** -4.703**  -1.844 -1.611 -1.291 -2.688 East Nusa Tenggara -1.264 -3.424 -2.003 -2.880  -2.719 -3.718 -2.172 -1.847 West Kalimantan -1.229 -2.569 -1.908 -3.757*  -3.886* -4.110* -1.562 -4.148* Central Kalimantan -1.912 -3.927* -2.448 -3.521  -3.865* -3.971 -2.672 -2.438 South Kalimantan -2.071 -2.734 -3.283* -4.506**  -4.055** -3.561 -2.373 -2.279 East Kalimantan -2.251 -3.911* -3.422* -4.324**  -3.044 -3.966* -3.067 -4.562* North Sulawesi -1.333 -2.279 -2.235 -2.900  -1.278 -1.900 -1.442 -2.845 Central Sulawesi -2.322 -3.259 -3.047 -3.352  -1.972 -2.250 -2.352 -2.902 South Sulawesi -1.020 -1.959 -3.008 -3.707  -2.998 -1.816 -2.073 -3.596 South-East Sulawesi -1.344 -2.105 -2.802 -3.153  -2.375 -0.985 -1.681 -2.245 Maluku -1.444 -2.512 -2.327 -3.617  -1.646 -5.052** -2.086 -4.708** Papua -1.894 -3.687 -3.466* -5.083***  -2.669 -2.539 -3.512* -3.280 
Split Province          
Bangka Belitung       -1.527 -5.107** -1.468 -3.426 Riau Islands      -3.337 -2.828 -4.052** -5.682** Banten      -0.788 -2.549 -1.274 -3.034 Gorontalo      -4.102** -3.258 -4.062** -4.179* West Sulawesi      -2.569 -3.075 -2.479 -3.670 North Maluku      -5.892*** -5.624*** -4.986** -4.872** West Papua           -1.654 -2.420 -0.774 -2.274 
Notes: See Table 1.4. Bangka Belitung Islands is a split province from South Sumatera, the Riau Islands from Riau, 
Banten from West Java, Gorontalo from North Sulawesi, West Sulawesi from South Sulawesi, North Maluku 
from Maluku, and West Papua from Papua. We use district/city codes from CBS to track and re-calculate the 
data period 2001-2012 for those provinces that split after 2001. Data for Maluku in 2000 were calculated via 
central moving average (CMA). 
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However, using the U1 definition and a quadratic trend, there are a substantial 
number of provinces which become significant and prove the hypothesis for 
persistence of unemployment compared to the test with a linear trend. These include 
North Sumatera, DKI Jakarta, West Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, South 
Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, and Papua. The other remaining provinces cannot reject 
the hysteresis unemployment rates. Similar results are also found in the period 2001-
2012 and using U1 definition in which three out of seven split provinces proved the 
persistence of unemployment. In total there are ten provinces out of 33 provinces 
which prove the persistence of unemployment rates.  
 






ZA, Breaks(const, trend) 





       
min-t year min-t year 




-5.009* 2005 -4.074 1997 




-4.095 2005 -3.112 2000 




-3.595 2004 -3.899 2005 




-4.805 2004 -3.505 2006 




-5.745*** 2005 -4.332 2005 




-4.971* 2005 -4.723 2005 




-4.431 2001 -4.548 2005 




-3.584 2002 -3.074 2006 




-4.523 2003 -4.673 1999 




-4.285 2005 -3.729 2005 




-5.253** 2005 -3.962 2007 




-3.458 2005 -3.543 2005 




-3.690 2003 -3.995 2005 




-3.716 2005 -3.820 2006 




-4.184 2005 -5.602*** 1995 




-5.367** 2001 -4.141 1995 




-4.541 2002 -3.969 2006 




-4.049 2001 -6.249*** 1994 




-4.787 2002 -4.624 1995 




-4.650 2006 -4.517 2001 




-3.020 2005 -3.368 1994 




-3.893 2006 -4.752 1994 




-4.107 2003 -4.110 1995 




-4.024 2001 -4.575 2005 




-4.140 2005 -5.421** 2005 




-6.315*** 2004 -5.202** 2004 




-3.894 2005 -3.427 2005 
Notes: ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Critical values at 1%, 5%, and 10% for DFGLS Trend: -
3.770, -3.190, -2.890 from Elliot, et. al. (1996), DFGLS-Quadratic: -5.040, -4.220, -3.840 from Ayat and Burridge 
(2000), ZA: -5.570, -5.080, -4.820 from Zivot and Andrews (1992). Sample period 1990-2012. 
 
 
 The alternatives to the DF tests are presented in Table 1.6. It compares the test 
methods from Elliot et. al. (1996), Ayat and Burridge (2000), and Zivot and Andrews 
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(1992). Most of the tests cannot reject the hysteresis using the CBS version and 
completely reject of the hypothesis for all provinces using the DFGLS-trend. Compared 
to the trend model, some of the quadratic model tests reject the hysteresis, especially 
when using the U1 definition. Furthermore, we find that the majority of the breaking 
points from the Zivot-Andrews tests are in the year of 2005 not 2001 as expected. This 
confirms the turning point of unemployment rate in 2005 on Figure 1.1.     
Tables 1.7 through 1.10 show the test results for each province by categories 
and their gaps. In Table 1.7, we see the tests by gender and their gap. Again, most of 
the tests cannot reject the hysteresis using the CBS or U1 definition. Nevertheless, the 
tests for gender gaps generate different results. Almost all DF-c statistics are significant 
using the CBS version except for West Sumatera and DKI Jakarta. Additionally, all 
statistics are significant using the U1 version. Therefore, the majority of the tests by 
the gender category cannot reject the hysteresis but not for the gender gaps. 
Comparable results are also found in the age category in which most of the tests are 
not rejected as the hysteresis, except for the adult category using the U1 definition 
and quadratic trend. On the other hand, the majority of the tests for the age gaps 
follow the persistence hypothesis (Table 1.8).            
Different results have emerged from the education category as explained in 
Table 1.9. The different definition and the DF test choices with a linear or quadratic 
trend seem to play a significant role in the results. Most of the tests for the low-
medium education cannot reject the hysteresis using the CBS definition and linear 
trend version. On the other hand, most of the tests agree with the persistence 
hypothesis using U1 and the quadratic trend. However, the majority of the tests for 
the education gaps reject the hysteresis in both the CBS and U1 definitions. The last 
table explain the test for hysteresis by location: urban and rural, and its gaps. Most of 
the tests cannot reject the hysteresis using the CBS definition, either in urban or rural 
areas. Nevertheless, most of the tests reject the hysteresis using the U1 definition and 
particularly including the quadratic trend in the DF model (Table 1.10). Similar to other 
categories, most of the tests for the urban/rural gap also reject the hysteresis and 
therefore favour for the persistence hypothesis. 
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Table 1.7 Test for Individual Province of Unemployment Hysteresis by Gender and Gender Gap, 1990-2012 















DF-t DF-q  DF-c DF-c 






-2.248 -2.744  -3.579** -4.610*** 






-1.190 -3.469  -3.499** -3.299** 






-2.307 -3.262  -2.479 -3.514** 






-2.856 -4.349**  -3.145** -4.409*** 






-2.337 -3.255  -2.637* -3.645** 






-2.803 -3.517  -3.481** -3.444** 






-4.515*** -5.195***  -8.506*** -6.957*** 






-1.958 -3.222  -4.982*** -4.434*** 






-1.420 -4.216**  -2.169 -4.104*** 






-1.923 -3.471  -2.986* -3.590** 






-2.313 -3.835*  -3.300** -2.842* 






-2.543 -3.289  -3.483** -3.583** 






-1.272 -3.134  -4.034*** -2.833* 






-3.401* -3.754*  -3.213** -4.380*** 






-4.067** -4.588**  -3.841*** -3.555** 






-2.390 -3.490  -4.050*** -4.001*** 






-2.030 -3.159  -4.389*** -4.275*** 






-2.890 -3.616  -6.135*** -5.677*** 






-3.281* -4.610**  -4.023*** -3.267*** 






-3.616** -4.483**  -4.817*** -5.460*** 






-2.425 -3.062  -6.640*** -4.378*** 






-3.189 -3.742*  -4.458*** -3.928*** 






-3.122 -3.995*  -4.041*** -4.100*** 






-3.216 -3.425  -5.006*** -5.656*** 






-2.498 -3.497  -4.065*** -4.617*** 
Papua -3.740** -5.231***  -4.428*** -5.511***  -1.496 -3.068  -3.280* -4.962***  -3.076** -4.309*** 




Table 1.8 Test for Individual Province of Unemployment Hysteresis by Age and Age Gap, 1990-2012 







U1  CBS U1 
  DF-t DF-q   DF-t DF-q   DF-t DF-q   DF-t DF-q  DF-c DF-c 






-3.269* -3.860*  -2.637* -2.578 






-2.093 -3.367  -2.819* -3.208** 






-2.846 -3.418  -2.386 -3.645** 






-3.191 -3.683  -2.088 -3.160** 






-4.497*** -4.466**  -3.962*** -4.189*** 






-4.679*** -6.039***  -3.867*** -4.716*** 






-3.962** -4.690**  -2.952* -3.990*** 






-2.482 -3.707  -5.145*** -6.228*** 






-2.009 -3.867*  -0.999 -1.376 






-2.307 -3.210  -1.245 -1.940 






-2.430 -3.594  -1.519 -2.575 






-2.010 -2.167  -3.118** -3.576** 






-1.629 -2.675  -2.103 -2.539 






-3.545* -3.890*  -3.029** -4.289*** 






-4.217** -4.708**  -2.483 -2.379 






-2.799 -3.796*  -3.729** -3.819*** 






-2.464 -3.959*  -3.320** -4.634*** 






-2.833 -3.722  -2.352 -2.398 






-3.632** -4.282**  -2.793* -5.149*** 






-2.746 -2.888  -2.608 -3.363** 






-2.698 -3.185  -2.875* -5.288*** 






-3.361* -3.458  -3.366** -3.360** 






-3.149 -4.000*  -2.416 -3.485** 






-3.381* -3.744*  -5.678*** -6.102*** 






-3.984** -4.574**  -3.029** -3.575** 
Papua -2.096 -3.645  -3.281* -5.052***  -2.411 -3.957*  -3.658** -4.614**  -2.031 -1.823 




Table 1.9 Test for Individual Province of Unemployment Hysteresis by Education and Education Gap, 1990-2012 







U1  CBS U1 
  DF-t DF-q   DF-t DF-q   DF-t DF-q   DF-t DF-q  DF-c DF-c 
Aceh Darussalam -2.353 -3.259*   -4.778*** -5.210***   -3.228* -3.234   -2.902 -3.021  -3.915*** -5.407*** 






-3.393* -4.651**  -2.718* -6.551*** 






-5.395*** -6.377***  -3.722** -6.206*** 






-2.424 -2.915  -2.970* -3.145** 






-7.302*** -7.177***  -5.523*** -5.561*** 






-5.099*** -5.262***  -3.041** -3.432** 






-4.576*** -5.107***  -5.451*** -6.821*** 






-3.020 -3.301  -2.942* -4.757*** 






-2.386 -3.243  -2.943* -3.980*** 






-4.643*** -5.182***  -2.368 -3.415** 






-3.090 -4.476**  -3.294** -4.228*** 






-2.675 -2.974  -4.502*** -5.211*** 






-2.737 -3.586  -1.893 -3.331** 






-3.065 -4.152**  -4.645*** -4.208*** 






-5.445*** -5.698***  -3.694** -4.841*** 






-4.341** -4.774**  -4.741*** -4.580*** 






-4.600*** -4.953***  -4.718*** -4.780*** 






-5.829*** -6.960***  -4.216*** -2.575 






-2.567 -3.398  -4.481*** -4.649*** 






-3.778** -4.258**  -3.801*** -2.897* 






-3.063 -3.074  -2.536 -3.015** 






-4.803*** -4.760**  -5.307*** -6.717*** 






-3.343* -3.536  -1.734 -6.026*** 






-5.622*** -7.093***  -4.715*** -9.929*** 






-4.323** -5.141***  -2.160 -4.335*** 
Papua -1.731 -3.485*  -5.036*** -5.313***  -3.644** -3.654  -4.286** -4.187**  -3.207** -4.326*** 




Table 1.10 Test for Individual Province of Unemployment Hysteresis by Urban-Rural and Urban-Rural Gap, 1990-2012 







U1  CBS U1 
  DF-t DF-q   DF-t DF-q   DF-t DF-q   DF-t DF-q  DF-c DF-c 
Aceh Darussalam -2.030 -3.442   -2.529 -3.562   -3.111 -3.634   -3.259* -3.380  -4.750*** -5.100*** 






-2.028 -5.344***  -2.451 -3.902*** 






-2.840 -4.091*  -3.275** -3.993*** 






-2.363 -4.161**  -3.117** -2.679* 






-2.981 -3.084  -3.156* -3.400** 






-2.870 -2.870  -16.032*** -14.265*** 






-4.140** -4.215**  -4.411*** -4.426*** 






-1.708 -3.097  -2.667* -5.619*** 
DKI Jakarta -1.457 -5.297*** 
 
-1.279 -4.743** 
      
   






-2.308 -3.582  -2.074 -2.275 






-1.578 -3.281  -3.592** -5.358*** 






-3.480* -4.532**  -4.677*** -4.698*** 






-1.822 -3.024  -3.880*** -4.892*** 






-2.779 -2.936  -3.104** -2.859* 






-4.130** -4.528**  -2.998** -2.395 






-2.901 -3.480  -3.358** -4.069*** 






-2.510 -4.651**  -2.292 -3.360** 






-2.682 -3.647  -4.420*** -4.284*** 






-4.742*** -6.445***  -4.547*** -2.738* 






-2.748 -2.884  -4.653*** -3.788*** 






-2.794 -3.546  -3.807*** -4.051*** 






-3.351* -3.755*  -2.607 -3.423** 






-3.625** -4.453**  -1.806 -3.615** 






-2.166 -2.372  -2.982 -3.403** 






-2.519 -3.288  -1.940 -2.532 
Papua -2.342 -3.773*  -3.232 -4.245**  -1.798 -2.870  -3.324* -4.274**  -2.237 -2.497 
Note: see Table 1.4. 
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1.5.3 Panel Data 
The results for the panel unit root tests are presented in Table 1.11. We apply Im, et. al. 
(2003) and Pesaran (2007) for the tests assuming that the ρs are different for each 
province. The majority of the tests reject the hysteresis hypothesis with the exception 
of the tests using the CBS definition, linear trend and IPS method (column 2). In this 
case, except for high education, all t-bar with a linear trend are not significant. The 
similar results are also found using the method of Levin, et. al. (2002) which assumes 
that there is the common coefficient (ρ-1) or (ρ) for all provinces (see Appendix 1.2). 
 It was noticed that on the individual time series unit root analyses, we found 
that the majority of the tests could not reject the hysteresis hypotheses. However, on 
the panel data analyses, most of the test rejected the hypotheses. The reason for 
behind this particularity lies in the fact that the null hypothesis in panel data assumes 
that all individual provincial coefficients are equal to zero. The null hypothesis can thus 
more easily be rejected due to this assumption. This would be one of the explanations 
for the differences in results between the individual and panel tests of hysteresis in 
OECD countries (see a summary comparison of the empirical results by Lee and Chang, 
2008). Leon-Ladesma and McAdam (2004) found similar results between individual 
and panel tests in the case of transition economies in Eastern Europe.       
 The next part investigates as to whether there are variables that affect the size 
of (ρ-1). This can be shown in Table 1.12 through Table 1.15 by using the definition of 
CBS and U1. For the assumption of the common value of ρ, we employ pooled 
regressions which do not account for heterogeneity. Alternatively, the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) method will be used to account for heterogeneity. Additionally, if we assume 
that ρ varies across provinces, we can employ the method of random coefficients 
estimators by Swamy (1970). This method is similar to the SUR estimators by Zellner 
(1962).  
 Table 1.12 is based on the model using CBS and U1 definitions. We find that the 
lagged unemployment rate is significant in all subdivisions of unemployment rates. The 
provincial economic growths are also significant on total, female, adult, low and 
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medium education and urban unemployment regressions. Linear and quadratic trends 
are also significant in all regressions. The R-squares range between 0.09 and 0.18 
which are relatively low. However, this is not surprising because the dependent 
variables are in first difference forms which usually produce low R-Squares. Similar 
results are found when using the U1 definition which produces R-squares ranging from 
0.10 to 0.20. 
 In Table 1.13 we add three policy variables that may have effects not only on 
the unemployment rate but also on the estimated coefficient of ρ. These include the 
interaction variables of lagged unemployment rates with local government 
expenditures (Lag of U*RGovCons), gross fixed capital formation or investment (Lag of 
U*RGfcf), and growth of real minimum wages (Lag of U*real_minwages). All 
coefficients ρ as well as the coefficients of linear and quadratic trends remain 
significant (not shown in the table). 
 In the CBS definition, the interaction variable between lagged unemployment 
and government expenditure has a negative and significant effect on total 
unemployment rates. This variable is also significant for the regressions on male, youth, 
adult, low and medium education, and urban unemployment rates. Meanwhile, the 
interaction of the lagged unemployment and investment also has a negative and 
significant effect on the unemployment rates analysed by total, female, youth, low and 
medium education, high education, and rural.  
The effects of the interaction variable on the growth of real minimum wages 
are significant only for female, high education and rural. The significant and negative 
effects of economic growth appear in total unemployment rates as well as female, 
adult, low and medium education and urban unemployment rates. Again, the trend 
and quadratic trends remain significant in all divisions. However, relatively different 
results are found for the U1 definition, especially for the interaction with the growth of 
real minimum wages. This variable has no significant effect on unemployment rates in 
all divisions.  
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Table 1.11 Panel Unit Root Tests 
  IPS (2003)   CIPS Method, Pesaran (2007) 
National CBS   U1 
 
CBS   U1 
  tbar-t tbar-q   tbar-t tbar-q   tbar-t tbar-q   tbar-t tbar-q 



































































By Gaps: tbar-c   tbar-c   tbar-c   tbar-c 





















Urban-rural gap -3.793***   -4.145***   -4.372***   -4.139*** 
Notes: ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Critical Values for tbar-c, tbar-t/tbar-q from Im, et. al. (2003) are: -1.820, -1.730, -1.690, -2.450, 






Table 1.12 Panel Regressions without Intervention Variables (Pooled Estimators) 
Variables D.UT D.UF D.UM D.UY D.UA D.ULM D.UHE D.UUR D.URU 
 
Total Female Male Youth Adult LowmedEd HighEd Urban Rural 
CBS Definition: 
Lag of  U -0.162*** -0.233*** -0.155*** -0.206*** -0.171*** -0.165*** -0.241*** -0.0735** -0.239*** 
 
(-6.285) (-6.863) (-5.459) (-7.811) (-5.466) (-6.348) (-5.825) (-2.379) (-6.360)    
growth_prov -0.016* -0.007** -0.009 -0.006 -0.009*** -0.016** 0.0002 -0.010** -0.006 
 
(-1.951) (-1.985) (-1.490) (-1.044) (-3.252) (-2.044) (-0.264) (-2.311) (-1.179)    
trend 0.260*** 0.185*** 0.114*** 0.160*** 0.133*** 0.248*** 0.020*** 0.063*** 0.203*** 
 
(6.360) (6.970) (4.810) (5.710) (7.090) (6.420) (3.280) (2.710) (6.910) 
trend2 -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.008*** 
 
(-7.494) (-7.882) (-5.271) (-6.601) (-7.389) (-7.463) (-2.664) (-3.879) (-7.539)    
_cons 0.129 -0.027 0.0945 0.217 -0.115 0.092 0.0304 0.228** -0.159 
 
(0.660) (-0.240) (0.830) (1.610) (-1.326) (0.510) (1.090) (2.000) (-1.194)    
R-sq 0.159 0.177 0.126 0.156 0.152 0.158 0.122 0.090 0.171 
U1 Definition: 
Lag of  U -0.215*** -0.318*** -0.174*** -0.226*** -0.260*** -0.316*** -0.316*** -0.102*** -0.359*** 
 
(-6.639) (-7.619) (-5.482) (-6.857) (-6.662) (-7.664) (-6.797) (-3.053) (-8.134)    
growth_prov -0.018** -0.008*** -0.009* -0.008 -0.010*** -0.003 -0.0001 -0.010** -0.008*   
 
(-2.337) (-2.600) (-1.720) (-1.345) (-3.531) (-1.105) (-0.142) (-2.400) (-1.699)    
trend 0.124*** 0.093*** 0.052*** 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.043*** 0.020*** 0.030 0.095*** 
 
(3.332) (4.139) (2.603) (2.807) (4.102) (4.095) (3.105) (1.302) (4.088) 
trend2 -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002** -0.004*** 
 
(-4.319) (-5.056) (-3.336) (-3.917) (-4.229) (-4.505) (-2.647) (-2.381) (-4.686)    
_cons 0.791*** 0.446*** 0.352*** 0.585*** 0.218*** 0.100* 0.058** 0.388*** 0.415*** 
 
(4.233) (4.437) (3.258) (4.523) (2.854) (1.691) (2.093) (3.423) (3.643) 
N 572 572 572 572 572 572 572 572 550 
R-sq 0.156 0.196 0.125 0.152 0.171 0.18 0.161 0.097 0.202 
Notes: ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses are t-statistics from robust standard errors. Trend2 is a quadratic trend. 
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Table 1.13 Panel Regressions with Intervention Variables (Pooled Estimators)  
Variables D.UT D.UF D.UM D.UY D.UA D.ULM D.UHE D.UUR D.URU 
 
Total Female Male Youth Adult LowmedEd HighEd Urban Rural 
CBS Definition: 
Lag of U -0.076* -0.147*** -0.104** -0.105** -0.111** -0.070* -0.378*** -0.099* -0.150**  
 
(-1.896) (-2.859) (-2.065) (-2.264) (-2.185) (-1.661) (-4.188) (-1.864) (-2.392)    
Lag of U*RGovCons -0.004** -0.001 -0.007*** -0.004** -0.004* -0.004** -0.001 -0.006** 0.001 
 
(-2.241) (-0.714) (-2.958) (-2.213) (-1.957) (-2.289) (-0.201) (-2.513) (0.512) 
Lag of U*RGfcf -0.003* -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.002 -0.003** 0.005** 0.002 -0.008*** 
 
(-1.930) (-2.907) (-0.450) (-2.066) (-0.859) (-2.119) (2.228) (0.924) (-3.592)    
Lag of U*real_minwages 0.014 0.032** -0.006 0.008 0.022 0.019 -0.048* -0.009 0.044*** 
 
(1.109) (2.195) (-0.452) (0.608) (1.305) (1.581) (-1.891) (-0.528) (2.673) 
growth_prov -0.018** -0.008** -0.008 -0.008 -0.009*** -0.018** 0.0002 -0.009** -0.008 
 
(-1.976) (-2.279) (-1.325) (-1.128) (-3.163) (-2.097) (0.200) (-1.984) (-1.414)    
R-sq 0.177 0.205 0.15 0.178 0.164 0.182 0.156 0.117 0.223 
U1 Definition: 
Lag of U -0.172*** -0.245*** -0.179*** -0.174*** -0.246*** -0.154* -0.542*** -0.201*** -0.235*** 
 
(-2.851) (-3.670) (-2.688) (-2.766) (-3.220) (-1.915) (-5.958) (-2.669) (-3.106)    
Lag of U*RGovCons -0.004 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.005* -0.004 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.006** 0.003 
 
(-1.635) (-0.400) (-2.665) (-1.770) (-1.389) (-2.916) (0.499) (-2.149) (0.947) 
Lag of U*RGfcf -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.007*** 0.004* -0.009*** 
 
(-0.337) (-1.392) -0.63 (-0.477) (0.315) (-1.507) -3.027 -1.714 (-3.725)    
Lag of U*real_minwages -0.012 -0.005 -0.019 -0.011 -0.011 -0.032 -0.037 -0.015 -0.009 
 
(-0.668) (-0.276) (-0.989) (-0.607) (-0.485) (-1.429) (-1.304) (-0.698) (-0.450)    
growth_prov -0.019** -0.010** -0.009 -0.008 -0.010*** -0.003 0.0001 -0.009** -0.010*   
 
(-2.125) (-2.559) (-1.508) (-1.278) (-3.266) (-0.888) (0.111) (-2.027) (-1.709)    
N 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 500 
R-sq 0.178 0.21 0.164 0.18 0.183 0.219 0.194 0.138 0.249 
 Notes: ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses are t-statistics from robust standard errors. RGovCons and RGfcf are 




Table 1.14 Panel Regressions with Heterogeneity (Arelano-Bond Estimators) 
Variables UT UF UM UY UA ULM UHE UUR URU 
  Total Female Male Youth Adult LowmedEd HighEd Urban Rural 
CBS Definition: 
Lag of U 0.465*** 0.438*** 0.375*** 0.437*** 0.643*** 0.497*** 0.239 0.441*** 0.479*** 
 
(3.888) (3.490) (3.013) (3.239) (3.984) (4.127) (1.621) (3.462) (2.639) 
Lag of U*RGovCons 0.003 0.006** -0.003 0.0005 -0.003 0.004 -0.007 -0.011** 0.007 
 
(0.899) (2.297) (-0.582) (0.130) (-0.442) (1.062) (-1.103) (-2.560) (1.177) 
Lag of U*RGfcf -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.007** -0.006 -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.016*** 
 
(-3.394) (-3.798) (-2.187) (-1.403) (-4.409) (-3.167) (-0.442) (-1.275) (-3.541)    
Lag of U*real_minwages -0.016** -0.006 -0.030*** -0.016 -0.024 -0.011 -0.073*** -0.025*** 0.011 
 
(-1.984) (-0.431) (-2.992) (-1.546) (-1.603) (-1.420) (-2.663) (-3.069) (0.721) 
growth_prov -0.013 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.010** -0.013 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(-1.050) (-1.540) (-0.236) (-0.390) (-2.089) (-1.177) (0.621) (-0.694) (-0.685)    
U1 Definition: 
Lag of U 0.263* 0.304* 0.244 0.285 0.474*** 0.295 0.045 0.269 0.386*** 
 
(1.785) (1.940) (1.639) (1.387) (2.697) (1.348) (0.277) (1.541) (2.733) 
Lag of U*RGovCons -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.010* -0.003 -0.013** 0.004 
 
(-0.158) (0.191) (-0.729) (-0.494) (-0.813) (-1.717) (-0.358) (-2.179) (0.955) 
Lag of U*RGfcf -0.006 -0.011** -0.004 -0.003 -0.013*** -0.008 0.001 0.003 -0.014*** 
 
(-1.428) (-2.490) (-0.871) (-0.439) (-4.900) (-1.592) (0.185) (0.688) (-3.710)    
Lag of U*real_minwages -0.031** -0.025* -0.039*** -0.024 -0.048*** -0.029 -0.072** -0.033*** -0.022 
 
(-2.496) (-1.749) (-3.307) (-1.639) (-2.911) (-1.250) (-1.964) (-4.865) (-1.444)    
growth_prov -0.01 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009** -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.005 
 
(-0.962) (-1.370) (-0.215) (-0.313) (-2.019) (-0.546) (1.044) (-0.362) (-0.796)    
N 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 475 
Notes: ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses are t-statistics from robust standard errors. Models include time 




 Table 1.15 Panel Random Coefficient Regressions (Swamy Estimators) 
Variables D.UT D.UF D.UM D.UY D.UA D.ULM D.UHE D.UUR D.URU 
  Total Female Male Youth Adult LowmedEd HighEd Urban Rural 
CBS Definition: 
Lag of U -0.427** -0.277 -0.769*** -0.387*** -0.612** -0.359* -1.018*** -0.821*** -0.302 
 
(-2.320) (-1.596) (-3.104) (-2.686) (-2.275) (-1.907) (-3.609) (-4.483) (-1.380)    
Lag of U*RGovCons 0.007 0.003 0.009 -0.007 0.025* 0.003 0.033 0.008 0.004 
 
(0.839) (0.284) (0.684) (-0.767) (1.705) (0.320) (1.304) (1.210) (0.379) 
Lag of U*RGfcf -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.010** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.003 -0.010* -0.023*** 
 
(-4.033) (-4.544) (-2.055) (-3.581) (-3.435) (-3.769) (-0.452) (-1.955) (-4.945)    
Lag of U*real_minwages 0.035*** 0.056*** 0.016 0.024*** 0.053*** 0.039*** -0.032* 0.023* 0.052*** 
 
(3.274) (4.529) (1.276) (3.098) (4.021) (3.884) (-1.844) (1.851) (5.325) 
growth_prov -0.029*** -0.013* -0.01 -0.018*** -0.008* -0.029*** 0.001 -0.008 -0.013 
 
(-2.924) (-1.720) (-1.337) (-3.102) (-1.916) (-3.532) (0.441) (-1.272) (-1.535)    
U1 Definition: 
Lag of U -0.994*** -1.039*** -1.090*** -0.899*** -1.204*** -1.098*** -1.305*** -1.198*** -1.130*** 
 
(-5.974) (-5.292) (-5.004) (-5.301) (-5.419) (-6.203) (-5.130) (-5.030) (-4.160)    
Lag of U*RGovCons 0.013* 0.016* 0.011 0.001 0.030* 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.023 
 
(1.771) (1.811) (1.069) (0.194) (1.879) (1.372) (0.987) (1.222) (1.622) 
Lag of U*RGfcf 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.0002 0.004 0.004 0.001 
 
(0.212) (0.200) (0.588) (0.186) (0.311) (0.036) (0.732) (0.723) (0.206) 
Lag of U*real_minwages -0.001 0.011 -0.01 -0.002 0.006 -0.039** -0.017 -0.012 0.007 
 
(-0.081) (0.767) (-0.711) (-0.224) (0.530) (-2.050) (-0.921) (-1.003) (0.572) 
growth_prov -0.016 -0.007* -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.008 
 
(-1.425) (-1.655) (-0.735) (-1.037) (-1.231) (-0.186) -0.796 (-0.631) (-1.111)    
N 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 500 
Notes: ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses are t-statistics from robust standard errors found through the bootstrap 
method. We employ the Stata command xtrc to get the results. Models include constants, linear and quadratic trends. 
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Table 1.14 presents the Arellano and Bond estimators. Most of the ρ 
coefficients are significant, except for high educated unemployment rates. 
Government expenditure is now insignificant, except for female and urban 
unemployment rates. This means that government expenditure becomes less effective 
to reduce unemployment rates and its degree of persistence (ρ), or its adjustment 
speed to normal level of unemployment rate. Minimum wages are also becoming less 
effective as a policy tool, except for total, male, high education, and urban 
unemployment. Relatively strong impacts are found for investment. This variable 
reduces the unemployment rates and their adjustments in all divisions, except in youth, 
high education, and urban. Provincial economic growths are also weakening in all 
divisions, except for adult unemployment rates. This concludes that relying on 
economic growth to reduce unemployment rates is not effective. Promoting 
investment is favourable to reducing unemployment and adjusting back to the normal 
level in regional labour markets. Linear and quadratic trends remain significant.  
The effectiveness of investment compared to local government expenditure is 
also supported by the Swamy estimators using the CBS definition (Table 1.15). All 
coefficients of investment are negative and significant, except for the unemployment 
rates by high education. Minimum wages are also an effective policy against 
unemployment rates. Compared to the Arellano-Bond estimators, with these 
estimators, the regional economic growth plays a significant role in reducing and 
adjusting unemployment rates.  
Moving to the U1 definition, there are quite sharp differences in the results 
compared to those found when using the CBS definition, especially when using the 
Arellano-Bond and Swamy estimators. Even though investment is relatively effective in 
reducing and adjusting unemployment rates in the labour market compared to 
government expenditure, this variable is less effective than the variables of minimum 
wages using the Arellano-Bond estimators (Table 1.14). We find that investment is 
becoming completely ineffective in reducing and adjusting unemployment rates using 





This paper provides the evidence from the empirical tests on the hysteresis versus 
persistence hypotheses for regional unemployment rates in Indonesia. The standard 
test for this uses the unit root test framework which uses the standard linear trend on 
the test. Following the actual trends of unemployment rates in Indonesia at the 
national and provincial levels, we propose the tests include quadratic trends. We also 
divide the tests by CBS version which is not consistent during the period 1990-2012 
because of the changed definition in 2001 and by U1 definition which has adjusted to 
be more consistent during the same period.     
 For the individual provincial tests, our results suggest for not rejecting the 
hysteresis as oppose to the persistence hypothesis when using the CBS definition and a 
linear trend in all divisions of unemployment rates, namely: gender, age group, 
education level, and location either in urban or rural areas. On the other hand, we find 
increasing rejections for unemployment hysteresis when using quadratic trends with 
both the CBS and U1 definition. Moreover, most of the tests for the gaps in 
unemployment divisions: gender, age, education, and location reject the hysteresis, 
though gaps in the U1 definition seem to be more significant than those in the CBS 
definition.  
For the panel data tests, we find that majority of the tests reject the hysteresis 
on Im, Pesaran, Shin (IPS) framework. The results also suggest rejecting the hysteresis 
and favouring the persistence hypothesis for both the CBS and U1 definition on the 
method of Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC). Moreover, all division gaps in unemployment rates 
support the persistence hypotheses either on the method of LLC or Im, Pesaran, Shin 
(IPS). 
 In order to reduce and adjust regional unemployment rates in regional labour 
markets to their normal levels, policies relating to investment should be encouraged 
rather than relying on local economic growth as an auto mechanism in regional labour 
markets. Local governments could also manage the growth of their real minimum 
wages for reducing and adjusting unemployment rates. These two policy tools are 
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Appendix 1.1 Unemployment Rates by Provinces, Categories and Gaps 
 
Figure 1.2 Unemployment rates by province, 1990-2012  
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Appendix 1.2 LLC Panel Unit Root Test 
  1990 – 2000   2001 – 2012   1990 – 2012 





  adj-t p-value adj-t p-value   adj-t p-value adj-t p-value   adj-t p-value adj-t p-value 
Unemployment Rate -8.034*** 0.000 -7.989*** 0.000 
 
-8.265*** 0.000 -1.891*** 0.029 
 
0.126 0.550 -3.380*** 0.000 
By Gender: 
              Female -7.200*** 0.000 -7.171*** 0.000 
 
-7.642*** 0.000 -3.468*** 0.000 
 
0.096 0.538 -4.094*** 0.000 
Male -9.670*** 0.000 -9.625*** 0.000 
 
-6.975*** 0.000 -3.839*** 0.000 
 
-1.133 0.129 -3.470*** 0.000 
By Age: 
              Youth, 15-24 -7.683*** 0.000 -7.653*** 0.000 
 
-8.726*** 0.000 -6.580*** 0.000 
 
-2.514*** 0.006 -4.806*** 0.000 
Adult, 25+ -8.887*** 0.000 -8.871*** 0.000 
 
-6.830*** 0.000 0.368 0.644 
 
3.230 0.999 -1.693** 0.045 
By Education: 
              Low and Medium -8.435*** 0.000 -4.650*** 0.000 
 
-8.839*** 0.000 -2.778*** 0.003 
 
0.755 0.775 -1.207 0.114 
High -5.379*** 0.000 -5.382*** 0.000 
 
-5.394*** 0.000 -4.298*** 0.000 
 
-6.528*** 0.000 -2.517*** 0.006 
By Location: 
              Urban -7.964*** 0.000 -7.947*** 0.000 
 
-8.486*** 0.000 -3.590*** 0.000 
 
-1.494* 0.068 -2.565*** 0.005 
Rural -7.598*** 0.000 -7.455*** 0.000 
 
-7.718*** 0.000 -3.958*** 0.000 
 
0.076 0.530 -4.603*** 0.000 
By Gaps: 
              Gender gap -6.742*** 0.000 -6.746*** 0.000 
 
-4.758*** 0.000 -8.392*** 0.000 
 
-13.881*** 0.000 -7.897*** 0.000 
Age gap -8.205*** 0.000 -8.241*** 0.000 
 
-6.113*** 0.000 -6.108*** 0.000 
 
-2.641*** 0.004 -5.736*** 0.000 
Education gap -9.239*** 0.000 -6.190*** 0.000 
 
-4.596*** 0.000 -4.900*** 0.000 
 
-12.720*** 0.000 -6.166*** 0.000 
Urban-rural gap -8.194*** 0.000 -8.284*** 0.000   -2.609*** 0.005 -6.370*** 0.000   -15.628*** 0.000 -6.401*** 0.000 
Note: for sample period 1990-2000 and 2001-2012:  included one lag and for 1990-2012: the optimum lags by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). LLC tests for the gaps 





Essay 2: Persistence of Individual Unemployment in Indonesia:  





This paper presents a dynamic probit analysis of individual unemployment incidence 
using a panel survey on the National Socio-Economy (Susenas), 2008-2010. It compares 
a variety of dynamic random effects estimators, particularly focusing on the Heckman 
(1981) and Wooldridge (2005) approaches. The main results show a strong evidence of 
persistence or state dependence of individual unemployment in Indonesia. This finding 
is consistent with the theory of scar unemployment.    
  
Keywords: individual persistent unemployment, state dependence, Wooldridge 
estimator, Heckman estimator. 
 





2.1  Introduction 
In microeconomic literature, individual persistent unemployment or state dependence 
in unemployment could be defined as a causal link between past and current 
unemployment (Heckman and Borgas, 1980). This is also consistent with the theory of 
scar unemployment which postulates that, in fairly general conditions, the probability 
of being unemployed is higher for individuals that have experienced long periods of 
unemployment than for those who have had no or limited unemployment duration 
(Vishwanath, 1986).  
This topic is widely studied in developed countries such as the United States 
America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany because of the availability of 
individual panel data. In USA, Heckman and Borgas (1980) used data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey 1969-1971 for young males and Corcoran and Hill (1985) focused 
on men aged 35-64. Both studies found no evidence of state dependence in 
unemployment duration. However, Narendranathan and Elias (1993) and Greeg (2001) 
found strong evidence of state dependence in unemployment status using the 
National Child Development Study from UK. Arulampalam et al. (2000) also found 
strong evidence of unemployment persistence, especially for men older than 25 using 
the British Household Panel Survey. Strong evidence was also found in the case of 
Germany in Flaig et al. (1993), Muhleisen and Zimmermann (1994) and Biewen and 
Steffes (2010).  
Related to individual unemployment persistence, there was strong evidence 
showing that unemployment benefits or insurance caused disincentive effects to 
unemployment duration, particular in the USA and European countries (Atkinson and 
Micklerweight, 1991; Holmlund, 1998, and Mayer, 2002). The availability of these 
benefits for long time periods might discourage the unemployed from searching for a 
job and cause them to prolong their unemployment duration in the labour market. 
Another effect of these benefits, among others, was that they could damage individual 
employability through productivity deterioration (Pissarides, 1992). Similar effects of a 
transfer cash program for work, called Plan Jefes, were found in the case of Argentina 
(Aturriza, et. al., 2011). However, for those countries that do not have unemployment 
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benefits or government support systems, South Africa for example, the financial 
support from family and household formation may prolong unemployment (Klasen and 
Woolard, 2009).  
Compared to those empirical works in the developed countries, individual 
unemployment persistence in developing countries, including Indonesian has not or 
rarely been investigated using individual dynamic panel data.  Most of unemployment 
studies in Indonesia however, use regional panel data at provincial or district level (see 
for example: Dhanani, et. al., 2009, Soekarni, et. al., 2009, Camola and de Mello, 2011, 
Suryadarma, et. al., 2013). This might be because not enough individual panel data are 
available. The Indonesia’s National Workforces Surveys (Sakernas) are based on 
individual data but cannot be used as panel data because they use a different random 
sample for each survey. Thus, an empirical analysis based on these data would be 
suitable for national or regional (provincial-district) panel analysis. Meanwhile 
Indonesia’s Panel National Social-Economic Surveys (Panel Susenas) are recorded in 
limited three year periods, the latest one having took place from 2008 to 2010.  
Therefore, this paper tries to analyse individual unemployment persistence in 
the case of Indonesia using Susenas Panel, 2008-2010. The method focuses the 
dynamic probit panel data model based on Wooldridge (2005) as an alternative to 
Heckman (1981). These methods are comparable, especially using short-time periods 
of panel data (Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009). For the empirical approach, this paper 
also investigates the effects of internal and external factors that affect employment 
prospects of an unemployed person. On internal side, it includes person’s education, 
age, gender, marital status. On the external side, it also consists of internal and 
external household support. The models also include household formation. Again, for 
developing countries, especially for the Indonesian case, this kind of empirical research 
is relatively rare.  
The next section describes the dataset of the Susenas Panel and the methods 
on which the empirical analysis is based. Section 2.3 shows the evidences on the 
persistence of individual unemployment in Indonesia and relative importance of family 
support and external support from government and other institution as well 
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The data contains a sample of households from the Panel National Survey on Socio-
Economy (Susenas) who have a family member between the age 18 and 64 in March 
2008 and who participated in all three waves of the survey from 2008 to 2010. There 
are 21,686 observations on the surveys that meet these criteria2
The dependent variable or unemployment status consists of employed and not 
employed. The explanatory variables include lag of unemployment for representing 
state dependence or persistent unemployment, number of employed adults in 
household and household’s income, indicating family support to the unemployed. 
These variables are expected to be positively related to the probability of being 
unemployed. Household formation is represented by the number of children below six 
years of age, children in school, and elders in household and are all expected to have 
negative effects on the probability of unemployment. Support from outside the 
household comes from the number of received social safety net programs from the 
government and how much financial support via financial credit from bank, non-bank 
and informal parties they received. These variables should have positive effects on the 
probability of being unemployed.      
. The definition of 
unemployment is based on the standard International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) 
definition: a person is unemployed if he or she does not have a job, and is actively 
looking for work. This is also the narrow version of the official definition for 
unemployment from the Indonesian Central Body of Statistics (CBS). Thus, the 
unemployment rates in this paper are relatively low compared to those reported by 
CBS. The study restricts the observations to only those are in the labour force in all 
three years of period.   
                                                          
2 The raw observations are more than 21,686 for each year. However, we put additional consistency 
criteria during paneling data 2008-2010: sex and a relaxed criterion up to one year difference in age. 
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The individual’s education in years, sex, age, age squares, marital status, urban 
and year dummies are placed as control variables to account for observed 
heterogeneities. For the advanced modelling of the Heckman’s and Wooldridge’s 
models, we include additional time-invariant variables to solve unobserved 
heterogeneity and initial conditions problems. These variables will be explained later in 
the section of methodology. 
 
Table 2.1 State Transitions of Individual Unemployment in 2008-2010 
State Transitions Frequency Percent 
Never Unemployed 21,020 96.93 
One period of Unemployed: 
                        U2008, E2009, E2010 251 1.16
                      E2008, U2009, E2010 167 0.77 
                      E2008, E2009, U2010 132 0.61 
Two period of Unemployed: 
                        U2008, U2009, E2010 45 0.21
                      U2008, E2009, U2010 16 0.07 
                      E2008, U2009, U2010 28 0.13 
Never Employed 27 0.12 
Total Individuals 21,686 100.00 
Note: U = Unemployed and E = Employed. 
 
 
 Table 2.1 shows the state transitions of employed and unemployed individuals 
during the periods of 2008-2010. From 21,686 total individuals in 2008, there were 
21,020 individuals or 96.93 percent that never fell into unemployment during the 
other periods. Meanwhile, there were 550 individuals that experienced unemployment 
in one period. Of these, 251 had an unemployment status in 2008 but became 
employed in 2009-2010. There are 132 individuals who finally got a job in 2010 and 
167 people who fell into unemployment in 2009 only. From 89 individuals that had two 
periods of unemployment, 45 of them finally got job in 2010 after trying to get jobs in 
2008-2009, while 28 and 16 individuals had a job only in 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
Lastly, there were only 27 people that had very persistent unemployment or never got 




2.2.2.1 Modelling Persistence of Individual Unemployment 
The observed dependent variable, referring to the other studies, is binary and takes 
the value of one if the observation is unemployed and zero otherwise, named 
individual unemployment (𝒖𝒏). Then, we may specify the dynamic model of the 
unemployment status for individual i at the interview date at time t as follows:  
(2.1) 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝑓�𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1,𝒇𝒔𝑖𝑡,𝒉𝒇𝑖𝑡,𝒆𝒔𝑖𝑡 �  
where 𝑢𝑛∗ denotes the unobservable individual propensity to be unemployed as a 
function of lagged observed unemployment status (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 ), family support (fs), 
household formation (hf), and external support from outside the household (es), such 
as government supports via social safety net programs, financial credit from the bank 
or loans from informal financial sources. The lagged unemployment status would 
increase the propensity being unemployed. Furthermore, the internal support from 
other family members and external support from outside the household would also 
increase that propensity. Meanwhile, the household formation with dependent 
children and elders would reduce it.         
The general model of dynamic random effects probit for individual 
unemployment in equation (2.1) can be rewritten as (see also Arulampalam, et. al., 
2000):  
(2.2)  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝛾𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡         (i = 1, 2, ..., N    and  t = 2, ..., T) 
(2.3)  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 1(𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ > 0)  
where: 𝒙  is a vector of explanatory variables affecting 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 , β is the vector of 
coefficients associated with explanatory variables 𝒙, and 𝑣 is the unobservable error 
term. In equation (2.3), a person is observed to be unemployed when his/her 
propensity to be unemployed crosses zero, that is, itun  = 1 if 
*
itun  > 0 and zero 
otherwise. However, in equation (2.2), *itun  is a function of the observed status of an 
unemployed person in the previous period or 1−tun . The inclusion of lagged 
unemployment on the right side of the equation allows us to test the persistence of 
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the individual unemployment. The positive and significant effect of this variable is also 
consistent with the testing for state dependence in unemployment or so-called the 
scar unemployment (Arulampalam, et. al., 2000). 
 
2.2.2.2 Heckman’s Estimator 
Heckman and Borjas (1980) pointed out a potential problem arising in equation (2.2) is 
that it could produce a spurious coefficient of lagged unemployment by including 
inappropriate control variables or by not including unobserved heterogeneity which 
might have a significant effect on the propensity of unemployment. They suggested 
controlling for all potential observable and unobservable individual characteristics. 
Hence, it assumes that the unobservable individual-specific heterogeneity is time-
invariant and decomposes the error 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 , then equation (2.2) could be 
modified as,          
(2.4)  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝛾𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡         i = 1, 2, ..., N    and   t = 2, ..., T, 
where 𝑐𝑖 is assumed to be independent for 𝒙 all i and which is called the uncorrelated 
random effect model.   
Furthermore, there is another problem in equation (2.4) when the initial 
observation of unemployed, 1iun  has a significant correlation with the unobservable 
heterogeneity 𝑐𝑖  (Heckman, 1981). This problem emerges because the start of 
observation period, year of 2008 in this case, does not coincide with the stochastic 
process generating individual’s unemployment experiences. Heckman suggested 
approximating the density function of the initial period using the same parametric 
form as conditional density for the rest of observations (Arulampalam and Stewart, 
2009). Then equation (2.4) can be rewritten as, 
(2.5)  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝛾𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ 𝜃𝑡𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡         i = 1, 2, ..., N    and   t = 2, ..., T, 
with 𝜃𝑇 = 1 for identification of  𝜎𝑐2, and the equation for the initial observation as,  
(2.6)  𝑢𝑛𝑖1∗ = 𝝀
′𝒛𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖1           i = 1, 2, ... n   and  t = 1. 
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where 𝒛 is a vector of exogenous covariates that is expected to include instrument 
variables such as pre-sample variables and 𝑐𝑖 denotes the full set of time-varying 
explanatory variables. The standard assumption of the 𝑒𝑖𝑡  and 𝑐𝑖 are both normally 
distributed with variance 1 and 𝜎𝑐2, respectively. 
 In his paper, Heckman (1981) allowed the error in the equation of the initial 
condition (𝜃1𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖1) to be freely correlated with the error in the equation for the 
other periods (𝜃𝑡𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡). In addition, he also relaxed the standard assumption of 
equi-correlated errors in period t = 2, ... ,T. Hence, the Cov(𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠) is also 
equal to 𝜎𝑐2 for t, s = 2, ... ,T where t ≠ s . Therefore, the correlation between the two 
periods is given by 𝜌 = 𝜎𝑐2/(𝜎𝑐2 − 1) (Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009). Then, we 
could specify equation (2.5) as the same model as in equation (2.4), 
(2.7)  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝛾𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡         i = 1, 2, ..., N    and   t = 2, ..., T, 
and equation (2.6) as 
(2.8)   𝑢𝑛𝑖1∗ = 𝝀
′𝒛𝑖 + 𝜃𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖1           i = 1, 2, ..., N   and    t = 1. 
These two equations are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood and we could test 
for the exogeneity of the initial conditions on 𝜃. It is noted that Heckman estimators 
approximate the joint probability of the full observed 𝑢𝑛  sequences 
(𝑢𝑛𝑖1,𝑢𝑛𝑖2, … ,𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑇).   
 
2.2.2.3 Wooldridge’s Estimator 
An alternative to the Heckman approach is a simplified model proposed by 
Wooldridge (2005). Based on his approach, the initial conditions problem is solved by 
modelling 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 at period t = 2, ..., T conditional on the initial period (𝑢𝑛𝑖1) and 
exogenous variables (𝒙𝑖𝑡). Recall equation (2.4), 
(2.9)  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝛾𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡          i = 1, 2, ..., N    and   t = 2, ..., T, 
then specify an approximation for density of 𝑐𝑖 conditional on 𝑢𝑛𝑖1 and the period-
specific versions of time-varying explanatory variables starting from the second period 
of observations as: 
(2.10)   𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑢𝑛𝑖1 + 𝒙𝒊+′𝛼2 + 𝜀𝑖           i = 1, 2, ..., N   and    t = 1. 
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where 𝒙𝒊+ = �𝑥𝑖2′ , … ,𝑥𝑖𝑇′ �
′
 and 𝜀𝑖 is the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 
𝜎𝜀2. Substituting equation (2.10) into equation (2.9) gives, 
(2.11)  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ 𝛾𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + α1𝑢𝑛𝑖1 + 𝒙𝒊+′𝜶𝟐 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡,       
This equation can be estimated by the standard random effects probit model. It 
notices that Wooldridge estimators starting 𝑢𝑛 sequence from the second period of 
observation compared to the full observations in the Heckman estimators. 
 
2.2.2.4 Correlated Random Effects of Dynamic Panel Model 
The standard uncorrelated random effects probit model assumes that 𝑐𝑖  is 
uncorrelated with 𝒙𝒊𝒕. If this is not the case then the maximum likelihood of the 
estimates will be inconsistent. To avoid this problem, it could relax the assumption by 
following Mundlak (1978) and adding within-means of explanatory variables into the 
main equation in the Heckman estimators. Instead of using means of the full period of 
the observations, we use within-means of time-varying variables at T-1 of the 
observations. Then, the Heckman models would be re-specified as: 
(2.12)  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝛾𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ 𝒙�𝑖′+𝒂1 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡         i = 1, 2, ..., N    and   t = 2, ..., T, 
(2.13)   𝑢𝑛𝑖1∗ = 𝝀




∑ 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝑇𝑡=2 .  
It would be relatively different in the case of Wooldridge estimators. The 
popular version of the correlated random effect models for the Wooldridge approach 
is to replace 𝒙𝒊+ with the means of time-varying explanatory variables of all time 
periods (for example: Stewart, 2007; Biewen and Steffes, 2010; Akay, 2012). Then the 
equation (2.11) is rewritten as follows: 
(2.14)  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝛾𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ α1𝑢𝑛𝑖1 + 𝒙�𝑖′𝜶2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. 
Nevertheless, the equation (1.14) can be severely biased in the short periods of panel 
data, particularly in 3-5 time periods (Akay, 2012; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2013). 
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As an alternative, we follow the suggestion by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) and 
use the following equation3





∑ 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝑇𝑡=2 .  
The original and constraint models of Wooldridge estimators in the equation (2.11) 
and (2.15) would perform well as Heckman estimators especially for short-period of 
panel data (Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2013).  
 
2.3 Empirical Evidence 
The results from pooled and random-effects probit estimators for a probability model 
of unemployment are given in Table 2.2. Column [2] and [4] give the standard model of 
state dependence with explanatory variables (marginal effects are reported in 
Appendix 2.2). The difference is due to the choices in family support variables between 
the number of employed in household and the household’s income or expenditure. 
The number of employed person in a household has negative effect to the probability 
of unemployed meanwhile household’s income has positive effect. It seems that 
household’s income is seen as financial support to the unemployed in the family, 
thereby increasing the probability of being unemployed. Meanwhile, instead of being a 
kind of family support to the unemployed member, the employed persons in the 
household put a physiological pressure on unemployed in the family to find a job and 
reduce his/her probability of being unemployed. In column [3] and [5], the estimates 
include the lag of family support, either lagged household’s income or the lag of the 
number of employed in the household. In those estimates, the lagged family support 
has positive and significant impacts to the probability of being unemployed.         
Increases in the number of children below the age of six and the number of 
children in school reduce the probability of being unemployed, while the number of 
                                                          
3 Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) also suggested including all the initial-periods of the explanatory variables in 
the equation (1.14) which they admitted was unrealistic even though it would perform well. Such equation would 
be: 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷 + 𝛾𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + α1𝑢𝑛𝑖1 + 𝒙�𝑖′𝒂𝟐 + 𝒙𝑖1′ 𝒂𝟑 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. 
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elders is insignificant except for the estimates in column [3]. Furthermore, the external 
support from outside the household, i.e: the number of received social safety net 
programs and the other financial support from bank and non-bank institution have an 
insignificant effect on the probability of being unemployed, except for that estimate 
where the household’s income is included as presented in column [4]. Being 
unemployed in t-1 strongly increases the probability of being unemployed at t based 
on a very significant variable of lagged unemployment status in all estimates. 
 
Table 2.2 Pooled and Random-Effects Probit Estimates 
Variables Pooled Pobit 
 
Random Effects Probit 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
[6] [7] [8] [9] 
Unemployment (t-1) 1.680*** 2.151*** 1.549*** 1.555*** 
 
1.081*** 1.619*** 1.107*** 1.120*** 
 
(0.065) (0.073) (0.061) (0.062) 
 
(0.088) (0.081) (0.066) (0.067) 
Family Supports: 
         Num. of Employed in HH -0.430*** -0.769***
 












                
















                
Log of HH’s Income 
  
0.100*** -0.090*   
   
-0.055 -0.179*** 
   
(0.029) (0.047) 
   
(0.038) (0.054) 
Log of HH’s Income (t-1) 
   
0.245*** 
    
0.174*** 
    
(0.047) 
    
(0.053) 
Household Formation: 
         Num. of Children Below 6  -0.184*** -0.129*** -0.131*** -0.127***
 
-0.058 -0.016 -0.036 -0.036
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) 
 
(0.046) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) 
Num. of Children in School -0.156*** -0.132*** -0.129*** -0.131*** 
 
-0.009 -0.012 -0.027 -0.03 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) 
Num. of Elders 0.095* 0.036 0.025 0.023 
 
-0.003 -0.048 -0.038 -0.04 
 
(0.053) (0.056) (0.050) (0.050) 
 
(0.068) (0.063) (0.054) (0.054) 
External Supports: 
         Num. of Safety Net Programs 0.026 0.027 0.046* 0.064**  
 
0.099*** 0.093*** 0.065** 0.075**  
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030) 
Num. of Other Supports -0.044 -0.046 -0.145* -0.135 
 
0.095 0.100 -0.058 -0.051 
 
(0.089) (0.094) (0.086) (0.086) 
 
(0.111) (0.103) (0.092) (0.092) 
Control Variables: 
         Education in years 
     
0.006 0.004 0.009 0.007
      
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Males 
     
0.087 0.071 0.119*** 0.119*** 
      
(0.057) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) 
Age 
     
-0.113*** -0.072*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
      
(0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age Squares devided by 100 
     
0.110*** 0.061*** 0.036* 0.035*   
      
(0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) 
Married 
     
-0.830*** -0.680*** -0.512*** -0.504*** 
      
(0.090) (0.066) (0.058) (0.059) 
Urban 
     
0.382*** 0.340*** 0.366*** 0.348*** 
      
(0.063) (0.052) (0.047) (0.047) 
Year 2009 
     
1.296*** 0.134 -0.462 -1.126*   
      
(0.358) (0.308) (0.585) (0.618) 
Year 2010 
     
1.140*** -0.021 -0.552 -1.221*   
      
(0.352) (0.311) (0.591) (0.625) 
_cons -1.452*** -1.940*** -3.723*** -4.495***
     
 
(0.056) (0.063) (0.427) (0.453) 
     Rho (ρ) 
     
0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -2110 -1902 -2279 -2266
 
-1777 -1619 -2039 -2034 
N 43372 43372 43372 43372 
 
43372 43372 43372 43372 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
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The second part of Table 2.2 gives the equivalent standard random effect 
probit estimates, treating lagged unemployment and initial conditions as exogenous 
variables (Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009). When we introduce control variables into 
the models, the family support remains significant, except for the estimate in column 
[8]. However, all variables in the household formation become insignificant. The 
number of received social safety net program remains positive and significant for all 
estimates as well as the lagged unemployment. Being married decreases the 
probability of being unemployed while living in urban area increases that probability. 
In some estimates, being male also increases the probability of unemployment. 
Surprisingly, education has no effect on the probability of being unemployed.         
 The random effects estimates would be similar to pooled probit estimates (all 
control variables included) if they produce ρ close to zero or zero. Except for the 
estimates in column [6] which it produces non zero ρ = 0.199, all estimates give ρ 
equal to zero. The coefficient of lagged unemployment at 1.081 is smaller than the 
pooled probit estimates at 1.680. However, the random effects probit and pooled 
probit models involve different normalizations (Arulampalam, et. al., 2000). To 
compare coefficients, those from the random effects estimator need to be multiplied 
by the estimates of (�1− 𝜌), where 𝜌 is a constant cross-period error correlation. 
Thus, the scaled coefficient of lagged unemployment in column [6] is 0.968. This 
estimated coefficient remains strongly significant. 
Table 2.3 presents the random effects probit estimates based on the 
Heckman’s and Wooldridge’s approaches. All estimates are modelled with the 
Mundlak specifications. In the Heckman estimates (full versions in Appendix 2.3), we 
include one pre-sampling exogenous instrument, Cohort1990 (labour force that was 
born in 1990 then had first experience on the labour market in 2008) on the initial 
period estimations. The estimations produce positive and significant of the lagged 
unemployment which this supports the evidence of the existence of persistent 
individual unemployment in the case of Indonesia. The coefficients are ranging from 
0.663–0.713. Compared to the random-effects estimators (Table 2.2) that treat the 
initial condition as exogenous, the estimated coefficients of the lagged unemployment 
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in the Heckman estimations are relatively lower in all cases and the coefficients of ρ 
are more than twice as high, especially for the first case, 0.520 and 0.199, respectively. 
In terms of scaled coefficient estimates, 𝛾(1 − 𝜌)0.5, the standard random-effects 
probit with initial conditions being treated as exogenous produces 0.97 while the 
Heckman estimator gives 0.46.    
Moreover, the current number of employed decreases the probability of being 
unemployed meanwhile its lag is not significant (column 2 and 3). The result also gives 
the negative and significant coefficient of the current household’s income but not its 
lag. All variables in household formation are not significant as well as the variables in 
external support from outside households. Being male and living in urban areas 
increase the probability of being unemployed meanwhile being married decreases that 
probability. The estimations of θ  in all estimates are significantly greater than zero, 
thus rejecting the exogeneity of the equation in the first observation. In fact, all 
coefficients of θ  are insignificantly different from one.      
In the Wooldridge estimates (full versions in Appendix 2.4), the effect of the 
current number of employed is consistently significant and negative while the previous 
number of employed is positively significant to the current status of unemployment. 
The similar results are also found for the household’s income, except for the estimate 
in column [9] where household’s income is insignificant. The variables of household 
formation are mostly insignificant except for the number of children younger than six 
years old. The variables of external support from the government and the others are 
also insignificant. The lagged unemployment remains significant for all estimates and 
their coefficients are ranging between 0.578 - 1.174. 
  These coefficients are relatively lower than those found in the other empirical 
studies. Arulampalam et. al. (2000) for example produced the coefficients ranging 
between 1.051 - 1.412. Arulampalam and Stewart (2009) provided the estimated 
coefficient from Wooldridge’s method at 1.062 in the case of the UK. Biewen and 
Steffes (2010) presented the empirical coefficients ranging between 1.387 - 1.612 in 




Table 2.3 Heckman and Wooldridge with Mundlak Specifications 
Variables Heckman   Wooldridge 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]   [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.663*** 0.713*** 0.676*** 0.696***  0.578*** 1.174*** 0.559*** 0.607*** 
 
(0.162) (0.171) (0.171) (0.170)  (0.196) (0.161) (0.176) (0.172) 
Family Supports: 
    
     
Num. of Employed in HH -1.814*** -1.769*** 
  




 (0.168) (0.124)                  








  (0.046)                  
Log of HH’s Income 
  
-0.336*** -0.287***    -0.248** -0.170 
   
(0.097) (0.107)    (0.113) (0.115) 
Log of HH’s Income (t-1) 
   
0.105     0.215*** 
    
(0.102)     (0.077) 
Household Formation: 
    
     
Num. of Children Below 6  0.109 0.115 -0.037 -0.037  0.255 0.296** -0.040 -0.040 
 
(0.134) (0.133) (0.097) (0.096)  (0.163) (0.134) (0.118) (0.117) 
Num. of Children in School -0.024 -0.021 -0.045 -0.045  0.048 0.061 0.014 0.011 
 
(0.116) (0.115) (0.082) (0.082)  (0.141) (0.119) (0.101) (0.099) 
Num. of Elders -0.074 -0.071 -0.021 -0.023  -0.021 0.041 0.017 0.01 
 
(0.209) (0.207) (0.149) (0.148)  (0.255) (0.212) (0.178) (0.177) 
External Supports: 
    
     
Num. of Safety Net Programs 0.064 0.063 0.052 0.051  0.091 0.069 0.035 0.034 
 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.054) (0.054)  (0.089) (0.075) (0.063) (0.062) 
Num. of Other Supports 0.227 0.228 0.145 0.143  0.233 0.208 0.141 0.137 
 
(0.200) (0.198) (0.141) (0.141)  (0.238) (0.195) (0.165) (0.163) 
Control Variables: 
    
     
Education in years -0.029 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029  -0.033 -0.034 -0.041 -0.039 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.035) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) 
Males 0.064 0.064 0.133*** 0.132***  0.097 0.083 0.139*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.051) (0.051)  (0.083) (0.065) (0.053) (0.052) 
Age 0.235 0.230 0.032 0.032  0.125 0.099 -0.101 -0.104 
 
(0.214) (0.221) (0.158) (0.146)  (0.255) (0.217) (0.178) (0.176) 
Age Squares divided by 100 -0.447 -0.436 -0.158 -0.158  -0.436 -0.348 -0.094 -0.089 
 
(0.311) (0.321) (0.225) (0.210)  (0.361) (0.305) (0.248) (0.245) 
Married -0.391 -0.389 -0.456** -0.454**  -0.620* -0.516* -0.666*** -0.655*** 
 
(0.291) (0.289) (0.219) (0.218)  (0.328) (0.273) (0.237) (0.235) 
Urban 0.550*** 0.540*** 0.408*** 0.403***  0.523*** 0.403*** 0.410*** 0.388*** 
 
(0.096) (0.095) (0.066) (0.065)  (0.097) (0.073) (0.063) (0.061) 
Year 2009 1.926 -0.063 -0.136 0.061  0.569 0.055 -0.957 -1.270*   
 
(30.920) (39.302) (42.163) (0.064)  (0.500) (0.394) (0.758) (0.753) 
Year 2010 1.669 -0.315 -0.180 
 
 0.413 -0.105 -0.954 -1.296*   
 
(30.920) (39.302) (42.163) 
 
 (0.498) (0.393) (0.759) (0.756) 
Initial Conditions:         
Unemployment 2008      1.083*** 0.627*** 0.679*** 0.645*** 
        (0.284) (0.220) (0.202) (0.196) 
Exogenous test on initial 
condition: 
    
     
Theta (θ) 1.053*** 1.067*** 1.126** 1.161**       
 
(0.283) (0.294) (0.457) (0.495)       
Rho (ρ)  0.520 0.506 0.212 0.202  0.574 0.312 0.253 0.228 
Log Likelihood -2763 -2763 -3416 -3415  -1635.6 -1595.9 -2024.9 -2021.1 
N 65058 65058 65058 65058   43372 43372 43372 43372 




The control variables of married and urban dummies are consistently significant 
for all estimates while the male dummy is only significant for some estimates. 
Education remains insignificant for all estimates. This is probably because the majority 
of the labour force in Indonesia has low skill or an average of 8 years of education (see 
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Appendix 2.1). Age and age squares are also insignificant for all estimates as well as 
time dummies with an exception in the last estimate (column 9). Lastly, the initial 
condition of unemployment status in the year of 2008 is significant in all estimates.    
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proved that there is strong evidence of an individual’s previous 
unemployment experience having implications on his/her future labour market 
experience, which is consistent with the state dependence or scarring theory of 
unemployment. This strong conclusion come from all estimates presented in this paper, 
namely: pooled probit, random-effects probit, Wooldridge and Heckman estimates.        
In addition, the consequences of including control variables or observable 
heterogeneity, unobservable heterogeneity, and initial conditions in the models, the 
effects of the variables in the household formation and external supports become 
weaker or insignificant. Meanwhile the variables in the family supports play a 
significant role in the current unemployment status. The probability of being 
unemployment increases if the persons are males and live in urban area. It will 
decrease if they are married. However, the level of education and external household 
support, especially receiving social safety net programs play no role in the probability 
of being unemployed.  
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Appendix 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  
Mean 
Obs 2008 2009 2010 
Unemployment 21686 0.016 0.012 0.009 
Num. of Adult Employment in HH 21686 2.219 2.236 2.219 
Log of HH Expenditure 21686 14.133 14.250 14.393 
Num. of Children Below 6 Years 21686 0.502 0.480 0.445 
Num. of Children in School 21686 0.808 0.810 0.808 
Num. of Elder in HH 21686 0.117 0.117 0.117 
Num. of Received Social Safety Net Programs 21686 0.604 0.538 0.702 
Num. of Other Supports 21686 0.061 0.056 0.079 
Education 21686 7.996 8.074 8.115 
Males 21686 0.665 0.665 0.665 
Age 21686 38.533 39.193 39.868 
Married 21686 0.841 0.842 0.846 
Urban 21686 0.435 0.435 0.435 
 
Appendix 2.2 Marginal Effects of Probit Estimates 
Variables Pooled Pobit 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.040*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Family Supports: 
    Num. of Employed in HH -0.010*** -0.017*** 
 




                








                
Log of HH’s Income 
  
0.003*** -0.002*   
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log of HH’s Income (t-1) 
   
0.006*** 
    
(0.001) 
Household Formation: 
    Num. of Children Below 6  -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Num. of Children in School -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Num. of Elders 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
External Supports: 
    Num. of Safety Net Programs 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.002**  
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001) 
Num. of Other Supports -0.001 -0.001 -0.004* -0.003 








Appendix 2.3 Full Versions of Heckman Estimates 
Variables Heckman Estimators with Mundlak Specifications 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.663*** 0.713*** 0.676*** 0.696*** 
 
(0.162) (0.171) (0.171) (0.170) 
Family Supports:     










  Log of HH's Income 
  
-0.336*** -0.287***
   
(0.097) (0.107) 
Log of HH's Income (t-1) 
   
0.105 
    
(0.102) 
Household Formation:     
Num. of Children Below 6 years  0.109 0.115 -0.037 -0.037 
 
(0.134) (0.133) (0.097) (0.096) 
Num. of Children in School -0.024 -0.021 -0.045 -0.045 
 
(0.116) (0.115) (0.082) (0.082) 
Num. of Elders -0.074 -0.071 -0.021 -0.023 
 
(0.209) (0.207) (0.149) (0.148) 
External Supports:     
Num. of Safety Net Programs 0.064 0.063 0.052 0.051 
 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.054) (0.054) 
Num. of Other Supports 0.227 0.228 0.145 0.143 
 
(0.200) (0.198) (0.141) (0.141) 
Control Variables:     
Education (years) -0.029 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) 
Males 0.064 0.064 0.133*** 0.132*** 
 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.051) (0.051) 
Age 0.235 0.230 0.032 0.032 
 
(0.214) (0.221) (0.158) (0.146) 
Age Squares (1/100) -0.447 -0.436 -0.158 -0.158 
 
(0.311) (0.321) (0.225) (0.210) 
Married -0.391 -0.389 -0.456** -0.454** 
 
(0.291) (0.289) (0.219) (0.218) 
Urban 0.550*** 0.540*** 0.408*** 0.403*** 
 
(0.096) (0.095) (0.066) (0.065) 
Year 2009 1.926 -0.063 -0.136 0.061 
 
(30.920) (39.302) (42.163) (0.064) 
Year 2010 1.669 -0.315 -0.180 
 
 
(30.920) (39.302) (42.163) 
 Time Invariant:    




  Mean of HH's Income, 08-10 
  
0.326*** 0.172
   
(0.107) (0.182) 
Mean of Child. Below 6, 08-10 -0.186 -0.190 -0.006 -0.005 
 
(0.151) (0.149) (0.107) (0.107) 
Mean of Child. in School, 08-10 0.007 0.005 0.014 0.014 
 
(0.124) (0.123) (0.088) (0.087) 
Mean of Elders, 08-10 -0.008 -0.011 -0.029 -0.027 
 
(0.229) (0.227) (0.165) (0.164) 
Mean of Social Programs, 08-10 0.120 0.118 0.062 0.062 
 
(0.102) (0.101) (0.073) (0.072) 
Mean of Other Supports, 08-10 -0.322 -0.317 -0.464** -0.456* 
 
(0.334) (0.330) (0.236) (0.234) 
Mean of Education 0.046 0.046 0.043* 0.042* 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.023) (0.022) 
Mean of Age -0.359* -0.351 -0.088 -0.087 
 
(0.214) (0.222) (0.158) (0.145) 
Mean of Age Squares 0.561* 0.547* 0.205 0.204 
 
(0.313) (0.323) (0.226) (0.210) 
Mean of Married -0.672** -0.658 -0.144 -0.140 
 
(0.313) (0.310) (0.231) (0.230) 




(30.921) (39.299) (42.152) (0.753) 
rfper1 




  Log of HH's Income 
  
-0.197*** -0.197***
   
(0.056) (0.056) 
Num. of Children Below 6 years  -0.052 -0.052 -0.022 -0.022 
 
(0.071) (0.071) (0.051) (0.051) 
Num. of Children in School 0.017 0.017 -0.016 -0.016 
 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.037) (0.037) 
Num. of Elders 0.143 0.142 0.044 0.044 
 
(0.105) (0.104) (0.074) (0.074) 
Num. of Safety Net Programs 0.091 0.090 0.046 0.046 
 
(0.062) (0.061) (0.046) (0.046) 
Num. of Other Supports 0.090 0.090 -0.062 -0.062 
 
(0.183) (0.182) (0.136) (0.136) 
Education (years) 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Males -0.075 -0.074 0.032 0.032 
 
(0.086) (0.085) (0.061) (0.061) 
Married 1.133*** -1.125*** -0.675*** -0.675*** 
 
(0.159) (0.158) (0.091) (0.091) 
Age -0.224*** -0.223*** -0.107*** -0.107*** 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.022) (0.023) 
Age Squares (1/100) 0.234 0.232*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 
(0.046) (0.045) (0.029) (0.029) 
Urban 0.611*** 0.606*** 0.556*** 0.555*** 
 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.075) (0.076) 
Cohort1990 -0.400* -0.399* -0.172 -0.171 
 
(0.236) (0.235) (0.172) (0.172) 
_cons 3.136*** 3.113*** 2.315*** 2.308*** 
 
(0.610) (0.607) (0.844) (0.844) 
theta 1.053*** 1.067*** 1.126*** 1.161*** 
 
(0.283) (0.294) (0.457) (0.495) 
rho  0.520 0.506 0.212 0.202 
Log Likelihood -2763 -2763 -3416 -3415 
N 65058 65058 65058 65058 
 
 
Appendix 2.4 Full Versions of Wooldridge Estimates 
Variables Wooldridge Estimators with Mundlak Specifications 
(1) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.578*** 1.174*** 0.559*** 0.607*** 
 
(0.196) (0.161) (0.176) (0.172) 
Family Supports:     
Num. of Employed in HH -1.858*** -1.338***                  
 
(0.168) (0.124)                  
Num. of Employed in HH (t-1)  0.397***                  
 
 (0.046)                  
Log of HH’s Income   -0.248** -0.17 
 
  (0.113) (0.115) 
Log of HH’s Income (t-1)    0.215*** 
 
   (0.077) 
Household Formation:     
Num. of Children Below 6  0.255 0.296** -0.04 -0.04 
 
(0.163) (0.134) (0.118) (0.117) 
Num. of Children in School 0.048 0.061 0.014 0.011 
 
(0.141) (0.119) (0.101) (0.099) 
Num. of Elders -0.021 0.041 0.017 0.01 
 
(0.255) (0.212) (0.178) (0.177) 
External Supports:     
Num. of Safety Net Programs 0.091 0.069 0.035 0.034 
 
(0.089) (0.075) (0.063) (0.062) 
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Num. of Other Supports 0.233 0.208 0.141 0.137 
 
(0.238) (0.195) (0.165) (0.163) 
Control Variables:     
Education (years) -0.033 -0.034 -0.041 -0.039 
 
(0.035) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) 
Males 0.097 0.083 0.139*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.083) (0.065) (0.053) (0.052) 
Age 0.125 0.099 -0.101 -0.104 
 
(0.255) (0.217) (0.178) (0.176) 
Age Squares (1/100) -0.436 -0.348 -0.094 -0.089 
 
(0.361) (0.305) (0.248) (0.245) 
Married -0.620* -0.516* -0.666*** -0.655*** 
 
(0.328) (0.273) (0.237) (0.235) 
Urban 0.523*** 0.403*** 0.410*** 0.388*** 
 
(0.097) (0.073) (0.063) (0.061) 
Year 2009 0.569 0.055 -0.957 -1.270*   
 
(0.500) (0.394) (0.758) (0.753) 
Year 2010 0.413 -0.105 -0.954 -1.296*   
 
(0.498) (0.393) (0.759) (0.756) 
Initial Conditions:     
Unemployment 2008 1.083*** 0.627*** 0.679*** 0.645*** 
 
(0.284) (0.220) (0.202) (0.196) 
Time Invariant:     
Mean of Employed in HH, 09-10 1.150*** 0.419***                  
 
(0.111) (0.094)                  
Mean of HH Income, 09-10   0.207* -0.06 
 
  (0.121) (0.152) 
Mean of Child. Below 6, 09-10 -0.340* -0.359** -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.176) (0.145) (0.126) (0.124) 
Mean of Child. in School, 09-10 -0.091 -0.089 -0.053 -0.051 
 
(0.150) (0.125) (0.106) (0.105) 
Mean of Elders, 09-10 -0.041 -0.112 -0.073 -0.071 
 
(0.272) (0.225) (0.191) (0.189) 
Mean of Social Programs, 09-10 0.076 0.069 0.069 0.075 
 
(0.108) (0.089) (0.076) (0.075) 
Mean of Other Supports, 09-10 -0.274 -0.19 -0.334 -0.319 
 
(0.332) (0.266) (0.228) (0.225) 
Mean of Education 0.046 0.044 0.053** 0.051*   
 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) 
Mean of Age -0.249 -0.183 0.049 0.053 
 
(0.256) (0.217) (0.178) (0.176) 
Mean of Age Squares 0.548 0.419 0.135 0.129 
 
(0.363) (0.305) (0.249) (0.246) 
Mean of Married -0.436 -0.291 0.083 0.091 
 
(0.335) (0.281) (0.244) (0.241) 
rho 0.574 0.312 0.253 0.228 
log Likelihood -1635.641 -1595.885 -2024.937 -2021.054 











Essay 3: Issues on Targeting and Designing the Amount of Grant for the 





This paper has two objectives. The first objective is to investigate who currently gets 
the cash transfer programs in Indonesia, especially BLT and PKH programs. The results 
show that there is a significant number of the non-poor or non-intended households 
receiving the programs. However, in the probit estimates of the BLT and PKH recipients, 
results indicate that being poor, having household characteristics related to the poor 
conditions, and being a recipient of the other social benefits, increase the probability 
of receiving the programs. The second objective is to propose better alternative 
options for designing the grant amount of grant compared to the fixed universal grant 
that has been applied by the Indonesian government recently. Based on the 
simulations, the better alternative options for the grant amount are: (1) making the 
grant equal to the income deficit of the poor household plus the expected inflation, 
and (2) giving the grant equal to the 75th percentile of the income deficits of the 
households plus the expected inflation in respective provinces. These two alternative 
options significantly reduce the provincial poverty rates compared to the fixed 
universal grant.   
 
Keywords: cash transfer, income deficit, poverty. 
 





The Asian economic crisis hit the Indonesian economy harder than most countries in 
the period of 1997–2000. According to the Indonesian Central Body of Statistics (CBS), 
the economy shrank by about 13 percent in 1998, after a strong performance from 
1970 to 1996. In the same period, investment decreased by approximately 30 percent. 
Inflation and interest rates increased into the double digits. Food prices, in particular, 
rocketed, increasingly by almost 80 percent. Poverty and unemployment, which were 
already problems before the crisis, escalated to destabilizing levels. Some academics 
and government officials believed that Indonesia would continue in economic 
depression and social chaos if the lack of comprehensive and integrated programs to 
prevent them continued. As a result, the interim government and legislators started to 
devise programs that could serve as social safety nets.  
In 2005, to compensate for the economic shock, as seen in the increase in fuel 
prices, the government of Indonesia (GOI) initiated a one-year unconditional cash 
transfer (UCT) program for poor and near-poor families, called Bantuan Langsung 
Tunai (BLT). In October, 2008, a second BLT was implemented to again compensate for 
increasing fuel prices, followed by a third in June, 2013, a third program, called 
Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat (BLSM). In mid-2007, the government also 
designed a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, called Program Keluarga Harapan 
(PKH), with the intention of running it from 2007 to 2014. In the BLT program, each 
targeted household would receive cash fixed at Rp 100,000 or $10 per month (Rp 
150,000 in BLSM). In the PKH program, grants would vary from a minimum of Rp 
600,000 to a maximum of Rp 2,200,000 per year, depending on the household’s 
characteristics, especially in health and education.  
Presently, economic arguments for the most suitable cash transfer amounts are 
not well-formed. The most popular argument from the government, which was used 
for the BLT program, is that the amount should depend on the availability of 
government funds and the number of targeted households. An alternative argument, 
this time used in the PKH program, is that poor households should be provided with a 
percentage of their monthly expenditure (15–20 percent).  
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The general finding in the literature is that cash transfer amounts are often too 
small, especially for conditional cash transfer programs for education (see for example: 
Filmer and Schady, 2006, World Bank, 2011). In the case of Indonesia, the grants are 
insufficient in covering the additional expenditures of households, such as additional 
junior high school fees (World Bank, 2011). Similarly, in Cambodia, grant amounts are 
so small that there is no evidence of a disincentive effect on labour supply (Filmer and 
Schady, 2006). Evidence in Latin America and the Caribbean also suggests that the 
amounts of benefit is too small to make a change (Handa and Davis, 2006, Kabeer, 
2009). However, several empirical simulations found that increasing the grant amount 
had positive effects, particularly on education (Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite, 2003; 
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago, 2011; Todd and Wolpin, 2006).   
Many studies started to pay more attention to the cash transfer programs’ 
impact evaluations and targeting methods rather than the amounts with which poor 
households should be provided (see for example: Fiszbein et. al., 2009, Arnold et. al., 
2011, and Klasen and Lange, 2012). For Indonesian cases, this can be found in the work 
of Alatas et. al. (2012) and the several studies of the World Bank (2011, 2012a, 2012b). 
Therefore, this paper aims to investigate who gets the cash transfer programs in 
Indonesia and to propose alternative options for calculating the expected amount of 
cash transfer that can be given to poor families when socio-economic indicators and 
living costs are taken into account in order to maximise the impact on poverty. This 
approach would be more appropriate than the previous or even current approach 
(fixed universal grant) being used by the government.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Desirable Goals 
In general, cash transfer programs are designed to support of some purposes, such as 
poverty alleviation, improved nutrition, health, and education outcomes, productivity, 
economic growth and women empowerment. Based on empirical evidences, 
particularly in Asia and Latin America countries, the primary function of most cash 
transfer programs is the direct and immediate support for the reduction of economic 
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vulnerabilities and alleviation of poverty in both development and humanitarian relief 
situations. In the medium-term, transfers are expected to show positive impacts on 
poor people’s productive livelihood strategies. In the long-term, with growing 
evidences, indicates that the programs can catalyse important effects that can help 
break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Nevertheless, not all programs 
that have been robustly evaluated deliver impacts in all of these areas. Many new and 
existing programs await rigorous evaluation, so the full range of impacts is still 
emerging (Fiszbein et. al., 2009). 
 
3.2.2 Targeting 
The other thing that is probably the most important to make cash transfer program 
successfully, is targeting. Targeting is the process of determining the family or the 
person entitled for receiving cash transfers. For the cases of developed countries in 
which the population administration and the system of social safety nets are well 
defined, then the targeting process is not going to be a significant problem. In contrast 
are the cases of developing countries, where these systems have not been managed 
well, and thus have turned the targeting process into a very serious problem.  
The targeting process ranges from universal to categorical options (e.g. by 
poverty status, disability, age, student, pregnant women). The process can be done by 
a means test which might be administratively difficult for developing countries and 
expensive due to the large number of potential recipients that need to be validated 
individually. One can use a proxy means test in which information on assets and 
demographic characteristics is used to create a proxy for household expenditure or 
income based on a survey of a group of households. The other way is self-targeting 
that relies on beneficiaries to categorise themselves as potential recipients. 
Geographical targeting (e.g. population in natural disaster areas) and community-
based selection can also be used (Coady, et. al., 2004; Arnold, et. al., 2011; Klasen and 
Lange, 2012).  
In fact, the targeting process could involve a combination of those processes. In 
developed countries, the targeted households apply for social benefits and are 
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evaluated by local/central government staff (often by using means tests, such as 
income) to decide whether the household is entitled to social benefits. In developing 
countries such as Indonesia, the government makes a database of intended beneficiary 
households by surveying and using PMT to create a final beneficiary list and delivers 
the social benefits based on this final list. This is probably why mis-targeting is 
relatively higher in developing countries than developed ones. Targeting inaccuracies 
in Indonesia have been documented in many government antipoverty programs 
(Cameron, 2002; Daly and Fane, 2002; Olken, 2006; World Bank, 2012a). 
 
3.2.3 Indonesia’s Cash Transfer Programs 
The Indonesian Constitution contains several articles on human rights and social 
security. Article 28H(3) states: “Every person shall have the right to social security in 
order to develop oneself fully as a dignified human being”. In Article 34(1), it states: 
“The poorest-poor and abandoned children shall be taken care of by the State”; (2) 
“The State shall develop a system of social security for all of the people and shall 
empower the inadequate and underprivileged in society in accordance with human 
dignity”; (3) “The State shall have the obligation to provide sufficient medical and 
public service facilities”; and (4) “ Further provisions in relation to the implementation 
of this Article shall be regulated by law”. Article 28H(3) is from the second amendment 
on 18th August, 2000, and Article 34(1)–(4) are from the fourth amendment on 10th 
August, 2002.    
Although, since 2000, the crisis has been overcome and the economy has 
improved, it took seven years before the government and its legislators passed a law 
mandating the implementation of a social security system (Law 40/2004). It then took 
another seven years to pass a law creating social security agencies (Law 24/2011). In 
general, Law 40/2004 regulates social security in terms of health, work accidents, old 
age, pensions, and death. Although these social security dimensions appear in some 
articles related to the poor, there is no explicit article in Law 40/2004 that regulates 
social security in the context of covering basic needs, such as food, shelter, and health 
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care. This law also does not regulate social benefits, such as cash transfers. This is in 
contrast to many developed countries, where social benefits are required by law. 
There are at least two reasons why social benefits or cash transfers should be 
regulated by law. The first is that political reasons for getting social benefits will be 
eliminated (i.e., as a means of gaining more votes in the general election), because 
every successive government will have the same obligation to protect poor citizens. 
The second reason is that there will be consequences for mis-targeting recipient 
households. In the GOI’s implementation of the cash transfer programs (BLT or PKH), 
there is a significant number of mis-targeted households. Although the government, 
not the targeted households, is usually responsible for failing to properly identify the 
poor households, there is no protocol for dealing with mis-targeting and recouping lost 
funds (such as by making the beneficiary return the grants). Sometimes, a negative 
result of the mis-targeting is social conflict, and the GOI relies on local administrative 
staff to resolve them. However, if social benefits are regulated by law, these problems 
will be resolved by the civilian court instead.  
 
Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT/BLSM) 
In October 2005, the GOI decided to reduce fuel subsidies by increasing fuel prices. To 
cope with the price shocks that resulted from the rise in fuel prices, the GOI ran a BLT 
program with immediate cash support for poor and near-poor households. The 
program was designed to last one year (October 2005–September 2006), with each 
household receiving Rp 100,000, or about US$10, per month and disbursements made 
quarterly (Table 1). Beneficiary households were identified by CBS using a proxy-means 
testing methodology, after which the GOI created a database by population survey, 
called Pendataan Sosial Ekonomi/Data Collection for Social Economy (PSE 2005). Total 
financing for this program was around Rp 24 trillion, or about US$ 2.4 billion. 
In May, 2008, amidst pressure from the global fuel price increase, the GOI again 
reduced fuel subsidies, which led to an increase in fuel prices by around 29 percent. A 
similar BLT scheme was employed in 2008–2009 to mitigate the economic shocks on 
the poor. The 2008 BLT program initially targeted the same number of people as the 
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2005 program—15.4 million households—after using the same baseline data. However, 
after adjustments were made following a verification process, known as Pendataan 
Program Perlindungan Sosial/Data Collection for Social Protection Programs (PPLS 
2008), the number of targeted households increased to 19.2 million (Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1 Summary of BLT/BLSM and PKH Programs 
 BLT/BLSM Program PKH Program 
Objective: Consumption support because 
of increased inflation caused by 
increasing fuel prices, which 
resulted from reduced fuel 
subsidies 
(1) Provide grants to send children to 
school and receive regular health 
care 
(2) Long-term poverty reduction and 
interruption of the transmission of 
poverty 
Type: Cash and Unconditional Cash and Conditional 
Year Implementation: 2005/2006, 2008/2009, 2013 2007–2014 
Targeting: 
      Targeted households (HH) Poor and Near-poor Very poor 
    Targeting Method Proxy Means Tests Proxy Means Tests 
    Targeting Database PSE 2005, PPLS 2008/2011 PPLS 2008/2011 
    Number of Official Targeted HH 15.4 to 19.2 million 2007–2008: 810 thousand 
  
2013: 2.4 million 
   Coverage Nationwide Pilot project 
Benefits: 
     The amount of grant Rp 100,000 (2005–2009) 
Rp 150,000 (2013) 
Minimum Rp 600,000 (per year)  
Maximum Rp 2,200,000 (per year) 
   Payee Head of the HH Mother or woman in HH 
   Payment method Via local post office Via local post office 
   Duration 2005/2006: 12 months  
2008/2009: 9 months 
2013: 4 months 
Up to 6 years, recertification should 
be made twice (after 3 and 6 years) 
Conditions: 
     Health None (1) Children aged 0–6 must visit a 
health clinic and receive medical 
treatment  
  (2) Pregnant or nursing women must 
attend a health centre to receive 
ante-and post-natal examinations 
   Education None (1) Children aged 7–12 must enrol in 
school and attend a minimum of 
85% of school days 
  
(2) Children aged 12–15 who have 
not completed 9 years of basic 
education must enrol in an 
education program to complete 
an equivalent of 9 years of basic 
education 
Financing: 




    Source of Financing Government Budget Government Budget 
Source: World Bank, Ministry of Social, Ministry of Finance of Indonesia. 
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The amount of funds disbursed was also Rp 100,000 per month per household, 
but the program ran for nine months only, from June, 2008, to February, 2009, in three 
tranches: Rp 300,000 for the months of June to August, 2008, Rp 400,000 for the 
months of September to December, and Rp 200,000 for the months of January to 
February, 2009. The total financing for this round was about Rp 17.8 trillion (about US$ 
1.8 billion). In June, 2013, the GOI decided to increase domestic fuel prices again, while 
at the same time starting the Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat (BLSM) 
program. This program targets 25 percent of the poorest households; that is, 15.5 
million households, based on PPLS 2011. Each family will receive Rp 150,000 ($15) per 
month for only four months. The total cost of this program is Rp 9.3 trillion ($ 0.93 
billion). 
 
Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) 
In 2007, the GOI introduced a pilot project in seven provinces for a conditional cash 
transfer program, called Program Keluarga Harapan. This program was motivated by 
the success of similar programs in Latin America, such as Mexico’s Progresa and Brazil’s 
Bolsa Familia. Targeted groups were the poorest households with pregnant or nursing 
women and children up to 15 years of age. These households received grants for a 
maximum period of six years. According to data from CBS, there were 6.5 million 
households in these categories. However, during its inception as a pilot project, only 
810,000 families were supported, with a planned total of 2.5 million households by 
2013 (Table 3.1).  
Beneficiary households must fulfil certain conditions related to health and 
education. Households with children aged 0–6 must visit health clinics and receive 
medical treatment, such as basic vaccinations. Pregnant or nursing mothers must 
receive ante- and post-natal treatment. Children aged 7–12 must enrol in a school and 
attend a minimum of 85 percent of school days. Children aged 12–15 who have not 
completed nine years of basic education must enrol in an education program to 




3.3 Targeting Performances of BLT and PKH Programs 
As it mentioned in earlier section, the Indonesian government made the database of 
the intended recipients both in the BLT and PKH programs. The database for these 
programs should be come from the database for the social protection programs in 
2008, called PPLS 2008.  
 
Table 3.2 Type of the Household Samples in Susenas 2009 and 2010 
Type of BLT Recipients (Susenas 2009)   PKH Recipients (Susenas 2010) 
Household Ya No Total   Ya No Total 
Poor HH 8,803 14,513 23,316 
 
265 7,320 7,585 
(%) (37.76) (62.24) (100.00) 
 
(3.49) (96.51) (100.00) 
Non poor HH 73,578 194,859 268,437 
 
820 58,111 58,931 
(%) (27.41) (72.59) (100.00)  (1.39) (98.61) (100.00) 
Intended HH 41,836 45,703 87,539 
 
103 2,427 2,530 
(%) (47.79) (52.21) (100.00) 
 
(4.07) (95.93) (100.00) 
Non-Intended HH 46,255 139,511 185,766 
 
982 63,004 63,986 
(%) (24.90) (75.10) (100.00)  (1.53) (98.47) (100.00) 
Notes: In Susenas July 2009, poor households are defined based on provincial poverty lines in March 2009 (published by CBS), with 
adjustment to the inflation from March to July. Intended beneficiaries are defined based on deciles 1–3 of household expenditure 
per capita in that particular province. In Susenas March 2010, poor households are defined based on the poverty lines in March 
2010 (also published by CBS) while intended beneficiaries are defined based on household expenditure per capita below 80 
percent of provincial poverty lines (the definition of the poorest household by CBS).  
Sources: Susenas July 2009 and March 2010. 
 
 Table 3.2 presents sampled households that are categorised based on 
participation in the BLT program (Susenas July 2009) and PKH program (Susenas Mach 
2010) and their poverty status in order evaluate the performance of the database. Of 
the poor households in 2009, 37.76 percent received grants from the BLT program, 
and 47.79 percent of households in deciles 1–3 were intended beneficiary households. 
Only 3.49 percent of the total poor households and 4.07 percent of intended 
beneficiary households were recipients of the PKH program in 2010. This contrast 
between recipients of the BLT program and PKH program is because the latter was 
designed to be a pilot project with an intentionally smaller number of served 
households. Officially, about 6.5 million households were served by the PKH program, 
compared with about 19.2 million households in the BLT program. 
Furthermore, if it used the poverty category as the foundation for delivering 
the program, then the exclusion error was at 62.24 percent for and the inclusion error 
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was at 315.57 percent 4
The exclusion error in PKH program was much worst at 96.51 percent but the 
low inclusion error was at 10.81 percent if it used the poverty category as compared to 
the BLT program. Nevertheless, in the PKH program, the government considered the 
PKH recipients as the poorest households (for those who had per capita expenditures 
below 80 percent of the poverty lines). In this category, the exclusion error was at 
95.93 percent and the inclusion error was at 38.81 percent of total intended 
beneficiaries. Again, this was because the PHK program was designed as a pilot project. 
. However, the government had categorized the BLT 
beneficiaries based on the deciles 1–3 of the household per capita expenditures in 
particular provinces. Thus, this category made the exclusion error at 52.21 percent and 
inclusion error at 52.84 percent.  
The significant exclusion and inclusion errors both in the BLT and PKH programs 
had consequences for the revision of the database PPLS 2008. The revision however, 
had been made when the government introduced PPLS 2011 as the newest database 
for the social protection programs in Indonesia.    
Furthermore, Table 3.3 presents the probit estimates of the BLT and PKH 
recipients. Even though there is a significant number of mis-targeting in those 
programs, in general, these probit estimates could well explain the characteristics of 
the BLT and PKH recipients from their household formation, health condition, house 
type, and head’s features. The number of children in the primary and secondary school 
increases the probability of being a BLT or PKH recipient. As explained in earlier section, 
there is a requirement that the children aged 0-6 years must visit health clinics, 
especially in the PKH program. Therefore, this variable increases the probability of 
being a PHK recipient. This condition does not apply to the BLT program which could 
cause a negative impact on the probability of being a BLT recipient. The variables in the 
health conditions of the member of the household also play a significant role on the 
probability of being a BLT or PKH recipient. The households with low quality housing 
tend to have a higher chance for receiving grants from the BLT or PKH program. The 
                                                          
4 The exclusion error is defined as the ratio of the poor households not receiving the BLT to the total poor 
households meanwhile the inclusion error is the ratio of the non-poor households receiving the BLT also to the total 
poor households (for this classification, see for example: Klasen and Lange, 2012) .              
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head’s education, gender, age, and marital status also have significant impacts on the 
probability of being BLT or PKH recipient. Being poor and receiving the other social 
benefits, such as raskin (subsidised price for rice), jamkesmas/kartusehat (health 
insurance card for the poor) and SKTM (identification card as the poor) also increase 
the probability of being a recipient of the BLT or PKH program. However, the probit 
estimate for the BLT recipients seems to be better compared to PKH since they 
produce pseudo R-squares at 0.347 for the BLT program and at 0.078 for the PKH 
program.  
 






 Household Formation:      
   Num. of Children below age 5 -0.060*** (0.006) 0.059*** (0.023) 
   Num. of Children in primary school 0.081*** (0.004) 0.138*** (0.017) 
   Num. of Children in secondary school 0.051*** (0.007) 0.113*** (0.027) 
   Num. of Adults older than 60 0.025*** (0.007) -0.062** (0.028) 
   Num. of Unemployed adults 0.010 (0.008) 0.045 (0.036) 
Health Condition:   
      Num. of HH’s members with serious health problems 0.030*** (0.004) -0.030* (0.016) 
   Num. of HH’s members with self-treatment 
  
0.014 (0.012) 
   Num. of HH’s members with traditional self-treatment 0.007 (0.005)
     Num. of HH’s members with modern self-treatment -0.009*** (0.003) 
     Num. of HH’s members with outpatient treatment -0.026*** (0.004) 0.076*** (0.016)
   Num. of HH’s members with hospitalised treatment -0.032*** (0.010) 0.051 (0.039) 
House Characteristics:  
      Floor (1 = soil) 0.229*** (0.009) 0.239*** (0.034) 
   Roof (1 =  from palm fibre) 0.239*** (0.011) 0.128** (0.050) 
   Ownership (1 = not owner) -0.063*** (0.009) 0.086** (0.037) 
   Wall (1 = not brick) 0.374*** (0.006) 0.086*** (0.029) 
   Floor size (m2) -0.003*** (0.000)  0.0001 (0.000)  
   Electricity (1 = does not have electricity) 0.305*** (0.009) -0.044 (0.036) 
   Drinking water (brand, refill, piping = 1) 0.077*** (0.008) -0.008 (0.035) 
   Toilet (1 = non-private) 0.076*** (0.004) 0.053*** (0.019) 
   Cooking (non-electric, non-gas = 1) 0.180*** (0.007) 
  Head of the Household:  
      Max years of education obtained (years) -0.027*** (0.001) -0.008** (0.003) 
   Sex (1 = male) -0.083*** (0.014) 0.005 (0.064) 
   Age (years) 0.004*** (0.000)  0.001 (0.001) 
   Marital status (1 = married) -0.258*** (0.013) 0.135** (0.063) 
Others Social Benefits:  
      Raskin (1 = buyer) 1.109*** (0.007) 0.231*** (0.031) 
   Jamkesmas (1 = user) 0.788*** (0.009) 0.153*** (0.016) 
   Kartusehat (1 = user) 0.456*** (0.024) 0.100*** (0.028) 
   SKTM (1 = user) 0.669*** (0.019) 
  Poor Household 0.176*** (0.011) 0.169*** (0.031) 
Log of Per Capita Expenditure -0.297*** (0.008) 0.018 (0.040) 
_cons 2.291*** (0.112) -0.144*** (0.034) 
Number of observations 291,753 66,516 
Pseudo R2 0.347 0.078 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Values in parentheses denote standard errors.  
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3.4 Method for Calculating the Amount of Grant and Simulation Options 
Ideally, one would want to give every household exactly the poverty gap. However, 
that is clearly not possible since one would need precise verifiable information. The 
other extreme is to set a single standard amount for all but that would be too little for 
the very poor and too much for the near poor. One could choose an intermediate 
strategy, e.g. 2-3 levels of grants, depending on the distance from the poverty lines. It 
also should reflect the differences in prices across regions or provinces (Klasen and 
Lange, 2012, 2013). 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the Indonesian government set the 
grants for the cash transfer programs, especially in the BLT/BLSM programs as fixed for 
all beneficiaries despite their socio-economic conditions, living costs and locations. 
This paper proposes two alternative options which they can be explained as follows.  
The estimated cash transfer for each poor household is calculated by 
subtracting its respective province’s poverty line from the household’s per capita 
expenditure (income deficit) in absolute term, or, 
(3.1) 𝑖𝑑𝑖 = |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖|    
where y and z are income/expenditure per capita and the poverty line, respectively. If 
the government makes up these deficits, poor households would escape from poverty. 
Moreover, if future inflation is taken into account, the expected cash transfer for each 
family would be, 
(3.2) 𝐸(𝑐𝑡𝑖) = {1 + 𝐸(𝜋𝑖)}. 𝑖𝑑𝑖   
where 𝐸(𝑐𝑡) is the expected cash transfer per capita and 𝐸(π) is the expected inflation 
of each household (i). This would be, hypothetically, the best way of calculating the 
expected amount of grants for the every poor household. This would be the first 
alternative option. However, it has two disadvantages. Firstly, it is difficult to assess 
every household’s income deficit when the income sources of the majority of poor 
households are in informal sectors. Secondly, if the assessments are based on 
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interviews, some households may report a lower income/expenditure so as to be 
classified as poor, and thus be able to apply for a grant.  
The second alternative option is when the representative value of the income 
deficits in a particular province is used. The mean, median, maximum, or 75th 
percentile of the deficits at a provincial level could be used as the expected cash 
transfer amount for each specific province, 
(3.3) 𝑐𝑡𝑝 = 𝑖𝑑𝑖����𝑝     
where ct is the cash transfer amount in the specific province (p). If the future inflation 
rate in the specific province is considered, the expected grants will be, 
(3.4) 𝐸�𝑐𝑡𝑝� = �1 + 𝐸�𝜋𝑝��. 𝚤𝑑𝚤����𝑝   
where 𝐸(𝑐𝑡) is the expected amount of cash transfer per capita and 𝐸(π) is the 
expected inflation in the specific province (p). By using these methods, the expected 
cash transfer amounts should vary across provinces but uniform transfers for each 
province. 
Although it may not allow some poor households to escape from poverty if the 
cash transfers are lower than their deficits, households still have the benefit of being 
supported at a level that commensurates with their own province, as well as reducing 
moral hazard. Furthermore, this second option is more suitable than the first option 
for economic policies, because it avoids the disadvantages which have been previously 
explained.  
In our formulas, the expected inflation is an important component for 
calculating the appropriate amount of cash transfer beside the income deficits. It will 
protect the purchasing power of the poor household in the future. However, the cities’ 
inflations published by CBS are biased for urban areas only. In order to capture the 
inflation in rural areas, one could use the change in the poverty lines both in rural and 
urban areas.     
Figure 3.1 shows that inflation rates have been in line with the changes in the 
urban poverty lines. National inflation from March 2008 to March 2009, was 8.48 
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percent, while the national poverty line changed by 9.65 percent during the same 
period. The highest inflation and poverty line occurred in West Papua, with a 20.77 
percent and 18.77 percent change, respectively. Inflation rates tended to be low from 
March 2009, to March 2010. Poverty lines, however, were quite high in almost all 
provinces. In East Nusa Tenggara, for example, the inflation rate was 8.00 percent and 
change in the poverty line was 12.24 percent, a 4.24 percent difference. Only in South 
East Sulawesi was the change in the poverty line lower than inflation, 1.22 percent and 
3.00 percent, respectively. Furthermore, in both periods, inflation rates varied across 
provinces. As such, price adjustments to poverty lines and expenditures also varied. 
Based on Figure 3.1, especially in 2008-2009, the changes in poverty lines could be 
used as the expected inflation.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Changes in Provincial Poverty Lines (PL) and Inflation 
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In order to prove that our alternative options are better than the fixed universal 
grant by the government, this paper simulates all possible options and compares their 
results of the provincial poverty rates. However, several assumptions for the 
simulations in this exercise should be noted. For the most part we use the same 
assumptions for simulations cash transfer as Klasen and Lange (2013).  
First, it is assumed that household attributes are perfectly observable at zero 
cost and they do not change their attributes in order to a gain beneficiary status. 
Second, we do not consider how the funds used for the transfer scheme are generated. 
Third, we assume that policy-makers agree for the total funding. Lastly, we assume 
zero growth of nominal income or expenditure. This assumption is quite relevant 
especially for 30 percent of the poorest population for each province. There are three 
options of five simulations based on the amounts of the expected cash transfers that 
would be given. They are:  
(1) Option 1: (Simulation 1). The grant is fixed at Rp 100,000 for each targeted 
household in all provinces with no adjustment to expected regional inflation. 
The grants are given to the poorest 30 percent of the population in particular 
province. This is the actual grant by the government on the BLT program in 
2008-2009. 
(2) Option 2: (Simulation 2). Give the grants to the poor households at their per 
capita income deficit amounts adjusted to the expected regional inflation. The 
grants are given only for the poor households at baseline. This is the first 
alternative option that was previously mentioned.  
(3) Option 3. Give the grants based on the representative values of the per capita 
income deficits, adjusted to the expected inflation at respective provinces: the 
means (Simulation 3), the medians (Simulation 4), and the 75th percentiles 
(Simulation 5). The grants are given for 30 percent of the poorest population in 
particular province. Therefore, the grants are uniform transfer for arch 
province. This option is the second alternative option as explained previously.   
The grant is given on a monthly basis and there is no inclusion and exclusion error for 
delivering the transfers. 
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3.5 Simulation Result 
Table 3.4 shows the means, medians, and 75th percentiles of the income deficits, the 
expected inflation using the change in poverty lines, and the expected cash transfer 
per capita across provinces using Susenas 2008-2010 (March rounds). In 2008 and 
using the means adjusted to expected inflation, the expected grants vary from Rp 
25,000 (Bali and West Sulawesi) to Rp 75,000 (West Papua). They are ranging from Rp 
28,000 (West Sulawesi and South Sulawesi) to Rp 88,000 (West Papua) in 2009 and 
from Rp 23,000 (West Sulawesi) to Rp 93,000 (West Papua) in 2010. If it uses the 
means, then the expected grants would be from Rp 20,000 (West Sulawesi and North 
Sulawesi) to Rp 77,000 (West Papua) in 2008, from Rp 23,000 (South Kalimantan) to Rp 
88,000 (West Papua) in 2009, and from Rp 18,000 (West Sulawesi) to Rp 91,000 in 
2010. Lastly, if it uses the 75th percentiles of the income deficits in respective provinces, 
then grants vary from Rp 34,000 (Bali) to Rp 107,000 (Papua) in 2008, from Rp 37,000 
(West Sulawesi) to Rp 125,000 (West Papua) in 2009, and from Rp 30,000 (West 
Sulawesi) to Rp 141,000 (West Papua) in 2010. 
 Table 3.5 presents the simulation results in 2008 and in Appendix 3.3 for 
simulation results in 2009. Susenas March 2008 is used as the baseline as well as the 
poverty lines at the combination Urban+Rural (published by the CBS but not used for 
the official poverty calculation) instead of using the urban and rural poverty lines (the 
official poverty lines for the official poverty rates by the CBS). The poverty rates at the 
baseline in 2008 vary from 4.29 percent (DKI Jakarta) to 40.47 percent (Papua). If the 
fixed cash transfer amount of Rp 100,000 per household per month (Sim1) and the 
actual poverty lines in 2009 is used then the poverty rates do not change so much. 
Even in some provinces, they have higher poverty rates compared to their baselines in 
2008. For example, Nangro Aceh Darussalam (NAD) has a poverty rate at 25.93 percent 
which is higher than its baseline at 25.86 percent. In North Sumatera however, the 
poverty rate is 14.10 which is lower than its baseline at 14.91. West Papua is 14.66 
percent higher than its poverty rate at baseline at 36.17. These simulated poverty 
rates are relatively similar to the actual poverty rates in 2009 at 24.34, 12.90, and 
36.64 percent for NAD, North Sumatera, and West Papua, respectively. 
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Table 3.4 Income deficits and Expected cash transfers per capita by Province  
Province 
Income deficit per month (thousand Rp)   Expected Inflation per year   Expected cash transfer per month (thousand Rp) 
mean median 75th percentile 
     
mean median 75th percentile 
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010  2008 2009 2010  2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
N.A.D 48 51 54 41 42 45 73 77 79 
 
10.0 9.2 6.3 
 
53 55 58 46 45 48 80 85 84 
N.Sumatra 32 35 41 24 30 37 48 51 59 
 
8.5 8.8 6.0 
 
34 38 43 27 33 39 52 55 62 
W.Sumatra 31 32 38 25 27 35 42 49 54 
 
8.3 11.1 6.1 
 
34 36 41 27 30 37 45 55 58 
Riau 39 38 41 33 33 31 59 53 62 
 
7.2 7.5 3.9 
 
42 40 42 36 35 32 63 57 65 
Jambi 25 33 29 22 28 23 37 48 44 
 
5.7 9.5 8.3 
 
27 36 31 24 30 25 39 52 48 
S.Sumatra 35 36 39 32 32 33 51 56 57 
 
10.2 8.1 4.4 
 
39 39 41 35 35 34 56 60 60 
Bengkulu 37 37 36 34 34 29 52 53 54 
 
11.0 10.8 7.5 
 
41 41 39 37 37 31 58 59 58 
Lampung 31 35 32 29 32 28 47 51 47 
 
9.7 9.6 7.2 
 
34 39 35 32 35 30 52 56 50 
BangkaBelitung 36 46 47 25 37 37 63 63 67 
 
4.6 8.4 7.3 
 
37 50 50 26 40 40 66 69 72 
RiauIslands 43 73 46 34 62 42 76 104 63 
 
5.6 8.3 3.9 
 
46 79 48 36 67 43 80 113 65 
DKIJakarta 44 50 42 37 45 32 65 74 58 
 
8.8 9.2 4.5 
 
48 54 44 41 49 33 70 80 61 
W.Java 31 31 34 25 27 28 42 45 51 
 
6.3 8.9 4.8 
 
33 34 36 26 29 30 45 50 53 
C.Java 31 31 30 27 27 26 46 46 44 
 
9.1 8.5 5.4 
 
33 33 32 29 29 27 50 49 47 
DIYogyakarta 36 44 41 31 41 37 53 64 61 
 
5.3 8.8 5.8 
 
38 48 43 32 45 40 56 69 65 
E.Java 31 33 33 26 28 28 45 48 47 
 
10.4 11.4 5.8 
 
34 36 35 29 32 30 50 53 50 
Banten 28 34 30 26 29 25 39 49 44 
 
6.8 9.8 4.7 
 
30 37 32 28 32 26 42 54 46 
Bali 23 29 28 19 28 21 32 42 39 
 
6.4 11.3 5.9 
 
25 33 30 21 31 22 34 47 41 
W.NusaTenggara 29 36 32 25 31 27 43 54 47 
 
11.7 10.4 6.0 
 
32 40 34 28 34 29 48 60 50 
E.NusaTenggara 27 30 36 25 25 31 40 45 55 
 
10.6 11.8 12.2 
 
30 33 40 28 28 35 45 50 61 
W.Kalimantan 24 29 24 19 23 21 35 45 36 
 
11.4 9.9 8.5 
 
27 32 26 22 25 23 39 50 39 
C.Kalimantan 29 30 30 22 28 25 43 42 45 
 
14.6 8.9 6.3 
 
33 32 32 26 30 26 49 46 47 
S.Kalimantan 27 27 27 20 21 21 39 40 34 
 
11.6 8.6 7.7 
 
30 30 29 23 23 22 44 44 37 
E.Kalimantan 43 50 55 38 37 43 64 76 76 
 
8.0 9.8 9.2 
 
47 55 60 41 41 47 69 84 83 
N.Sulawesi 25 30 25 19 29 22 39 44 36 
 
7.4 9.9 5.2 
 
27 32 27 20 31 23 42 48 38 
C.Sulawesi 35 41 35 29 36 29 49 60 52 
 
9.1 12.9 7.2 
 
38 46 37 32 41 31 53 68 55 
S.Sulawesi 25 26 27 22 21 21 36 38 43 
 
9.2 11.1 6.1 
 
28 28 29 24 24 22 39 42 45 
S.E.Sulawesi 25 29 30 22 23 26 34 40 44 
 
8.6 13.9 2.2 
 
27 33 31 24 26 26 37 46 45 
Gorontalo 28 32 31 26 27 28 43 47 45 
 
6.5 10.2 5.7 
 
30 35 33 28 29 30 46 52 48 
W.Sulawesi 23 26 21 18 25 17 36 33 29 
 
8.3 11.4 5.0 
 
25 28 23 20 28 18 39 37 30 
Maluku 39 41 41 34 35 36 53 61 66 
 
5.2 10.0 8.8 
 
41 45 45 36 39 39 56 67 72 
N.Maluku 29 33 36 25 29 31 41 47 52 
 
13.7 7.4 5.7 
 
33 36 38 28 31 33 46 51 55 
W.Papua 59 74 88 51 74 85 92 105 133 
 
13.4 18.8 6.2 
 
67 88 93 58 88 91 105 125 141 
Papua 67 64 65 69 64 60 96 90 89  11.3 9.3 5.2  75 70 68 77 70 63 107 98 94 
Note: the calculation for income deficits restrict for the poor only. Expected Inflation is calculated from a percentage change of the poverty lines (Urban+Rural) to previous year. 
92 
 
Table 3.5 Simulation Results in 2008 and Actual Poverty in 2009 
Province 
Number of Poor Households     Percentage of Poor Households   
Baseline2008 
Option1 Option 2 Option3 
Actual 2009  Baseline2008 
Option1 Option 2 Option3 
Actual 2009 
Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 Sim5  Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 Sim5 
N.A.D 1,054,897 1,057,883 265,966 671,299 728,550 390,765 996,953 
 
25.86 25.93 6.52 16.45 17.86 9.58 24.34 
N.Sumatra 1,917,792 1,813,688 624,498 1,240,216 1,470,064 718,060 1,681,017 
 
14.91 14.10 4.85 9.64 11.43 5.58 12.90 
W.Sumatra 561,831 610,494 282,227 442,476 515,706 313,587 505,383 
 
12.56 13.65 6.31 9.90 11.53 7.01 11.23 
Riau 593,839 587,221 195,030 366,636 418,221 205,490 534,910 
 
11.14 11.01 3.66 6.88 7.84 3.85 9.61 
Jambi 330,043 285,802 124,569 241,454 255,645 176,245 272,270 
 
11.82 10.24 4.46 8.65 9.16 6.31 9.56 
S.Sumatra 1,417,908 1,338,165 353,363 908,906 998,524 583,753 1,393,773 
 
20.11 18.98 5.01 12.89 14.16 8.28 19.43 
Bengkulu 360,665 349,760 118,800 258,740 275,271 160,668 330,179 
 
21.14 20.50 6.96 15.16 16.13 9.42 18.93 
Lampung 1,740,906 1,521,537 500,912 1,215,313 1,268,425 699,842 1,744,993 
 
22.95 20.06 6.60 16.02 16.72 9.23 22.64 
BangkaBelitung 88,065 93,358 39,390 54,176 54,176 28,621 73,590 
 
8.71 9.24 3.90 5.36 5.36 2.83 7.17 
RiauIslands 200,843 188,352 55,650 119,795 141,943 66,401 162,933 
 
13.52 12.68 3.75 8.06 9.55 4.47 10.51 
DKIJakarta 379,681 412,223 175,019 273,369 318,931 179,353 323,173 
 
4.29 4.66 1.98 3.09 3.60 2.03 3.62 
W.Java 6,151,057 5,291,488 2,159,261 4,227,522 5,177,119 2,826,674 5,421,589 
 
15.03 12.93 5.28 10.33 12.65 6.91 13.01 
C.Java 6,835,575 5,632,149 2,036,361 4,406,517 4,981,385 2,573,792 6,187,989 
 
21.23 17.49 6.32 13.69 15.47 7.99 19.15 
DIYogyakarta 716,066 600,210 169,852 467,883 533,783 289,724 661,741 
 
21.28 17.84 5.05 13.90 15.86 8.61 19.46 
E.Java 7,590,067 6,841,000 2,410,208 5,416,478 6,050,382 3,449,347 6,680,083 
 
21.12 19.03 6.71 15.07 16.83 9.60 18.51 
Banten 1,023,960 969,410 464,731 787,360 830,177 563,866 951,912 
 
10.22 9.68 4.64 7.86 8.29 5.63 9.23 
Bali 263,602 254,484 162,774 224,999 259,507 161,746 207,401 
 
7.54 7.28 4.66 6.44 7.42 4.63 5.85 
W.NusaTenggara 1,146,884 1,050,817 439,498 908,463 988,245 633,047 1,193,029 
 
25.27 23.15 9.68 20.01 21.77 13.95 25.85 
E.NusaTenggara 1,352,161 1,586,936 444,477 1,306,776 1,359,611 927,004 1,214,204 
 
31.57 37.06 10.38 30.51 31.75 21.65 27.94 
W.Kalimantan 539,765 501,085 260,302 395,553 468,978 243,411 476,021 
 
11.75 10.90 5.66 8.61 10.21 5.30 10.18 
C.Kalimantan 217,813 187,168 99,968 142,793 173,632 93,294 178,287 
 
9.48 8.15 4.35 6.22 7.56 4.06 7.54 
S.Kalimantan 259,409 217,865 131,481 156,437 197,419 111,865 221,211 
 
7.68 6.45 3.89 4.63 5.84 3.31 6.44 
E.Kalimantan 364,056 369,494 93,997 241,716 266,649 165,220 358,852 
 
12.09 12.27 3.12 8.03 8.85 5.49 11.59 
N.Sulawesi 234,301 200,302 119,730 166,834 213,743 100,930 223,031 
 
10.58 9.05 5.41 7.53 9.65 4.56 9.94 
C.Sulawesi 536,083 543,554 231,326 405,550 462,995 270,133 509,770 
 
21.20 21.49 9.15 16.04 18.31 10.68 19.76 
S.Sulawesi 1,257,142 1,130,935 500,076 890,943 1,022,135 619,758 1,235,753 
 
16.25 14.62 6.46 11.51 13.21 8.01 15.79 
S.E.Sulawesi 463,781 458,899 194,933 378,997 404,721 311,521 448,471 
 
20.77 20.55 8.73 16.97 18.12 13.95 19.55 
Gorontalo 223,465 199,849 63,671 154,840 164,434 99,579 240,125 
 
25.09 22.44 7.15 17.38 18.46 11.18 26.74 
W.Sulawesi 163,405 156,410 85,705 129,304 155,658 84,336 169,404 
 
15.97 15.29 8.38 12.64 15.22 8.24 16.37 
Maluku 403,882 445,552 129,406 345,377 367,389 232,383 409,861 
 
30.60 33.76 9.81 26.17 27.84 17.61 30.44 
N.Maluku 133,775 132,078 42,756 69,563 82,797 49,882 113,472 
 
14.37 14.18 4.59 7.47 8.89 5.36 11.99 
W.Papua 253,891 356,838 109,533 257,799 275,022 179,690 263,537 
 
36.17 50.83 15.60 36.72 39.18 25.60 36.64 
Papua 800,338 897,346 97,008 813,869 798,459 557,033 768,693  40.47 45.38 4.91 41.16 40.38 28.17 37.94 




Table 3.6 Total Cost of Each Simulation 
Province 
Expected Total Cost (in billion Rp) in 2008 
Option1 Option2 Option3 
Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 Sim5 
N.A.D 25.75 118.26 68.20 61.76 102.94 
N. Sumatra 86.40 160.32 152.29 120.93 232.91 
W. Sumatra 31.29 49.17 54.30 43.12 71.87 
Riau 34.70 61.09 73.34 62.87 110.02 
Jambi 20.18 23.17 24.01 21.34 34.68 
S. Sumatra 47.02 121.02 87.39 78.43 125.48 
Bengkulu 12.92 38.30 24.74 22.33 35.00 
Lampung 53.67 139.70 81.09 76.32 124.02 
Bangka Belitung 7.66 8.88 13.97 13.97 24.93 
Riau Islands 11.54 18.38 24.24 18.97 42.16 
DKI Jakarta 64.78 47.02 142.53 121.74 207.86 
W. Java 309.81 518.88 431.01 339.59 587.74 
C. Java 249.36 538.46 342.58 301.05 519.05 
DI Yogyakarta 31.94 73.94 44.74 37.67 65.93 
E. Java 279.53 652.37 389.25 332.01 572.43 
Banten 73.05 88.77 104.62 97.64 146.46 
Bali 26.11 19.30 28.38 23.84 38.59 
W. Nusa Tenggara 35.05 88.81 46.03 40.27 69.04 
E. Nusa Tenggara 25.36 94.78 42.14 39.33 63.21 
W. Kalimantan 30.13 34.25 41.71 33.99 60.25 
C. Kalimantan 16.69 17.01 24.40 19.23 36.23 
S. Kalimantan 26.56 19.50 34.02 26.08 49.90 
E. Kalimantan 20.83 44.48 47.44 41.38 69.64 
N. Sulawesi 17.67 17.89 21.19 15.70 32.97 
C. Sulawesi 17.54 51.02 32.61 27.46 45.48 
S. Sulawesi 50.92 82.02 70.03 60.03 97.55 
S.E. Sulawesi 14.48 34.94 20.22 17.98 27.71 
Gorontalo 6.79 18.90 9.95 9.29 15.26 
W. Sulawesi 6.70 12.18 9.38 7.51 14.64 
Maluku 8.12 40.49 19.81 17.39 27.06 
N. Maluku 5.99 11.20 12.57 11.05 17.52 
W. Papua 3.98 26.79 13.48 11.67 21.13 
Papua 12.20 111.77 41.19 42.28 58.76 
Total 1,664.73 3,383.07 2,572.87 2,194.24 3,748.44 
 
 
 Table 3.5 presents the simulation 2 (Option 2) where the grants equal to the 
household’s income deficits plus the expected inflation for each poor household as the 
first alternative to the fixed universal transfer amount. In total, the national poverty 
dropped down to 5.81 percent compared to 17.45 percent at the baseline in 2008. This 
5.81 percent of national poverty rate comes from the near-poor households in 2008 
and after the simulation they become poor using the actual poverty lines in 2009.  
The second alternative (Option 3) uses the means (Sim3), the medians (Sim4), 
and the 75th percentiles (Sim5) of the income deficits. By using the means, the poverty 
rates in all provinces decrease by about 1.1 to 9.41 percent compared to their 
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respective poverty rates at baseline except for West Papua and Papua. In these 
provinces, the poverty rates are 0.55 percent and 0.69 percent higher than their 
baselines. In total, the poverty rate decrease to 12.38 percent compared to 17.45 
percent at baseline. Similar to the simulation 3, we find relatively lower of poverty 
rates by 0.12 to 8 percent in the simulation 4 (the medians), except for East Nusa 
Tenggara and West Papua which they increase by 0.18 and 3.01 percent, respectively. 
In total, the poverty rate decreases to 13.97 percent. It is still lower than the baseline.  
 The best simulation in this option is using the 75th percentiles of the income 
deficits (Sim5) as the amounts of grants. The poverty rates decrease by an average of 
8.9 percent or range from 2.91 percent (Bali) to 16.28 percent (Nangro Aceh 
Darussalam) compared to their respective poverty rates at baselines. In total, the 
poverty rate decrease to 7.97 percent compared to 17.45 percent at the baseline and 
15.94 percent at actual poverty rate in 2009. From these three simulations, we 
conclude that the cash transfer should be varied across provinces and should large 
enough (in this case, 75th percentiles of the income deficits of respective provinces). 
The universal fixed cash transfer is not the best option. 
 Table 3.6 shows the expected total cost of the simulation 1–5, excluding all 
administrative, personnel, and other costs. Total financing for simulation 1 (fixed grant 
at Rp 100,000 per household in all provinces) is Rp 1,665 billion per month. Compared 
to simulation 1, the total cost for simulation 2 (grant equals to household’s income 
deficit for each poor family) is about 100 percent higher at Rp 3,383 billion. 
Furthermore, the total cost for simulation 3 (the means) is also higher at Rp 2,572 
billion per month compared to the fixed universal cash transfer amount. In the last two 
simulations, the total costs are Rp 2,194 billion of the simulation 4 (the medians) and 
Rp 3,748 billion per month for simulation 5 (the 75th percentiles). 
The total cost, excluding administration and other costs, for simulation 1 at Rp 
1.665 billion per month is relatively low compared to the total actual financing of the 
BLT program in 2008–2009, which is Rp 18,966 billion for nine months or Rp 2,107 
billion per month (World Bank, 2012b). However, this total actual financing of the BLT 




Despite a significant number of mis-targeting in the BLT and PKH programs using the 
database for the social protection programs in 2008 (PPLS 2008), the probit estimates 
of these programs’ recipients indicate that being poor, having household 
characteristics related to the poor conditions, and being recipients of the other social 
benefits, increase the probability of being a recipient of the programs.  
Furthermore, the main weakness of the Indonesian government’s policy in 
determining cash transfer amounts, especially in the BLT/BLSM programs, lacks 
awareness of the socio-economic conditions and living costs of recipients. This paper 
examined two alternatives to the GOI’s fixed cash transfer amounts that should be 
used as guidelines by decision-makers. The first is making the amount equal to the 
value of the poor family’s income deficit plus expected inflation which almost 
eradicate all poor households. The second is making the value of the cash transfer 
amount equal to a province’s representative value of income deficit plus its expected 
inflation. From this alternative, we simulate three scenarios in which the 75th 
percentiles of the income deficits are the representative value for the amount of 
expected cash transfer in specific province.  
Of the two alternatives, the second would be the most suitable for a cash 
transfer program in the future. Basing the amount on individual households would be 
more accurate, but would also create the risk of a moral hazard, as some households 
may lie about their income or expenditure to receive grants. This is avoided by using 
75th percentiles of the provincial income deficits. The second alternative may make a 
greater contribution to poverty-reduction than the fixed cash transfer amounts, while 
providing minimal risk for the government. 
Finally, because of the importance of cash transfer programs to poor 
households, it is strongly recommended that a law be created to better facilitate the 
empowerment of the poor. Currently, cash transfer programs are provided as a matter 
of policy, not law; as such, the government is not legally obligated to support the poor, 
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Appendix 3.1 Simulation Results in 2009 and Actual Poverty in 2010 
Province 
Number of Poor Households     Percentage of Poor Households   
Baseline 
2009 




Option1 Option 2 Option3 Actual 
2010 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 Sim5  Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 Sim5 
N.A.D 996,953 950,211 179,975  552,520 667,908 344,291 894,316  
 
24.34 23.20 4.39 13.49 16.31 8.41 21.84 
N.Sumatra 1,681,017 1,511,554 434,270  996,113 1,079,585 626,513 1,576,955  
 
12.90 11.60 3.33 7.64 8.28 4.81 12.10 
W.Sumatra 505,383 477,357 162,645  291,684 349,060 154,618 493,177  
 
11.23 10.61 3.61 6.48 7.76 3.44 10.96 
Riau 534,910 480,371 111,447  269,267 315,928 161,855 570,788  
 
9.61 8.63 2.00 4.84 5.68 2.91 10.25 
Jambi 272,270 259,040 113,619  170,315 207,548 101,053 289,783  
 
9.56 9.10 3.99 5.98 7.29 3.55 10.18 
S.Sumatra 1,393,773 1,083,714 173,008  779,663 831,805 425,228 1,238,926  
 
19.43 15.11 2.41 10.87 11.60 5.93 17.27 
Bengkulu 330,179 302,709 76,621  209,517 226,598 127,733 335,391  
 
18.93 17.36 4.39 12.02 12.99 7.33 19.23 
Lampung 1,744,993 1,464,344 352,623  1,126,455 1,210,971 647,407 1,674,587  
 
22.64 19.00 4.58 14.62 15.71 8.40 21.73 
BangkaBelitung 73,590 77,027 27,625  47,346 53,935 27,136 65,132  
 
7.17 7.50 2.69 4.61 5.25 2.64 6.34 
RiauIslands 162,933 150,021 3,228  56,718 70,465 34,548 124,584  
 
10.51 9.67 0.21 3.66 4.54 2.23 8.03 
DKIJakarta 323,173 306,866 87,893  172,912 189,928 114,804 312,179  
 
3.62 3.44 0.99 1.94 2.13 1.29 3.50 
W.Java 5,421,589 4,235,812 1,146,856  3,002,972 3,497,625 1,662,299 5,114,039  
 
13.01 10.16 2.75 7.21 8.39 3.99 12.27 
C.Java 6,187,989 4,683,003 1,000,122  3,539,073 3,944,886 2,074,229 5,560,401  
 
19.15 14.49 3.09 10.95 12.21 6.42 17.20 
DIYogyakarta 661,741 552,140 133,683  366,214 391,042 236,605 636,362  
 
19.46 16.24 3.93 10.77 11.50 6.96 18.72 
E.Java 6,680,083 5,135,991 1,449,403  3,859,802 4,284,402 2,252,911 6,017,993  
 
18.51 14.23 4.02 10.69 11.87 6.24 16.67 
Banten 951,912 783,446 236,344  516,026 583,898 300,066 873,406  
 
9.23 7.60 2.29 5.00 5.66 2.91 8.47 
Bali 207,401 168,296 52,872  129,269 138,971 74,596 232,070  
 
5.85 4.75 1.49 3.65 3.92 2.11 6.55 
W.NusaTenggara 1,193,029 949,545 150,273  668,274 761,201 386,338 1,078,204  
 
25.85 20.58 3.26 14.48 16.50 8.37 23.37 
E.NusaTenggara 1,214,204 1,298,778 351,234  1,018,191 1,115,881 612,095 1,241,565  
 
27.94 29.89 8.08 23.43 25.68 14.09 28.57 
W.Kalimantan 476,021 441,530 198,786  264,376 354,091 164,555 483,620  
 
10.18 9.44 4.25 5.65 7.57 3.52 10.34 
C.Kalimantan 178,287 151,065 78,027  106,589 111,589 76,568 170,029  
 
7.54 6.39 3.30 4.51 4.72 3.24 7.19 
S.Kalimantan 221,211 196,283 80,149  131,540 183,967 86,853 217,917  
 
6.44 5.71 2.33 3.83 5.35 2.53 6.34 
E.Kalimantan 358,852 382,126 94,510  205,411 280,642 121,988 312,727  
 
11.59 12.35 3.05 6.64 9.07 3.94 10.10 
N.Sulawesi 223,031 171,761 57,319  137,369 137,369 86,400 207,171  
 
9.94 7.66 2.56 6.12 6.12 3.85 9.23 
C.Sulawesi 509,770 472,787 129,433  288,939 326,429 162,895 509,165  
 
19.76 18.32 5.02 11.20 12.65 6.31 19.73 
S.Sulawesi 1,235,753 939,326 254,908  672,019 790,109 442,468 1,100,619  
 
15.79 12.00 3.26 8.59 10.10 5.65 14.06 
S.E.Sulawesi 448,471 315,021 28,267  209,498 251,824 111,486 423,558  
 
19.55 13.73 1.23 9.13 10.98 4.86 18.46 
Gorontalo 240,125 195,469 20,666  123,802 150,734 63,517 215,514  
 
26.74 21.77 2.30 13.79 16.78 7.07 24.00 
W.Sulawesi 169,404 134,787 31,341  99,069 99,069 70,227 143,918  
 
16.37 13.03 3.03 9.58 9.58 6.79 13.91 
Maluku 409,861 411,162 89,579  252,261 283,837 167,990 412,242  
 
30.44 30.54 6.65 18.74 21.08 12.48 30.62 
N.Maluku 113,472 110,528 15,042  59,844 63,768 35,972 107,154  
 
11.99 11.68 1.59 6.33 6.74 3.80 11.33 
W.Papua 263,537 251,880 30,913  150,963 150,963 68,631 271,508  
 
36.64 35.02 4.30 20.99 20.99 9.54 37.75 
Papua 768,693 821,098 55,207  647,888 647,888 439,647 818,863  
 
37.94 40.53 2.72 31.98 31.98 21.70 40.42 
Total 36,153,610 29,865,048 7,407,888 21,121,899 23,753,916 12,463,522 33,723,863  15.72 12.99 3.22 9.19 10.33 5.42 14.67 
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Essay 4: Dollar a Day Re-Revisited 
 
 
with: Friederike Greb, Stephan Klasen, and Manuel Wiesenfarth 
 
Abstract 
Recently, the World Bank re-estimated the international poverty line used for global 
poverty measurement and the first Millennium Development Goal based on an 
updated country sample of national poverty lines and new results for PPP exchange 
rates.  The empirical relationship between those poverty lines and the log of mean 
consumption is the basis of the international poverty lines, but the new international 
poverty line of $1.25 per capita per day in 2005PPP$ is based on estimating the 
relationship between the poverty line and mean consumption.  In this paper we show, 
using the same data, that the estimated relationship is statistically problematic and 
that the best statistical estimation of the relationship between mean consumption and 
national poverty lines generates a point estimate of an international poverty line that 
is substantially higher than $1.25 a day, but with very large standard errors attached to 
the estimates.    
 
Keywords: international poverty line, global poverty, purchasing power parity. 
 











In 2008, the World Bank presented its results from a major revision of the global 
absolute income poverty estimates, commonly known as the $-a-day poverty numbers.  
These numbers measure the number, headcount ratio, and poverty gap of people in 
the developing world who fall below the international poverty line.  This international 
poverty line was created by taking the averages of the national poverty lines of a 
sample of poor countries (with the lines expressed in PPP$, see Ravallion, Datt, and 
van de Walle, 1991; Chen and Ravallion, 2001). The argument supporting this 
averaging has been that for a large range of low income countries, the observed 
national poverty lines are empirically rather similar, while for richer economies the 
poverty lines appear to rise with (the log of) mean incomes (see Figure 1a).  Since their 
inception in 1990, they have since become one of the central targets of the Millennium 
Development Goals.   
As described in detail in Chen and Ravallion (2010), these revisions drastically 
changed the view of the level and distribution of global poverty in the world.  In 
particular, the headcount rate of poverty in 2005 was now estimated at 25%, while 
prior to the revision, the number for the same year had been estimated (by the same 
authors) to be 17%. The difference implies that some 400 million more people (1.37 
billion instead of 930 million) were now declared to be absolutely poor, compared to 
before.  The level adjustments were particularly substantial in East Asia, followed by 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, while they were much smaller elsewhere.  The time 
trends in poverty between 1981 and 2005 were reported as being similar to the 
previous ones.  Both are nicely summarized in the title of Chen and Ravallion (2010)’s 
paper: ‘the developing world is much poorer than we thought, but no less successful in 
the fight against poverty.’ 
The drastic revisions have generated considerable debates and commentary 
with several authors questioning aspects of the revisions (e.g. Deaton, 2010, Ward, 
2009; Klasen, 2009; Reddy, 2008; Heston 2008); this paper contributes to one aspect of 
this debate.  The debate is however complicated by the fact that the revision 
undertaken by the World Bank in 2008 included not one but two major changes.  The 
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first was to base the entire poverty analysis, including the international poverty line, 
on the new purchasing power parity estimates that had been produced in the 2005 
round of the International Comparison of Prices Project (ICP2005), thereby discarding 
the ones previously used the 1993 ICP.  The 2005ICP suggested that many developing 
countries, particularly China, but also India and some African countries, were much 
poorer than previously thought, related to the higher price levels identified in the ICP. 
The second major change was that the new international poverty line was re-created 
using the same procedure but a different country sample than had previously been 
used.  In particular, the poverty line switched from $1.08 per capita per day at 
1993PPPs to $1.25 per capita per day at 2005 PPP.5
One way to test this assumption is to simply use the old sample of countries 
that made up the old international poverty line ($1.08) and calculate the new poverty 
line.  Using the median of the national poverty lines of the 10 countries included in the 
$1.08 poverty line (Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Tunisia, and Zambia, see Chen and Ravallion, 2001)
  While many surmised that the 
changes in levels and regional distribution of poverty were largely driven by the 
changes in the ICP, Deaton (2010) argued that this is unlikely to be the case.  In 
particular, if the ICP simply made the average PPP-adjusted poverty line of the poor 
countries that make up the international poverty line lower than before (due to higher 
prices observed in these countries in the ICP2005) and reduced their consumption 
levels as well for the same reason, then this should not have any significant impact on 
measured poverty rates in the developing world.  
6, the updated poverty 
line at 2005ICP would be $1.05 per capita per day (or $32.04 per month).   Note that 
this apparent decline from $1.08 to $1.05 in the value of the poverty line despite 
international inflation in the intervening years7
                                                          
5 This is discussed in detail in Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2009) as well as Chen and Ravallion (2010) 
, precisely reflects the fact that the 
ICP2005 finds price levels to be much higher in poor countries (on average and relative 
to rich countries) than the 1993ICP.  At the $1.05 a day poverty line, the Povcal 
6 To create the median, we take the average of the two middle observations: Indonesia ($32,63 a 
month) and Bangladesh ($31.46 a month). 
7 In fact, as calculated by Chen and Ravallion (2010), had one simply inflated the $1.08 poverty line using 
the US CPI, the international poverty line in 2005 would have been $1.45.   
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database calculates that the number of poor people in 2005 would have been 979 
million, only slightly higher than the 931 million found using the old $1.08 poverty line 
and the 1993ICP.8  Thus, it indeed appears to be the case that the change in the ICP 
has a minor impact on the global number of poor people, while the switch in the 
sample to generate the new poverty line (i.e. essentially from $1.05 to $1.25) accounts 
for the bulk of the change to be explained.9
We first find that there are some problems with the way the methods proposed 
in Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (henceforth referred to as RCS) (2009) are actually 
applied in their estimation.  In particular, they estimate a model that relates the 
poverty rates to mean consumption levels (rather than logs), thereby essentially 
estimating the relationship in Figure 1b.  We show that they thereby force a non-linear 
relationship on the data that is actually not warranted.  Addressing this and other 
issues and additionally supplementing the analysis using straight-forward parametric 
and advanced non-parametric techniques, we find that the analyses based on these 
methods used to derive the poverty line converge on a significantly higher poverty line, 
  As a result, the question of whether the 
new international poverty line is properly derived is the key question to examine. 
Deaton (2010) already expressed a range of criticisms and suggested some ad hoc 
adjustments which we will discuss below.  We will take a different route here though.  
We will basically examine whether the newly derived international poverty line is 
properly specified when the most suitable econometric and statistical methods are 
applied to the issue.  As shown in the next section, this essentially boils down to the 
question how best to estimate a kinked regression line between (the log of) per capita 
consumption and the national poverty line (expressed in 2005PPP$), allowing for a flat 
relationship for a range of low-income economies and an ascending portion covering 
richer economies, giving it the shape of a piece-wise linear curve (see Figure 1a).  
                                                          
8 See http://go.worldbank.org/NT2A1XUWP0 accessed on March 23, 2011.  After completing work on 
this paper, we noted that Deaton performed a similar calculation with similar results.  See Deaton 
(2010b)  
9 This confirms the claim by Deaton (2010) who arrived at this conclusion using a different approach.  Of 
course, the changes in the ICP will have larger impacts on the regional distribution of poverty to the 
extent the changes in the PPP exchange rates differ between and within regions which they did to some 
extent.  See Deaton (2010).   
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ranging from $1.33 to $1.53.  We also find that there is a great deal of uncertainty 
surrounding these estimates, even larger than suggested by RCS (2009).  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses the way 
the international poverty line is derived, reviews Deaton’s (2010) critiques and 
presents the basic framework for the analysis.  The following section presents the 
methods used in the estimation, section 4.4 presents the results and section 4.5 
concludes. 
 
4.2 Deriving the International Poverty Line 
It is important to preface this section by emphasizing that we do not attempt to 
somehow generate some consistency between the old and the new poverty line.10
A consequence of accepting this line of argument is that the ‘revisions’ 
prepared by the World Bank in 2008 cannot be seen so much as ‘revisions’ and 
certainly cannot be considered an ‘update’, rather they are a completely new analysis 
starting essentially from scratch: a new poverty line is derived using a new sample of 
countries and new ICP data.  The only link to previous estimates is that they are 
  We 
thereby accept the (plausible) arguments advanced by Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 
(2009) that the data base used to generate the old international poverty line was 
dated, unrepresentative, too small, and with insufficient official status.  Indeed, they 
show that the older database included only 22 observations, largely from the 1980s, 
while the new data base includes 74 observations from 1988-2005; the latter also 
appears to originate from more official sources while quite a few of the older ones 
were based on academic studies where it was unclear to what extent these poverty 
lines were officially accepted.   
                                                          
10 For reasons explained, for example, in Reddy and Pogge (2008), it is not possible to generate inter-
temporally consistent PPP-adjusted estimates of incomes or poverty.  Each ICP produces PPP exchange 
rates valid for the benchmark year.  Linking them with previous years using old ICP rounds (as was done 
using the Penn World Tables) or national inflation rates (as done in the World Bank poverty work) has 
different conceptual advantages and disadvantages. We also do not want to contribute here to the 
debate on whether using the ICP rounds to derive an international poverty line and then calculate global 
absolute poverty numbers is conceptually a good idea.  See Klasen (2009) for a discussion of these issues 
and possible alternatives.   
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roughly based on the same empirical approach (see below); the second link is that 
once the international poverty line has been derived for the benchmark year (now 
2005, before 1993) and translated into local currency in that year, both approaches 
use national CPIs to inflate and deflate the poverty line backwards and forward in time 
and then use the household surveys of the respective years and the deflated poverty 
line to count the poor.  As a result, it is, of course, not surprising that the trends in 
poverty have not changed a great deal.  They have only changed to the extent that the 
location of the poverty line also affects the pace of poverty reduction.  Since the 
density of people around the poverty line will differ depending on the location of the 
poverty line, this will affect poverty reduction, but the effect is empirically not 
substantial.11
Once it is accepted that one is essentially redoing the entire analysis from 
scratch, trying to find consistency with the previous estimate is no longer the pertinent 
question.  The key question is whether the methods to do it now from scratch are the 
best available and the results robust to methodological choices.  This is what we focus 
on here. 
   
The empirical starting point for the analysis is Figure 1a which shows the log of 
per capita consumption from the national accounts and the national poverty lines, 
expressed in 2005PPP$.  These data are identical to the ones used by Ravallion, Chen, 
and Sangraula (2009).  As can be seen, there clearly appears to be a range of low levels 
of (log) per capita consumption where the relationship is flat, while the relationship 
turns clearly positive at higher levels of (log) per capita consumption.  Since the first 
derivation of the international poverty line, the essence of the international poverty 
line has been to take the average of the flat portion of the curve;12
                                                          
11 See Bourguignon, (2003) and Klasen and Misselhorn (2007) for a precise statement on this under the 
assumption of lognormal income distributions.  
 the central 
question is where the flat portion ends and the rising portion begins.  In other words, 
what is the relevant reference group over which to calculate the average?  Ravallion, 
12 In Chen and Ravallion (2001) using the old 1993ICP, the median of the countries along the flat portion 
was used.  In Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2009), the mean is used (although the median is also 
mentioned and does not differ much).  To keep with the more recent approach, we will stick to the 
mean.              
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Chen, and Sangraula (2009) end up with a reference group of the poorest 15 countries 
which then delivers a mean $1.25 (and a median $1.27) international poverty line.  
They use two approaches to get there.  The first is to estimate the following 
parametric regression equation:  
(4.1) 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑍∗𝐼𝑖 + 𝑓(𝐶𝑖)(1− 𝐼𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖                                                
where Z* is the mean poverty line of the reference group (countries with Ci ≤ C*), also 
known as the estimated international poverty line, and 𝐼𝑖 takes the value one if 𝑖 is a 
member of the reference group and zero otherwise. 
 
Figure 4.1 Estimated Threshold Models for Log of consumption (a)  
and Consumption (b) 
 
Note: Dashed vertical lines indicate the estimated thresholds.  
 
They then check whether the estimated curve is (roughly) continuous and 
whether the reference group is consistent so that the estimated per-capita 
consumption at the poverty line is below the maximum per capita consumption of the 
reference group countries and find this to be the case.  When estimating the above 
model, one only needs to check for one condition.  If one does not impose continuity 
on equation (4.1), consistency is assured as the OLS estimate of the flat portion of the 
curve is simply the mean of the reference group.  As that group was chosen ex ante, 
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consistency is assured and one just needs to check for continuity which RCS do by 
visual inspection and find it to be (roughly) so.  If one does impose continuity on (1) 
(see below), then one needs to check for consistency as we do below. They concede, 
however, that their approach of estimating (1) is statistically not valid as it treats “the 
regressor 𝐼 as data since 𝐼 is a function of C*, which depends on the parameters.” (RCS 
(2009): 175). To remedy this, they estimate a restricted piece-wise linear threshold 
model based on Hansen (2000) where they constrain the model to have a slope of 0 in 
the lower linear segment, Z* to be consistent and that there must not be any 
discontinuity at the kink.  Using this approach, the estimate for Z* is quite close ($1.23). 
In his critique of the new global poverty numbers, Deaton (2010) is largely 
concerned with trying to establish some consistency between the old and new 
numbers.  He carefully investigates to what extent the change could be due to changes 
in the ICP and estimates thus possibly boosting global poverty count by some 100 
million poor people. The rest is due to the re-estimation of the poverty line using the 
new sample.  Here Deaton criticizes that several populous fast-growing countries 
including China, India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh are no longer part of the new 
reference group.  As some of them, notably India and China, have rather low poverty 
lines, their removal from the reference groups contributed to increasing the global 
poverty line and, paradoxically, leading to higher measured poverty rates using this 
global line in India and China.  He then proposes that a better procedure would be to 
calculate the international poverty line using all 74 observations, but weighed by the 
number of poor people in each country.  This would, of course, mean that the 
international poverty line thus derived would be heavily driven by the poverty lines of 
the population giants India and China and many other data points would be largely 
irrelevant.  This would then generate a poverty line of $0.92 in 2005PPP$ and a global 
poverty count of 874 million, actually lower than the last count using the old $1.08 line 
of 931 million.   
As we are not treating RCS (2009) as an ‘update’ (as Deaton implicitly does), we 
are less concerned about the consistency between the estimates (although it is of 
course interesting to understand what drives the differences).  As to the weighting of 
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the poverty lines, while one may give higher weight to poverty numbers that have 
been derived with greater technical competence or have been based on a great deal of 
public discussion (as has been the case in India), it appears implausible to assume that 
the credibility or standard of the poverty line is proportional to the poor people in the 
country.  Also, this poverty line would then be influenced by countries in the ascending 
portion of the line which appears wrong since in these countries apparently absolute 
poverty considerations have given way to more relative views of poverty and it 
appears unclear why these countries should influence the global absolute poverty 
line.13 Thus, our approach is to more narrowly focus on whether the proposed two 
estimation methods discussed above are indeed the best ways to estimate the 
international poverty line. The first and rather important point of note is that both 
models actually estimated by RCS (2009) do not actually use the relationship in Figure 
4.1a where the national poverty lines are plotted against respective log of per capita 
consumption.  Instead, both regressions only use the per capita consumption (not the 
log thereof) as the regressor. They thus try to estimate the relationship in Figure 4.1b.  
But the piece-wise linear relationship that drives the whole motivation for the 
international poverty line is actually not there in Figure 1b.  This is already apparent 
from visual inspection. Also, using the Hansen model and assuming either 
homoscedasticity or heteroscedasticity, the p-value for the null hypothesis of no 
threshold (i.e. no kink) is 0.15 and 0.73, respectively.  In both cases, one cannot reject 
the claim of a simply linear relationship between per capita consumption and the 
poverty line.  In contrast, the respective p-values for the log-linear relationship in 
Figure 1a are 0.0002 and 0.005, respectively, clearly rejecting the no threshold 
hypothesis and confirming that estimating a linear threshold model is clearly favoured 
over a simple linear model.  Thus, in the following, we base our considerations on the 
model of Figure 4.1a with ln𝐶 as the regressor assuming that the log-transformation is 
justified (and thus the motivation of the derivation of the poverty line) and investigate 
whether the poverty line of 1.25$ still results.14
                                                          
13 On a closely related issue, see Ravallion and Chen (2010).  
 
14 However, note that the log transformation is an assumption and its theoretical justification is unclear 
in this context. In principle, any other nonlinear monotone transformation could also be plausible and 
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4.3 Identifying the Most Appropriate Reference Group 
We now present several approaches to estimate the international poverty line based 
on different approaches used to generate a reference group.  In principle, we will 
follow two approaches.  The first is to simply determine at which point the flat portion 
of the curve in Figure 1a experiences a slope that is significantly different from 0.  We 
will investigate this question using parametric and non-parametric approaches.   As 
soon as the curve has a significant positive slope, we can be sure that the optimal size 
of the reference group has been exceeded, i.e. there must be a country (or countries) 
included where the poverty line depends on (log) per capita mean income and no 
longer seems to be appropriate for inclusion for an absolute poverty line.  That is, the 
reference group should include all countries where the relationship between the log of 
per capita consumption and national poverty lines did not exhibit a positive 
relationship.  
In the simplest form, we simply run a sequence of linear parametric regressions 
in “windows” of different sizes sliding along the x-axis. That is, we order the data by 
ln𝐶 and compute a linear model based on observations 𝑖, … , 𝑖 + ℎ with 𝑖 an integer 
increasing from 1 and ℎ the window width (number of countries included)15. Thereby, 
we obtain the reference group by determining where the slope begins to turn positive 
with p-value for the slope smaller than 0.05 (0.10) as stopping-rule16
                                                                                                                                                                          
lead to different results. Thus, the question of whether the logarithmic transformation is sensible is a 
crucial issue to discuss. On the other hand, not taking the logarithm puts the motivation of the poverty 
line into question as it is one transformation where we clearly see the distinction between the flat and 
ascending portion of the line.  Also, as we are following RCS (2009) here and their motivation for the 
international poverty line (which, in their figures, always uses Figure 1a as motivation), we think it is 
appropriate to continue with this assumption.   
, i.e. countries 1 to 
15 Note that this strategy is similar to the method of moving averages with “moving slopes” instead, and 
to local polynomials of degree one with bandwidth depending on the number of countries within the 
window and uniform kernel. However, we do not intend to estimate a regression curve but interpret the 
coefficients as slopes (actually at country i+h), thus in a way interpreting them as the first derivative of 
the regression curve at a given point. 
16 Note that we refrain from calling this a significance level since we are confronted here with a classical 
example of the problem of multiple testing: The type-1-error rate increases with the number of 
comparisons made and thus the significance level would have to be adjusted for this (e.g. by Bonferroni 
correction). Also, with the small number of observations considered, the normality assumption is 
questionable. However, still the p-value can serve as an order statistic and the stopping rule is as 
arbitrary as any significance level. Further, we will handle this issue in our nonparametric approach. 
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𝑖 + ℎ − 1 are considered the reference group with the minimal 𝑖 where the slope at 
countries 𝑖 to 𝑖 + ℎ has a smaller p-value than a certain level. 
A valid concern, of course, is that using this method, the reference group might 
depend on the number of countries in the window (ℎ) and on the stopping-rule. The 
simplest way to address this robustness issue is to try different values of ℎ (we tried ℎ 
=10, 15, 20) and levels of 0.05 and 0.10 which we also implement below and show that 
changing the window width does not affect the results. A more elegant way is to use a 
nonparametric approach to estimate the point where the slope turns significantly 
positive. More precisely we now consider the model:  
(4.2) 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑠(ln𝐶𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖  
where 𝑠(∙) is a smooth function of unknown functional form. We use penalized splines 
to estimate this function (see Ruppert et al., 2003). Thereby, the curve of interest is 
approximated by some spline basis based on a generous number of knots and 
overfitting is avoided by penalization with an integrated squared derivative of the 
spline function. We used cubic B-splines with penalty on the integrated squared 
second derivative of the spline function in order to get a twice differentiable curve. To 
obtain the estimated curve, we employ the mixed models representation of penalized 
splines due to the following advantages. First, this allows us to automatically estimate 
the smoothing parameter controlling the “wiggliness” of the curve (which corresponds 
in some sense to estimating the window width in our parametric approach from the 
data) from the corresponding restricted likelihood simultaneously with the remaining 
parameters. Secondly, heteroscedastic data can be easily handled within this 
framework. Finally, this allows us to use a recent approach to construct simultaneous 
confidence bands which were shown to perform well even under such small sample 
sizes (see Krivobokova et al., 2010, and Wiesenfarth et al., 2010)17
                                                          
17 Due to lack of easily available simultaneous confidence bands, usually pointwise confidence intervals 
are given. However, these bands correspond to the curve estimates at specific values of a covariate and 
do not assess the whole function. In particular, pointwise confidence intervals - in contrast to 
simultaneous confidence bands - do not allow statements about the statistical significance of certain 
features in a regression curve as we do here. More precisely, the usually used pointwise intervals only 




In order to identify the point where the slope of the curve turns statistically 
significant, we estimate the first derivative 𝑠′(∙) of the curve. Then, the slope is 
significant when the simultaneous confidence band around the first derivative does 
not enclose the zero line. This nonparametric estimation is more appropriate as it can 
identify much more clearly where the shape of the curve changes, irrespective of the 
previous length of the flat portion. At the same time, it may still be the case that the 
identification of a significant positive slope will depend on the number of 
observations:18 More observations lead to a more precise estimate and therefore 
might lead to an earlier finding of a positive slope (and thus a smaller reference group 
implying a possibly different international poverty line).19
The crucial advantage of the nonparametric strategy is that no prior 
assumption on the functional form of the regression line can influence the estimation 
of the poverty line (particularly in the ascending part of the line in Figure 1a where no 
foundation for linearity seems to be given by the theory and where the linearity 
assumption is questionable as seen from Figure 4.2a). Further, the possible presence 
of outliers can barely have an effect.  Note that we have to assume that vthe 
regression curve is twice-differentiable (smooth) in order to obtain a once 
differentiable first derivative which is in contradiction to the motivational assumption 
of a broken regression line with a kink at lnC* (and which we did not have to assume 
for the parametric approach). However, this might be interpreted as a “smooth 
transition” from the constant to the ascending part and thus as a range of countries 
  Still, in any case this 
approach as well as the parametric approach from before serve to identify the upper 
bound for the number of countries in the reference group: We obtain the maximal 
number of countries where the regression line can be flat. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
where 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) and in the extreme case a specific point of the curve could be never covered. In 
contrast, simultaneous confidence bands cover the entire true curve with some pre-specified probability 
such that the significance level holds for every point of the curve. Moreover, simultaneous confidence 
bands treat the problem of multiple testing in footnote 15. Thus, simultaneous confidence bands are 
generally wider than the pointwise ones. 
18 More precisely, the p-value is a function of the sample size and a large p-value (insignificance) cannot 
be interpreted as evidence for constancy (no positive slope) of the regression curve. 
19 A smaller reference group does not necessarily generate a lower average poverty line; it depends on 
whether the marginal observation is above or below the average.  
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where we are indifferent as to whether they already belong to the linearly ascending 
part or still to the constant part of the regression curve.  
Nevertheless, in order to stick to the motivation of the broken regression line 
with two linear parts and as our second approach to determining the reference group 
size, we estimate a piecewise-linear threshold model to estimate the full relationship 
presented in Figure 1a.  There is a simple approach chosen also by RCS (2009) which is 
to estimate equation 1 above.  We will do that as well, except that we, as discussed 
above, will estimate the model with log-transformed consumption as regressor.  We 
will also consider the continuity and consistency issues that they considered as 
discussed above.  
But since this approach treats the reference group as data rather than as a 
function of C* which itself is a parameter, we will also estimate, as did RCS(2009), the 
piecewise linear threshold model using the procedure of Hansen (2000).  The 
difference is that we will, following our threshold tests reported on above, again 
estimate the model with ln𝐶as regressor, which was the only one where a threshold 
was identified in the data. More precisely, we will estimate the model: 
(4.3)  𝑍𝑖 = 𝑍∗𝐼𝑖 + 𝑓(ln 𝐶𝑖)(1− 𝐼𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖  
where 𝑓(∙) is assumed to be linear as in equation (3.1). What has become known as 
Hansen's method is plain least squares estimation for threshold regression models. In 
our case, this amounts to finding the threshold C* as the argument minimizing the sum 
of squared errors:  




where C* enters through 𝐼𝑖 ,  Z* and f. We minimize this function over all linear f 
restricted to meet the consistency and continuity conditions imposed; the parameters 
specifying f are concentrated out beforehand.20
                                                          
20 Note that in contrast to our nonparametric approach this approach depends on the assumption of a 
linear functional relationship for the ascending part in Figure 1a. Thus, if linearity is actually not given 
(but for example a quadratic relationship warranted), the estimated threshold may be affected. This 




4.4 Empirical Result 
Table 4.1 shows the results of the first linear estimation approach. It turns out that, 
depending on the stopping rule and window width chosen, a reference group of 29 or 
30 countries would be appropriate in the sense that the p-value for the slope would be 
clearly larger than the levels of 0.10 and 0.05. This would lead to an international 
poverty line significantly above the $1.25 a day.  If the mean of the reference group is 
chosen the poverty line ranges from $1.31 (G29) to $1.33 (G30).   
 
Table 4.1 Estimating the Relationship using lnC based on Fixed Windows of Countries 
(h=10, 15, 20)   
h=10 h=15 h=20 
Obs. lnC t-stat Obs. lnC t-stat Obs. lnC t-stat 
8-17 12.389 0.47 8-22 10.219 0.51 8-27 8.417 0.560 
9-18 -1.149 -0.04 9-23 19.783 0.86 9-28 10.079 0.710 
10-19 -3.629 -0.13 10-24 13.613 0.55 10-29 22.206 1.490 
11-20 14.169 0.36 11-25 12.386 0.51 11-30 21.507 1.590 
12-21 23.645 0.77 12-26 24.249 1.32 12-31 46.440*** 3.290 
13-22 25.163 0.82 13-27 15.067 0.71 13-32 56.581*** 3.970 
14-23 43.227 0.94 14-28 14.051 0.67 14-33 60.329*** 4.030 
15-24 -8.087 -0.15 15-29 24.352 1.01 15-34 53.051*** 3.070 
16-25 50.067 1.07 16-30 45.631*** 3.42    
17-26 46.378 1.08 17-31 75.446*** 3.33    
18-27 9.183 0.17 18-32 86.974*** 3.93    
19-28 16.681 0.37 19-33 86.832*** 3.57    
20-29 37.229 0.74 20-34 68.873** 2.34    
21-30 68.715** 2.4       
22-31 94.303* 2.22       
23-32 109.406** 2.53       
24-33 135.316*** 3.97       
Note: t-statistics are based on robust standard errors and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, one-tailed 
test. Columns “Obs.” give the range of countries included ordered by lnC. 
 
In Table 4.2 additionally estimates for parametric models based on reference 
groups of different sizes are given. Here, also p-values for the regression coefficient lnC 
are smaller than 0.05 and 0.10 for group sizes of 30 and 31 countries, respectively. 
Thus, these groups (according to the stopping rule) already include observations of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          




ascending part of the kinked regression line. Thus, this again leads us to the conclusion 
that 29 or 30 are the maximal numbers of countries that should be included in the 
reference group. 
 
Table 4.2 Estimated Linear Regressions using lnC based on Reference Groups of 
Different Sizes 
Indep. Variables 
Dep. Variable = Z 
G15 G29 G30 G31 G32 
lnC 3.763 9.359 11.947* 19.321** 23.471*** 
 
(0.19) (1.19) (1.70) (2.17) (2.77) 
_cons              23.927 2.151 -7.826 -36.288 -52.321 
 
(0.32) (0.07) (-0.28) (-1.04) (-1.57) 
N                      15 29 30 31 32 
F-statistics                   0.035 1.405 2.879 4.725 7.683 
R-squared                   0.003 0.048 0.083 0.166 0.228 










Median of Z 38.510 38.510 39.100 39.690 40.365 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses based on robust standard errors and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, 
one-tailed test. 
 
The nonparametric estimation results using simultaneous confidence bands are 
shown in Figure 4.2.  As heteroscedasticity clearly is an issue here (see panel b), the 
simultaneous confidence bands need to be adjusted to account for this.  The first 
derivative of the nonparametrically estimated curve suggests that the slope turns 
significantly positive (on a 10% level) around a log of per capita expenditure of 4.43 (or 
$83.93). This would generate a reference group of the 27 poorest countries and deliver 
a mean poverty line of about $1.26 (95% confidence interval [$1.09; $1.43])21
                                                          
21 On a 5% significance level the slope turns significantly positive around a log of per capita expenditure 
of 4.48 generating a reference group of the 27 or 28 poorest countries (where lnC is below 4.43 and 
4.59, respectively) and delivers a mean poverty line of about $1.26 or $1.27. 
. It is 
surprising that the line is very close to the $1.25 found by RCS. This clearly suggests 
that the reference group of just the 15 poorest countries excludes a considerable flat 
portion of the curve in Figure 1a.  In order to appreciate the great uncertainty inherent 
in these estimates, one can examine the predicted poverty line at the cut-off point of 
per capita expenditures of $83.01, which would be an upper bound of the 
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international poverty line as it is based on the point estimate where the slope has just 
turned significantly positive (instead of using the average of the flat portion). The point 
estimate is $1.53 with confidence interval (as given by the simultaneous confidence 
band around the nonparametric fit) ranging from $1.04 to $2.03. So the nonparametric 
approach to identifying the flat portion of the curve suggests an international poverty 
line of $1.26 or $1.53 (depending on assumptions made), but with substantial 
uncertainty associated with these estimates. 
 
Figure 4.2 Nonparametric estimation of Z regressed on lnC 
 
Notes: Panel (a) shows the curve with 90% and 95% pointwise (shaded areas) and simultaneous 
confidence bands (areas between dashed and dotted lines), panel (b) the standard deviation of residuals 
(suggesting heteroscedasticity) and panel (c) the first derivative of the curve in panel (a). 
 
The piece-wise linear estimation (equation 4.1) using lnC as regressor without 
assuming continuity of the two pieces is shown in Table 4.3. Consistency is still assured 
for all the estimations for the reasons discussed above. The results are shown for the 
reference groups of 15 (as used by RCS), 29 and 30 countries. The regressions with 29 
and 30 countries yield the same higher poverty lines as shown in Table 4.1 (as the OLS 
estimates provide nothing else than the mean of the flat portion); the fit is marginally 
higher for those estimates than when using the 15 country reference group.  But note 
that the confidence intervals suggest substantial uncertainty of these point estimates. 
Much more important is, however, that the estimation that uses the 15 country 
reference group is highly discontinuous at the kink which is shown in Figure 4.3. This 
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upward portion of the line which have poverty lines lower than the flat portion.  On 
the other hand, there are no such problems when using the reference group of 30 (or 
29) countries.   This provides further confirmation that a reference group of about 30 
countries would be more appropriate.  
 
Table 4.3 Estimated International Poverty Lines (IPL) of Various Reference Groups 
Indep. Variables 
Dep. Variable = Z 
G15 G29 G30 
I 37.983*** 39.791*** 40.492*** 
 
(12.55) (14.64) (14.89) 
1-I -288.914*** -380.743*** -389.714*** 
 
(-8.28) (-6.41) (-6.22) 
lnC(1-I) 73.792*** 89.613*** 91.311*** 
 
(10.24) (8.14) (7.92) 
N 74 74 74 
F-statistics 158.988 167.992 169.549 
R-squared 0.878 0.884 0.884 
Estimated IPL  (Z*) in $ a day 1.25 1.31 1.33 
95% confidence interval [1.05, 1.44] [1.13, 1.48] [1.15, 1.51] 
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In Table 4.4, we now constrain equation (4.1) to be continuous. The results are 
interesting. For the 15 country reference group, a poverty line of $0.81 is now 
generated, which is, of course, due to the very small reference group.  Enforcing 
continuity drags down the poverty line substantially. For the 29 or 30 country 
reference groups, this is not a problem.  The poverty lines are now 1.27 and 1.32, again 
with rather wide confidence intervals, and it can be shown that they are also 
consistent in the sense that no country in the reference group has a higher lnC than 
the estimated lnC at the kink. 
 
Table 4.4 Estimating Equation (4.1) Assuming Continuity 
   
Indep. Variables 
Dep. Variable = Z 
G15 G29 G30 
I 24.676*** 38.731*** 40.161*** 
 
(3.397) (6.453) (6.785) 
1-I -242.954*** -367.722*** -385.401*** 
 
(-8.249) (-9.798) (-9.900) 
lnC(1-I) 65.738*** 87.404*** 90.402*** 
 
(11.391) (12.238) (12.250) 
N 74 74 74 
F-statistics 129.761 149.775 150.060 
R-squared 0.643 0.675 0.676 
estimated IPL  (Z*) in $ a day  0.81  1.27  1.32 
95% confidence interval [0.38,1.24] [0.90,1.65] [0.94,1.71] 
 
Lastly, we consider the constrained threshold model following procedures by 
Hansen (2000), arguably the econometrically best way to approach the issue when the 
motivational assumption of two continuously connected linear lines is correct.22
                                                          
22 Continuity and consistency problems cannot arise here as they are parts of the constraints for the 
estimation.   
  The 
results are shown in Table 4.5. The endogenously determined threshold is found to be 
at a level of lnC of 4.96, or a monthly per capita expenditure of $142.6.  Left of the 
threshold there are 39 observations (now including also India and China), and the 
estimated international poverty line stands at $1.45. Asymptotic confidence intervals 
for the threshold translate into a global poverty line between $1.06 and $1.75 a day at 
117 
 
95% confidence level. 23  Thus the possibly best approach to generating an 
international poverty line generates the largest reference group of 39 countries and a 
line that is substantially above the one found by Ravallion, Chen, and Sagraula 
(2010).24
 
   
Table 4.5 Estimation of Threshold Model using Hansen (2000) Method 
 
Indep. Variables 
Dep. Variable = Z 
complete observations without outliers 
I 44.353*** 44.353*** 
 
(15.247) (15.247) 
1-I -497.883*** -559.469*** 
 
(5.165) (6.722) 
lnC(1-I) 109.384*** 118.733*** 
 
(16.209) (17.982) 
N 74 72 
F-statistics 262.743 323.364 
R-squared 0.783 0.820 
estimated IPL  (Z*) in $ a day  1.45  1.45 
95% confidence interval [1.06,1.75] [1.23,1.91] 
 
4.5 Some Robustness Checks 
Our results so far indicate that all methods we proposed using to estimate the 
relationship between log per capita expenditures and the national poverty lines 
(expressed in 2005PPP$) generate a higher poverty line.  Arguably the best approach 
generates a poverty line of $1.45. We now do a range of robustness checks to assess 
the sensitivity of our findings.   
                                                          
23 These confidence intervals have to be treated with upmost caution. Following RCS we base our strategy on 
Hansen (2000). However, the theory developed in Hansen (2000) is based on assumptions which do not hold 
for the constrained threshold model which we estimate here. Clearly, with respect to one of his assumptions, 
he notes that while it "might appear innocuous, it excludes the interesting special case of a continuous 
threshold model"; namely, it excludes our model. While this does not have consequences for estimation, our 
confidence intervals (computed as outlined in section 4.1 of Hansen, 2000, using kernel regression to 
estimate𝜂2 for the heteroscedasticity adjustment; and augmented to account for the variability of the 
poverty line implied) are based on an inappropriate asymptotic distribution. Furthermore, the value of 
asymptotic confidence intervals based on just 74 observations is questionable.  
24 One should note again that the threshold model estimation is sensitive to the functional form assumption 
on the right of the threshold.  Choosing, for example, a quadratic function to the right of the threshold would 
deliver a somewhat lower poverty line.  We follow RCS (2009) here as they assumed a linear function.   
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When estimating the entire relationship directly (model 3), two issues might 
arise in a robustness check.  The first is the sensitivity to outliers.  As can be seen in 
figures 1 and 2, Mauritius and Paraguay are outliers in the sense that they have 
unusually high poverty lines, given their per capita expenditure levels.  We therefore 
exclude these two countries in the constrained threshold model estimation.  As shown 
in Table 5, the results do not greatly change.  A second issue that might arise is that 
the fit of the entire curve as well as the identification of the threshold might be driven 
by observations that should arguably not drive the results.  In particular, one might 
worry that the threshold and the associated international poverty line is heavily driven 
by country observations with high levels of per capita consumption and high poverty 
lines; those countries should arguably not have a large influence on the results.  In a 
further robustness check, we progressively remove the observations with the highest 
levels of per capita expenditures. As shown in Figure 5, removing up to 15 observations 
does not generally change the identified threshold by much, in most cases is stays very 
close to $1.45 a day.25
 
 This check to some extent also serves to investigate the 
robustness of the threshold parameter with respect to the linearity assumption on the 
regression line on the right hand side of the threshold. 
Figure 4.4 Estimates for Reduced Sets of Observations 
 
                                                          
25 We explain the large effect of excluding 5,8, or 9 observations with the fact that the threshold least 
squares estimator does not produce reliable results in certain settings, particularly in small samples. This 
view is encouraged when comparing least squares estimates with those obtained using a modified 
threshold estimator, which has proven to possess superior properties. The latter turn out to be more 




In this paper we revisit the derivation of the new international poverty line proposed 
by Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2009). First, we emphasize that it is critical to 
estimate the relationship with respect to the log of per capita consumption as only 
that relationship actually shows a structural break which is at the heart of the issue of 
an absolute international poverty line.  When doing so, all our estimates generate a 
significantly larger reference group for the estimation of the international poverty line.  
Our best estimate for the threshold model stands at $1.45 per day.  Of course, this 
would lead to a higher global poverty count that the new $1.25 poverty line already 
generated.  In fact, in 2005, we would now be looking at 1.74 billion absolutely poor in 
the world if we adopted that procedure for finding the new international poverty line.  
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